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Abstract. 
Abstract. 
This thesis addresses the development of a methodology to determine primary safety 
strategy with respect to the choice of appropriate technological solutions to the 
problem of accidents in cars. 
In motorised societies in the 1990s, road accidents are a major cause of loss of life, 
injury and property damage. Motor manufacturers have increasingly been concerned 
with reducing the effects of accidents and have recently been developing 
technologies to attempt to reduce the number of accidents on the roads. 
Traditionally, these technologies have been transferred from other domains into 
vehicles, (principally from aerospace). Two problems however exist with this 
approach. 
Firstly, developing solutions on the basis of what is technologically feasible may 
ignore the requirements of the drivers in terms of systems that would actually be of 
benefit whilst driving. In part, this is due to an incomplete understanding of the 
reasons why drivers have accidents in cars. 
Secondly, motor manufacturers are faced with an ever increasing number of 
potential systems that they may develop and eventually implement in cars. 
Currently, they have no methodology to determine which of these systems, if any, 
should be researched or developed further. 
This thesis addresses both of these issues. Firstly, a large scale questionnaire survey 
was conducted using a population of recently accident involved drivers drawn from 
the insurance group of a major motor manufacturer. The survey was designed to 
obtain information from drivers pertaining to the reasons for the occurrence of their 
accident. This information was more detailed than had previously been gained from 
drivers after they have been involved in accidents in cars. 
This data was built upon in the second study of the thesis, which used real life 
accident data to develop a methodology to determine safety strategy for a motor 
manufacturer. Focus groups using a variety of employees of the motor manufacturer 
were employed to correlate accident scenarios with a series of functionally defined 
accident countermeasures. When combined with quantitative data from the 
questionnaire survey, assessments of the overall efficacy of the countermeasures 
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could be deduced. From this, an outline strategy for primary safety system 
development was deduced. 
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Definitions. 
Definitions. 
Throughout the course of this thesis, a number of closely related terms will be used 
and are explicitly defined below. 
Accident: An accident is an unexpected and unintentional series of events, that 
occurs through a combination of contributory and causal factors. It may result in one 
or more of a number of possible outcomes, including physical harm to an individual, 
damage to property, or merely a significant deviation from safe system operation, 
(adapted from Bentley 1998). 
Road Traffic Accident, (RTA): RTAs are a subset of accidents that occur in the 
road traffic environment and are concerned with failures in the safe operation of 
motorised transportation. These failures may result in physical harm to either the 
operator of the transportation system, (the driver), harm to other road users, or may 
result in damage to either the vehicles concerned or to other property. In addition, 
RTAs may result in neither harm to individuals or property, but may result only in 
significant departures from safe system use, (for example in the case of a vehicle 
running off the roadway but not colliding with any roadway or roadside objects). 
The focus of this thesis is on RTAs involving cars, and as such this term will only be 
used when at least one of the vehicles involved is a car. 
Causal Factor: Any identified factor which directly causes an accident and without 
which the accident would not have occurred. Examples of such factors would be a 
sudden and catastrophic mechanical failure whilst driving at speed, such as a tyre 
blowout on a motorway. It is highly likely that given this factor, an accident will 
occur, (from Broughton and Markey t996). 
Contributory Factor: Any identified factor that contributes to an accident, but does 
not in isolation cause it. An example of this would be a driver who is in excess of 
the legal limit of blood alcohol concentration. Whilst this driver is more likely to be 
involved in an accident, drivers may frequently drive with excess alcohol in their 
blood and not have an accident and thus this factor cannot be described as causal, 
(from Broughton and Markey 1996). 
Accident Prevention Measu res/Acci dent Countermeasures: Any intervention that 
may serve to reduce the likelihood of an accident occurring. It is implicit in this 
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definition that these interventions will only have potential to prevent some forms of 
accidents and that these interventions may be based on the driver, the vehicle, or the 
environment through which driving occurs. 
DRIVE, (Dedicated Road Infrastructure for Vehicle safety in Europe): European 
based research programme in transport Telematics and intelligent transport systems. 
Two such programmes have been undertaken, DRIVE I (running from 1989-1991) 
and DRIVE 11, (1992-1995), both funded by DG XIII of the European Commission. 
Unless specifically required, both research programmes will be referred to in this 
thesis as DRIVE. 
PROMETHEUS, (PROgraMme for European Traffic with Highest Efficiency and 
Unprecedented Safety): A research programme carried out in parallel to the DRIVE 
programme, (1986 to 1994), funded by Eureka. In contrast to DRIVE, the 
PROMETHEUS programme was funded primarily by industry and was headed by 
European based motor manufacturers. 
ATT/IVHS: ATT, (Advanced road Transport Telematics) and IVHS (In-Vehicle 
Highway Systems), are sub-classes of accident prevention measures that are focused 
primarily at the vehicles concerned. They may be systems based exclusively in the 
vehicles themselves, (such as Anti-lock Braking Systems), or may be systems that 
interact with the vehicle and environment, or other vehicles within the environment, 
(such as Variable Message Signs on motorways). These are systems that are either 
currently in production in vehicles, or are in prototype or simulation form. 
Technologies described in the academic literature, (for example in literature 
undertaken throughout the DRIVE or PROMNETHEUS programmes) will be 
described as either ATT or IVHS. 
Potential Technological Solutions: These are a subset of Accident Prevention 
Measures or Accident Countermeasures that are focused exclusively on 
technological systems that a motor manufacturer would have direct input in 
designing or implementing in their vehicles. Two distinctions are drawn between 
these systems and those described in the DRIVE or PROMETHEUS work. Firstly, 
these systems are not yet in production or prototype form, but are suggested as a 
result of the implications of the methodologies developed in this thesis and the 
strategy for primary safety system development. Secondly, these systems will be 
functionally described; in relation to the actions these systems will carry out they 
will be described in terms of the function that the system performs for the driver 
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rather than the technological action per se. For example, antilock braking systems, 
(ABS) would be described as either a system that allows constant efficient braking 
under poor road conditions, or one that allows a driver to steer and brake effectively, 
rather than one that maintains optimum traction for braking through rapidly applying 
and releasing the brakes so as to prevent skidding. 
These systems although having significant components based in vehicles are not 
exclusively based on in vehicle systems. They may for example rely on information 
transmitted to the vehicle and presented to the driver by an on-board system, for 
example information from road side beacons relating to hazardous roadway 
situations ahead. Systems with no vehicular component, for example Variable 
Message Signs, (VMS), currently seen along some stretches of motorway in the 
United Kingdom are excluded from this category. 
Our Driver: In the context of the current work, 'our driver' will refer to the driver 
completing the RTA causation questionnaire. 
Other Driver: In the case of an RTA involving more than one vehicles, 'other 
driver' will refer to the driver of the vehicle most proximal to that of our driver. 
Discussion of an additional driver will not be undertaken except where pertinent. 
Functionality Matrix: A functionality matrix is a method described within the 
HUFIT toolset that allows large amounts of information relating to user 
requirements and system functionalities to be cross referenced. The matrices are 
completed by groups, using a non numerical coding scheme indicating the required 
system functionalities for each system. 
Solutions Matrices: A Solutions Matrix is modification of the Functionality Matrix 
concept in which RTA scenarios are cross referenced with Potential Accident 
Countermeasures. In addition, information relating to the development efforts 
required are contained within the Solutions Matrix which is used to determine the 
relative efficacy of a number of Potential Accident Countermeasures for the 
purposes of defining safety strategy. 
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Introduction. 
1.0 Introduction. 
1.1 Chapter summary. 
This chapter introduces the thesis as a whole and the area of research in which these 
studies were conducted. Specifically, this chapter outlines the requirements for this 
work and describes some of the issues allied with work in this area. Finally, the 
chapter then describes the structure of the thesis and the studies described herein. 
1.2 General introduction to the thesis. 
In motorised societies in the 1990s, road accidents are a major cause of loss of life, 
injury and property damage. The motor industry as a whole has increasingly been 
concerned with reducing the effects of accidents and has accordingly been 
introducing technologies aimed primarily at reducing the injuries sustained by those 
involved. Efforts have also been directed towards transferring technology from other 
domains into vehicles, (principally from aerospace), as well as at developing novel 
technologies to aid and assist drivers. Traditionally, these technologies have been 
directed simultaneously at many aspects of improving driving (for example 
efficiency or comfort). Only one of these aims is the safety of those travelling. 
However, it can be seen that two problems exist with respect to the introduction of 
new driver information and support technologies into vehicles in this manner. 
Firstly, the emphasis of much of the research and development has been from a 
technological perspective. In essence, much of the efforts have been directed 
towards developing and implementing systems that are technologically feasible 
rather than systems that are actually required by the drivers to assist their driving. 
Some of these systems may effect a reduction in the number of accidents occurring 
on roadways by directly improving the safety of those travelling on the roads, (for 
1 
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example traction control or anti-lock braking systems). However, the new 
technologies are for the most part not specifically designed for this purpose and 
consequently technologies aimed primarily at reducing the likelihood of accidents 
occurring are rare. 
Secondly, given the number of technological products that are being developed and 
tested, motor manufacturers are faced with the decision of which if any of these 
potential accident countermeasures should be further researched or implemented into 
their production vehicles. With respect to accident prevention, currently no 
methodology exists to allow a motor manufacturer to decide upon which 
technologies should be further researched or manufactured to effect a reduction in 
the number of accidents. The development of a methodology to allow a motor 
manufacturer to make strategic decisions regarding potential technological solutions 
for accident prevention is the primary aim of this thesis. Since this research is aimed 
at the development of a methodology from which to produce a strategic plan, it was 
not expected to result in precisely quantifiable results. It is a means to an end. 
1.3 Background to the research. 
Despite recent efforts directed towards increasing the safety of those travelling on 
the roads, in motorised societies, the number one public health problem in the 1990s 
has been argued to be due to road traffic accidents, (Deering and Viano 1994). In the 
West, more pre-retirement deaths are due to traffic crashes than to the combined 
effects of the two leading diseases, cancer and coronary heart disease, (Evans 1991). 
Road deaths are not just of consequence to the middle aged however. In the US 
alone, almost half of the 19 year olds dying annually do so due to traffic accidents. 
The ever increasing reliance on the road as a means of transportation will continue 
to place increasing demands on roads, vehicles and the drivers utilising them. With 
the numbers of motor vehicles constantly increasing, the issue of the safety of those 
on the roads has become of more importance in the past 10 years. 
2 
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Currently, although the number of licensed drivers in the UK has risen by a little 
over a third in the last 15 years, the numbers dying on the roads annually are 
actually falling slightly, (DoETR 1997). This is due to a number of factors, not least 
of which is the increasing number and efficiency of occupant protection 
technologies that have been developed and are currently in vehicles. The efficacy of 
measures such as equipping the vehicle with seat belts has become greatly enhanced 
by recent advances in electronics, sensor technology and computing, in addition to 
vehicle design as a whole. Vehicles are now commonly equipped with seat belt 
pretensioners and air bags, and may soon be equipped with more advanced occupant 
protection devices such as smart air bags that are timed to activate according to the 
size and weight of the occupants so as to maximally enhance the survivability of an 
accident, (Grafton, Galer Flyte, King, & Jackson 1995; King, Jackson, Galer Flyte, 
& Grafton 1995). 
These advances in technology have also facilitated the research and development of 
novel high technology systems such as collision warning systems and intelligent 
cruise control into vehicles, (see Figure 1.1). As can be seen however, in addition to 
modifying vehicles, changes in the nature of driving may be effected by introducing 
modifications to the environment, (for example with roadway layout modifications), 
or changing the way the driver behaves, (for example by changing the nature of the 
training a driver undertakes before being licensed). Not all of the changes in driving 
that may be produced by modifying elements in the driver - vehicle - environment 
systems are therefore technological in nature. The changes that a motor 
manufacturer would have most influence on however are mostly those concerning 
the vehicles themselves. In general, any changes in driving brought about by the 
influence of a motor manufacturer's direct input will by necessity be due to the 
implementation of technology in some form. 
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IVHS). 
Driver Solutions Speed limiting measures, 
Education/training, Licensing. Traffic management systems 
VMS, Improved crash barriers. 
Vehicle Solutions (May include IVHS and ATT) 
Improved performance, and reliability, 
Intelligent vehicle solutions, (e. g. Collision 
avoidance systems, Intelligent cruise control), 
Enhanced occupant protection, (e. g. Air bags, Seat 
Figure 1.1 A schematic outline of the subsystems involved in driving illustrating 
potential solutions to the problem of vehicle accidents, (adapted from Zimmer 
1990). 
This thesis is concerned with changes in the nature of driving that a motor 
manufacturer may have an active role in effecting. The emphasis is therefore 
primarily concerned with the nature of the process through which a motor 
manufacturer develops and implements technologies into vehicles. Specifically, this 
thesis will address systems that are characterised by being technologically advanced, 
and may be introduced into vehicles in the near future. The focus of this thesis is 
those systems that are designed to effect a reduction in the number of accidents 
currently occurring on the roads and such systems will be described as potential 
technological solutions. (Accident prevention measures out of the direct influence of 
a motor manufacturer will be discussed where pertinent however). 
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1.4 The development of advanced technologies in 
vehicles. 
Some potential advanced technologies solutions have progressed sufficiently in their 
development and are now in production in vehicles, an example being route 
guidance systems that allow the driver to select and be directed to a destination. 
More advanced route guidance systems that actively take into account the current 
traffic environment, (for example circumventing sections of the route that a given 
driver may wish to avoid or directing the driver around an unexpected hold-up in the 
intended route), are being developed and are expected in the marketplace in the near 
future. Other technologies which may have a more obvious primary safety 
application, for example collision avoidance systems or intelligent cruise control, are 
currently being developed and are expected to enter the marketplace within the next 
5 years. 
Whilst efforts are being made to ensure that such technologies conform to basic 
ergonomic criteria, in that for example they are not distracting, and do not put 
unnecessary cognitive burdens on the driver, (for example Galer and Simmonds, 
1984, Galer 1985, Robertson and Southall 1992), the majority of development 
efforts have been directed at perfecting the technological aspects of the systems. 
Little concern has been directed to the potential for such systems to perform what 
must be a basic system action, that of effecting some reduction in the number of 
road accidents, and by implication the number of casualties currently experienced. 
Largely this is due to the development history of such technologies as they have for 
the most part been technologies transferred from other domains, (notably aviation 
and military applications), and subsequently applied to the driving scenario. 
It can be seen therefore that whilst the systems currently under development, (and to 
some extent those in production now), technologically function well, and are for the 
most part ergonomically appropriate, (or are under development to improve their 
usability), little attention has been given towards effecting a reduction in the number 
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of accidents currently experienced on the roads that appropriate implementation may 
produce. In effect, many systems have been designed on the basis of what is 
technologically feasible and implemented with the hope that a reduction in accident 
numbers will result. 
Two problems therefore exist for motor manufacturers with respect to the choice of 
such technologies for implementation. Firstly, the current technologies do not 
specifically address the problem of accidents in cars. Secondly, motor manufacturers 
are bombarded with products by their suppliers, (as well as prototype systems being 
developed in house), and these companies have no way of making informed 
decisions about the relative merits of any particular system. It is the development of 
a methodology to determine primary safety strategy with respect to the choice of 
appropriate technological solutions that this thesis addresses. 
1.5 Underpinning thesis hypothesis. 
In order to effectively understand priorities for primary safety systems development, 
one needs to collect data on real life accidents and have a means of evaluating the 
potential value of technological solutions in reducing the number of accidents. 
1.6 Aims and objectives of the thesis. 
The aim of the current work is the development of a methodology, the application of 
which will allow a motor manufacturer to make strategic decisions concerning the 
priorities for in vehicle primary safety countermeasures development. To 
accomplish this, the objectives of the thesis are as follows: 
1. To perform state of the art literature reviews of the current situation with respect 
to accident causation, vehicle accidents in specific, and available and prototype 
technologies that may address primary safety in cars. 
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2. To collect information on accidents involving cars to determine the nature of the 
causative factors in more detail. 
3. To define a procedure for correlating information on accident causation and 
potential accident countermeasures. 
4. To develop processes within a motor manufacturer whereby they can utilise such 
a methodology to determine their primary safety strategy. In effect, a process 
model for implementation of the methodology will be developed. 
1.7 The structure of the thesis. 
The thesis is partitioned into three main stages of work, state of the art literature 
reviews, data collection and methodology derivation, and discussion and 
conclusions of the project as a whole. 
Chapter 2 details reviews of literature concerning accident causation in general, 
accident causation in cars in specific, methodologies of data collection on accident 
causation and on technological countermeasures. 
Chapters 3 and 4 describe the main data collection of the thesis. Specifically, 
Chapter 3 describes the work undertaken to determine in some detail the nature of 
the factors impinging on car accidents. Chapter 4 builds on this work with the 
development and testing of the Solutions Matrices methodology which determines 
the most effective technological solutions that a motor manufacturer may consider in 
their safety strategy. 
Chapter 5 discusses the project as a whole and describes a process model wherein a 
motor manufacturer may integrate the information described in Chapters 2 to 4 into 
a structured safety strategy. 
Finally Chapter 6 recapitulates the conclusions of the study and discusses the 
opportunities for further work continuing on from this thesis. 
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1.8 Chapter conclusions and summary. 
This chapter has introduced the scope of the thesis and in particular the need for this 
research. The underlying hypothesis in this work has been outlined and the aims and 
objectives of the study and the structure of the thesis overall have been described. 
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2.0 Literature reviews. 
2.1 Chapter summary. 
This chapter introduces the background to the thesis by describing the literature 
underlying the work undertaken. The review will describe accident causation in 
general, followed by accidents in cars in specific. This includes details of in-depth 
accident studies and methodological limitations of these studies. Following this, the 
nature of technologies being introduced into vehicles and how in-depth studies may 
be used to better determine these are described. 
2.2 Background to the research. 
One of the major public health problems in motorised societies is road traffic 
accidents, (RTAs). Considerable costs to society as a whole occur due to those killed 
and injured as well as the very much more frequent non-injury RTAs, (Deering and 
Viano 1994). Safety science describes the possible remedial actions that may be 
taken to reduce the toll of vehicle accidents in three domains, (Forum of European 
Road Safety Research Institutes 1994, Tingvall 1997); 
9 Primary safety: concerns the prevention of accidents and relates to improving the 
skill of the driver or the performance of vehicles (by introducing for example 
anti-lock braking systems). 
0 Secondary safety: concerns the prevention and reduction of injury once an 
accident has occurred and relates to the crashworthiness of vehicles (such as air 
bags or seat belt pre-tensioning systems). 
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0 Tertiary safety: concerns the minimising of the consequences of injury and 
preventing these injuries from worsening given that they have occurred. This 
relates most often to the speed and quality of post incident trauma care that the 
victims receive. 
At least to some extent however, the costs are preventable by implementation of 
suitable accident prevention measures and as such a number are currently being 
employed or developed. In terms of the activities of a motor manufacturer, only 
primary and secondary safety interventions are of direct relevance. 
Unlike secondary safety countermeasures which are exclusively technological in 
nature, primary safety countermeasures may be either a technological intervention, 
(such as anti-lock braking systems or traction control systems), or a social 
intervention, (such as driver training or safety education). From the perspectives of a 
motor manufacturer, only technological interventions are of primary interest. 
Vehicle design considerations and the implementation of new technology into 
vehicles for the express purpose of accident prevention are an important, and 
currently under researched area of activity. There are three main reasons for research 
in this specific application area. Firstly, whilst secondary safety measures are 
becoming increasingly efficient at saving lives and reducing injuries, some accidents 
that occur are simply not survivable given the nature of the accidents themselves, 
(notably multiple vehicle, high speed impacts). This is linked to the second issue, 
namely that secondary safety is arguably rapidly approaching a plateaux in terms of 
the number of fatalities and injuries preventable, (Deering and Viano 1994). Finally, 
a third issue is that whilst injuries and fatalities are preventable to some extent given 
that an accident has occurred, a logical approach would be to attempt to prevent the 
accident from occurring in the first instance, thus reducing or eliminating the costly 
requirements of injury rehabilitation. Sanders and McCormick (1992), stated that 
one of the main objectives of human factors is to reduce accidents, and in the current 
context, it can hardly be argued that prevention is indeed better than cure. 
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The hypothesis underpinning this thesis is as follows; in order to effectively 
understand priorities for primary safety systems development, one needs to collect 
data on the causes of real life RTAs and have a means of evaluating the potential 
value of technological solutions in reducing the number of accidents. It is thus 
argued that by understanding why these RTAs occur, appropriate actions may be 
undertaken to prevent these RTAs. An Ergonomics or Epistemological approach is 
therefore being taken, (Bentley 1998). 
Driving can be viewed from a systems perspective, the systems concerned being the 
driver, the vehicle, the environment in which the driver and vehicle move through, 
and the interfaces between these subsystems, (Figure 1.1). From this perspective, 
RTAs are viewed as a product of mismatch between the driver, the vehicle and 
environment. By identifying the factors and interactions impinging on RTA 
causation, and hence identifying these mismatches, an understanding of the nature 
of their causation may be derived. Following this, appropriate accident 
countermeasures may be designed and eventually introduced. However, no method 
exists to determine which potential technologies should be implemented or 
researched further. 
The emphasis of this work is from the perspectives of a motor manufacturer and 
what such a manufacturer may do to effect a reduction in the number of RTAs. This 
project is thus to develop a methodology to identify the human-vehicle interactions 
impinging on accident causation with a view to improving safety through vehicle 
design improvements and the appropriate implementation of advanced technology 
into vehicles. 
2.3 Aims and objectives. 
This chapter has two aims; to demonstrate the need for this research by reviewing 
the literature and highlighting the omissions in the research, and to use this review to 
outline the work undertaken and described in the thesis. There are three objectives; 
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0 To describe the scope of the problem by reviewing the literature relating to 
accidents in general and in cars in specific. 
To describe the details of in-depth accident studies relating to accidents in cars 
and to outline the methodological limitations of these studies. 
To describe the in-depth studies that have related the cause of the RTAs to 
possible RTA countermeasures, and outline the limitations of these studies. 
2.4 An Introduction to accident causation. 
2.4.1 The nature of accidents and of the accident process. 
Most dictionary definitions and many scientific approaches to accidents include 
some references both to the consequence of the incident and the chance nature of the 
event. For example, an accident may be defined as 'an event that is without apparent 
cause, or is unexpected; an unfortunate event, especially one causing physical harm 
or damage', (Concise Oxford Dictionary 1996). In scientific literature, similar 
definitions abound. Meister (1987) for example defined an accident, as 'an 
unanticipated event which damages the system andlor the individual or affects the 
accomplishment of the system mission or the individual's task'. 
Suchman (1961) produced a list of indicators of the 'accidental nature of an event', 
the more of which are present the more likely the incident is to be called an accident. 
The indicators are: 
s Low degree of expectedness. 
* Low degree of avoidability. 
9 Low degree of intention. 
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A frequent characteristic of the majority of accident investigations, (notably those 
within the domain of aviation), is to find a single cause, or a small number of 
causative factors on which to assign blame. Thus the emphasis tends, especially 
within a legal framework, to assign blame to an individual or company often for the 
purposes of litigation. 
Causal 
Factor 
ýFýContributory Factor 
PRIMARY 
SAFETY 
I Contributory Factor I 
Danger 
SECONDARY Release Contributory Factor 
SAFETY 
I 
Phase 
I Contributory Factor I 
Hann 
Phase 
I Contributory Factor I 
Figure 2.1 A schematic overview of an accident sequence. 
However, in almost all cases, an accident results, not from a single factor, such as a 
pilot making an error, but due to a multitude of factors, many of which are unrelated 
in their aetiology, (Figure 2.1). An illustrative example is the fire, started by Nero 
that destroyed the city of Rome in AD 64 (Dixon 1994). The devastation caused by 
this fire was greatly enhanced by several factors; the location of the original act of 
arson, the prolonged period of drought immediately prior to the fire and the strong 
winds blowing towards the centre of the city from the direction of the start of the 
fire. Had the fire been started in a different part of the city, or had there not been a 
water shortage caused by a prolonged drought, or had the prevailing winds not been 
blowing in the direction that they were, the devastation caused would have been 
considerably reduced. 
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Many authors have emphasised the multifactorial nature of accidents, even those 
advocating the theory of accident proneness, that in its original conception 
postulated that the main cause of accidents was a single, unwavering personal 
disposition, (Shaw and Sichel 1971). 
A distinction may be drawn between factors that make the likelihood of an accident 
occurring higher, and those that actually cause and accident. these are contributory 
and causal factors respectively. In Figure 2.1 a contributory factor is defined as an 
identified factor that when present significantly increases the probability of an 
accident, but does not in isolation cause it. An example of this would be a driver 
who is in excess of the legal limit of blood alcohol concentration. Whilst this driver 
is more likely to be involved in an accident, not every driver who drives with excess 
alcohol in their blood will crash, and thus this factor cannot be described as causal. 
A causal factor however, is defined as a failure of a critical piece of equipment or a 
human error without which an accident would not have occurred. Examples of such 
factors would be a sudden and catastrophic failure whilst driving at speed, such as a 
tyre blow-out on a motorway. It is highly likely that given this factor, an accident 
will occur and without this causal factor, an accident will not result. Causal factors 
are thus typically what would be regarded for legal purposes as being the cause of 
the accident. The danger release phase is the moment of the accident, i. e. the crash or 
explosion, and is distinct from the harm release phase, which is the phase during 
which harm to people and property occurs. Dependant on the nature of the systems 
involved, there may be some delay before the harm release phase occurs, and this 
phase itself may extend over a very short period of time or many years. 
A summary of several dictionary definitions of 'accident' suggests that an accident is 
ý7nything that happens; an unforeseen or unexpected event; a chance or a mishap'. 
To many, therefore, the term accident implies an act of fate, which is therefore 
devoid of any predictability. Figure 2.1 is illustrative of the nature of the fallibility 
of this and of using non technical terms in a technical argument. Accidents are not 
just 'acts of chance' but are probabilistic events whose causes may be determined 
and countermeasures prescribed accordingly. The basic definition of an accident 
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used in the remainder of this thesis, is derived from that of Bentley (1998). The 
emphasis of this definition is that although an accident is unexpected and 
unintentional, they occur through the interaction of a series of contributory and 
causal factors. Additionally, an accident may result in a number of possible 
outcomes, including physical harm to an individual, damage to property, or a 
significant deviation from safe system operation. 
For simplicity in the remainder of this thesis, the term Road Traffic Accident, 
(RTA), will be applied to accidents involving motorised transportation. RTAs are a 
subset of accidents that occur in the road traffic environment and are concerned with 
failures in the safe operation of motorised transportation. These failures may result 
in physical harm to either the operator of the transportation system, (the driver), 
harm to other road users, or may result in damage to either the vehicles concerned or 
to other property. In addition, RTAs may result in neither harm to individuals or 
property, but may result only in significant departures from safe system use, (for 
example in the case of a vehicle running off the roadway but not colliding with any 
roadway or roadside objects). The focus of this thesis is on RTAs involving cars, and 
as such this term will only be used when at least one of the vehicles involved is a 
car. 
It should be remembered that the use of accident does not imply that an RTA is a 
random, unpredictable event, but one that occurs though the interaction of a number 
of causative and causal factors that may be deduced and thereby effective accident 
prevention measures designed. 
Having described the nature of accidents, the sequence of events in an accident 
requires consideration. Ramsey described an accident sequence model which may be 
directly applied to RTAs, (Ramsey 1985). In Ramsey's model, the information 
processing stages in an accident sequence are described, and with reference to a 
specific domain, the factors associated with an accident's genesis may be 
determined. Once an individual has been exposed to a hazardous situation, upto 4 
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main stages are passed through before safe or unsafe behaviours are exhibited and 
the accident either occurs or is avoided. The model is presented in Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2. A model of an accident sequence, (adapted from Ramsey 1985). 
Ramsey's model stresses the importance of hazard perception, many accidents that 
occur are due to not recognising or to underestimating hazards and risks involved in 
the situation. Errors associated with driving in particular have been associated with 
inappropriate information acquisition and processing, (Rumar 1988), failures of 
which will fit within Ramsey's model. Once a hazard has been identified, the 
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motivational aspects of hazard avoidance are also implicit in this model. This is of 
especial importance as drivers have frequently been shown to behave as if it is the 
responsibility of the other road users involved in an accident to avoid the accident 
occurring, (Clay 1995, Evans 1991). Ramsey's model may be criticised however for 
its apparently linear nature when viewed at face value. Its value in the description of 
RTAs are the 4 central processes of perception and cognition of the hazard, and the 
decision and ability to avoid the hazard. This model is limited however as the 
reasons for an RTA are not explained. The factors underlying specific RTAs are not 
described explicitly. 
2.4.2 Theofies of accident causation. 
Theories of accident causation will naturally focus on attempts to determine the 
factors underlying accident occurrence. In an analysis of insurance company data 
Heinrich (1959) concluded that in 85% of accidents human operator error was the 
direct cause. It may be possible in any given case to assign the fundamental error to 
the operator of a system that breaks down and causes an accident, or to the designer 
of that system. Taking this broad perspective, Petersen (1984) concluded that human 
error was the fundamental cause behind all accidents. The precise allocation of cause 
often depends upon the stop rule applied in the accident analysis, (the point at which 
the accident analyst stops searching for more causal or contributory factors). This in 
itself will be determined largely by the background of those investigating the 
accident; psychologists may naturally look for human errors whereas engineers may 
more inclined to look for engineering system failures. 
Accidents may be caused by either unsafe acts of persons, (operator error), or unsafe 
conditions, (designer error, Heinrich, 1959). The implication of this is that often the 
injured individual or operator of the system, is blamed, (as exemplified by the Driver 
/ Pilot error scenario). There is therefore a tendency to direct attention at fault, 
(Alicke 1992, Clay 1995, Shealy 1979). Shealy (1979), noted 4 main underlying 
reasons for fault attributions; 
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It is human nature to blame what appears to be the active operators for system 
failures resulting in accidents. This is especially the case when personal injury to 
third parties results. At least in part these attribution errors may result from 
processes of social cognition, (Alicke 1992, Hewstone 1988), manifesting itself 
as an overly optimistic appraisal of one's own driving abilities at the expense of 
others, (McKenna 1993, McKenna, Stanier and Lewis 1991, Svenson 1981). 
The legal system is geared towards assigning blame or fault often for the 
purposes of litigation; accident data is often collected merely to fulfil legal 
requirements, (Sanders and McCormick 1992). By implication, such data are 
inadequate for post hoc deduction of accident prevention measures as it is often 
difficult to extrapolate from data collected purely for other purposes, (Frampton 
1997). 
* From an organisational perspective, it is often easier for management to blame 
workers than to accept that other, (often more costly), changes are required, (for 
example workplace improvements or changes in standard operating procedures). 
Accident investigation forms that are to be completed are often modelled on the 
unsafe act/unsafe condition dichotomy, (e. g. Heinrich 1959). 
Early accident investigations noted that some individuals suffered more accidents 
than others and specifically more than would be expected by chance alone, (e. g. 
Greenwood and Yule 1920), and this naturally leads to Farmer and Chambers (1926) 
postulating the theory of 'Accident Proneness'. Simply stated, this theory suggests 
that the reason for some individuals being involved in multiple accidents is that they 
possess a permanent characteristic of being accident prone. The theory of accident 
proneness has a certain amount of face validity and was generally accepted albeit 
with some modification until the mid 1960s. It was still favoured by some until the 
1970s, (for example Shaw and Sichel 1971). At a superficial level, accident 
proneness seemed to fit accident statistics, however few explanations for this 
personal disposition were suggested. This may have partly been due to the pervasive 
acceptance of behaviourism, although one notable exception to this lack of 
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explanation was the work of Dunbar. Dunbar (1954) suggested that a personality 
trait of accident proneness was a proven fact and advanced psychoanalytic 
explanations for the existence of this trait. Later versions of the accident proneness 
theory were less extreme in outlook than the earliest theories presented. Shaw and 
Sichel (1971) for example suggested that accident proneness was not an enduring 
trait, but was modified throughout life in a similar manner to other behavioural 
changes. The fundamental concept of accident proneness remained however. 
There are several reasons for the decline of the accident proneness theory. Firstly, 
and perhaps most importantly, close examination of the data suggests that the theory 
is not accurate. Whilst it is undeniable that some individuals are involved in more 
accidents than others, it can be readily seen that different individuals are involved in 
different types of accidents, and thus the concept of being generally accident prone 
cannot be the complete explanation. Additionally, few attempts were made to 
explain the concept of accident proneness at a behavioural or cognitive level. In 
essence, the concept of accident proneness is a circular argument; it suggests that 
some individuals are involved in multiple accidents because they possess some 
enduring trait which predisposes them to be involved in multiple accidents. 
With the decline in the acceptance of the theory of accident proneness, several other 
theories were suggested. These were summarised by Sanders and McCormick 
(1992). Arousal theory suggests that performance is related to an individual's level 
of arousal, a graph of performance against arousal being an inverted U shape. Too 
little arousal and an individual performs poorly, performance gradually improves to 
a peak at the optimum level of arousal. Beyond this optimal level of arousal, 
performance gradually declines. The same reasoning can be applied to job demands 
and worker capability. As the demands of a job increase, performance increases, and 
therefore errors and hence accidents are reduced. Beyond the optimal level of job 
demands, performance decreases as the worker becomes overloaded and the levels of 
demands exceed an individual's ability to cope. 
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An alternative model proposed that the greater freedom that individuals have to set 
their own goals the better performance becomes resulting in fewer accidents. This is 
known as the goal s-freedom-a I ertnes s theory. Psychoanalytic theories have also been 
suggested that describe accidents as punitive self acts caused by guilt and 
aggression. However, perhaps due to its face validity and the idiomatic use of the 
term 'Accident Prone', the theory of accident proneness has remained popular 
almost to date. 
A modification of the theory of accident proneness, the theory of accident liability, 
suggests that different individuals are more or less prone to accident involvement 
and that this trait changes over time. For example, it has been demonstrated that the 
young are generally involved in more RTAs that middle aged drivers, and that states 
such as inexperience, inattention, overestimation of personal ability and pride may 
be related to their increased accident risk. A higher degree of explanation is inherent 
in this theory than in many other accident causation theories, although McKenna 
(1983) demonstrated that some individuals may be exposed to more hazards than 
others and are therefore more likely to be involved in RTAs irrespective of their own 
accident liability. 
A modified differential accident liability theory has been proposed, (McKenna 
1983). This theory postulates that people are differently liable to accident 
involvement due to different personal circumstances. For example, those driving 
more miles per year would be at greater risk than those driving fewer miles. By 
implication, further analyses would have to be undertaken in any specific domain in 
order to deduce the underlying factors causing a differential liability to be involved 
in an accident. To some extent, this can be argued to be simply a more explicit 
investigation of the demographic factors underlying accidents in any domain and 
thus this theory of accident causation is more a demographic descriptive framework. 
Taking a wider perspective, this framework can be applied to gain a more complete 
understanding of the nature of drivers who are involved in accidents. It is then 
necessary to determine why these drivers are being involved in accidents. It can be 
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argued that human error is at the heart of this question, but definitive analyses of 
these errors are rare. 
2.4.3 Human error and accidents. 
'It is virtually impossible to design and operate a perfectly safe human- 
technological system', (Brown 1990 pp 755); errors are therefore a natural 
consequence of learning and operating such systems, (Rasmussen 1987). Reports of 
industrial or transportation accidents are often concluded with the 'blame' for the 
accident being placed on human error, (Dixon 1994). Typically for example 'pilot 
error' is blamed for an aviation accident occurring. Arguments abound as to the 
proportion of accidents that may be attributed to human error, but it is clear that a 
significant percentage of accidents have some human error component. Due to the 
pervasive nature of human error in accidents, in order to understand the causes of 
accidents, an appreciation of human error is required. 
Sanders and McCormick (1992), defined error as 'an inappropriate or undesirable 
human decision or behaviour, that reduces, or has the potential for reducing 
effectiveness, safety or system performance', (pp 656). Rasmussen (1987) defined 
error in a more equivocal manner as the effect of human variability in unfriendly 
environments. Brown (1994) subsequently suggested a framework for accident 
analysis that focuses not only on the frequency and variability of differences 
between prescribed task and actual performance, (errors), but explicitly requires a 
precise understanding of what these discrepancies are so that effective remedial 
measures may be undertaken. 
2.4.4 Error classiflcation schemes. 
Whatever the precise definition of error, it can be readily seen that in any domain, a 
huge variety of error types may be exhibited, and thus taxonomies of error have been 
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developed in order to more readily facilitate an understanding of the nature of errors, 
how they are caused and how they may be prevented. 
Swain & Guttman (1985) produced one of the simplest and most widely used error 
classification systems for single, discrete actions. Errors are classed according to one 
of four types; omission, (failure to do something); commission, (performing an act 
incorrectly); sequence, (performing a task correctly, but out of the appropriate 
sequence); or timing, (failure to perform a task within the allotted time). In theory 
any error can be categorised according to the above scheme, although in order to 
achieve this in practice, a precise understanding of the nature of the task in hand 
must be arrived at. Pragmatically, this requires that a task analysis of the operation 
of the system under consideration must be undertaken. In the case of driving, task 
analyses have been performed, (for example, McKnight and Adams 1970, Stene 
1991), but this error taxonomy is impractical to use in driving, not least because 
1500 separate perceptual tasks alone were identified in driving, (McKnight and 
Adams 1970). In conjunction, this error taxonomy is too simple, and the task 
analysis too complex to pragmatically determine the causes of RTAs. An additional 
criticism of this model of error from the perspective of driving, is that it is only 
directly applicable to single, discrete actions. 
An alternative approach is to classify the errors according to the nature of the 
information processing being undertaken. Rouse & Rouse (1983) devised a scheme 
that follows the information processing procedures assumed to occur when humans 
operate controls. The operator first observes the system state, then formulates a 
hypothesis concerning the state and intended goal state, selects one or more 
procedures to attain the system goal and finally executes the procedures. This 
classification scheme is better defined than Swain & Guttman's (1985), although 
many errors are placed under a general and somewhat vaguely defined category of 
'execution of procedure'. Both Swain & Guttman's (1985) and Rouse & Rouse's 
(1983) taxonomies thus suffer from vagueness in definition. Whilst these 
classification systems suffice for simple linear tasks, in the case of driving where 
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multiple actions may be correctly undertaken at any given time to avoid an accident, 
neither classification may be usefully employed. 
A number of other theories of human error warrant brief description. Shffrin and 
Schneider (1977) described a theory of controlled and automatic processing 
distinguishing between two modes of memory, a long term store, (which is non 
sensory in modality), and a short term store. The long term store was thought to 
passively retain information, whilst the short term store provides a cognitive 
workspace for current tasks and accesses relevant information from the long term 
store to facilitate this. Whilst this theory highlights the value of information required 
in any given setting, (information thereby being the reduction of situational 
uncertainty Rumar 1988, Stene 1991), it is difficult to envisage how this theory may 
be practically applied. 
Broadbent's (1984) "Maltese Cross" model of memory and information processing 
distinguishes between representations and processes and as with Shffrin and 
Schneider (1977) requires that information on an individuals intentions and task 
knowledge are deduced and compared to their antecedent behaviour. It is arguable as 
to whether an individual would have access to such cognitive processes in sufficient 
depth and thus these theories are beyond pragmatic usage. 
An alternative approach recognises the need for accident reports to contain 
information pertaining to the degree of conscious control an individual has over 
behaviour, (Norman and Shallice 1980). Thus for accident reporting and analysis, 
individuals have to be aware of cognitive processes and an assessment of the 
appropriateness of preceding behaviour needs to be arrived at. Motivational factors 
are also included so that assessments of why actions are performed are required in 
accident analysis. 
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Two models of human error have been widely applied to RTAs, that of Rasmussen, 
(1982,1987), and that of Parker, Reason and Manstead, (1995, based on earlier work 
by Reason, 1990). 
Rasmussen (1982,1987), produced a model of behaviour developed to account for 
more serious errors that can occur in complex, tightly coupled industrial and process 
control operations. This taxonomy places more emphasis on an accident analyst 
being an expert on the systems involved and deducing the previous behaviour and 
errors rather than the individual concerned in the accident accessing cognitions. This 
taxonomy is thus arguably more useful in accident investigations than those 
previously described. Additionally, this taxonomy is more explicitly defined than 
several others and has been applied to road accidents, (for example van Elslande 
1997). In this scheme, behaviours are classified as being one of 3 major types, either 
skill based, rule based or knowledge based. The nature of the behaviours and the 
errors associated with each behavioural type are as follows: 
0 Skill based behaviours are subconscious routines and stored patterns of 
behaviour appropriate for well learnt behaviour in routine situations. Skill based 
errors are therefore execution errors. 
Rule based behaviours apply to recognised situations in which stored 
behavioural routine may be applied. Errors in applying rules are caused either by 
situation recognition failures, or by application of inappropriate rules. 
Knowledge based behaviours are required in unique, unfamiliar situations in 
which actions are planned in relation to specific goals. Errors involving 
knowledge based behaviours are due to inadequate analysis of the situation or 
poor decision making. These errors are generally viewed to be more serious than 
skill or rule based errors, (Grayson 1991). 
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One of the implications of this theory is that in the acquisition of skilled 
performance, there is a gradual progression from skill based behaviour, to rule and 
eventually knowledge based behaviour. The errors expected would thus progress 
from skill, to rule then knowledge based errors as ability improves. It has been stated 
that most errors with respect to driving are knowledge based, in particular, errors 
associated with driving have been associated with inappropriate information 
acquisition and processing, (Rumar 1988). Additionally, misinterpretation of 
information, especially concerning the intent of other road users has frequently been 
cited as the cause of road accidents. Rasmussen's error classification fits the domain 
of driving well, both by describing the errors involved and from the point of 
matching the acquisition of skilled performance in driving. However, this taxonomy 
does not address the sequence of the errors or the sequence of the RTA and therefore 
is limited with respect to its applicability in suggesting appropriate accident 
countermeasures. 
Reason (1990) distinguished between driving errors and deliberate violations of safe 
driving practices. Errors arise out of information processing problems and may be 
one of two types, slips and lapses, (actions deviating from an adequate plan), or 
mistakes, (actions conforming to an incorrect plan). Violations however are 
deliberate deviations from acceptable behaviour such as speeding or dangerous 
driving, (Reason 1990, Parker, et al 1995). In contrast to Rasmussen, who stated the 
majority of driving errors were related to inadequate analysis of the situation or poor 
decision making, Parker et a], (1995) related the majority of accidents to non 
malevolent violations. Thus the two theories differ in the degree of intentionality on 
the part of the accident involved driver, Parker et al, (1995) relating accidents to 
those drivers who deliberately commit violations of the highway code whilst 
Rasmussen (1982,1987) related accidents to errors in information acquisition and 
processing. Parker et al (1995) do suggest however when considering that nature of 
drivers involved in accidents, that there may be 'no systematic link between errors 
and accidents', (pp 1037). This may in part be due to an incomplete model of human 
error and the role of the sequential nature of these errors in accident genesis. It is 
clear however, that errors do have a link with accident involvement, although the 
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nature of the link is still not understood. Subsequent in-depth analysis of accidents 
are frequently designed to elucidate these errors and the role they play in RTA 
genesis. 
2.5 Individual differences in RTAs. 
Were RTAs to be randomly distributed spatially and temporally, and all drivers 
equally likely to be at risk, frequency histograms of these variables would be 
normally distributed, (i. e. they would fit a Poisson or normal distribution curve). It is 
clear from an inspection of the statistics that a large proportion of RTAs are 
clustered at specific sites and times and occur more commonly to different types of 
drivers. In terms of those involved in RTAs, the obvious conclusion is that some 
categories of drivers exhibit more RTAs than others. The study of individual 
differences in RTA liability was originally associated with the concept of accident 
proneness, (Farmer and Chambers 1926) and is now replaced with concept of 
differential accident involvement, (McKenna 1983). This section will describe some 
of the relevant literature concerning individual differences in RTA involvement, but 
without specific reference to contributory or causal mechanisms. 
25.1 Gender. 
Every measure of involvement in fatal accidents in the USA for the 1980s shows 
double rates for men over women, despite the fact that double pair comparisons have 
shown that for the same physical injury, females are 25% more likely to be killed 
than males, (Evans 1991). Males are therefore involved in more accidents involving 
a fatality than females. Males do in general drive more than females and thus their 
increased exposure to risk of an RTA may have some influence on accident 
statistics, but the degree to which exposure causes higher fatalities in males than 
females is disputed and unclear, (West, Elander and French 1992). However, some 
have argued that even with exposure measures accounted for, males are still 
differentiallY at more risk of death in accidents than females, (Evans 1991). 
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Additionally, the nature of accidents in which males and females are involved 
typically differs, males are more likely to be involved in RTAs concerned with 
alcohol, speeding, or single vehicles running off the roadway. Females in contrast 
are more likely to be involved in RTAs where vehicle handling errors are implicated 
in the RTA causation, (Evans 1991). 
25.2 Ajae. 
- 
Young drivers are particularly involved in RTAs which have been described as a 
plague of the young, (Evans 1991). As with gender differences, there are age 
differences in the types of RTAs experienced and in the culpability of these drivers 
with age. Evans (1991) showed young drivers are more likely to be killed in single 
vehicle run off road or roll over RTAs whereas older drivers more likely to be killed 
by side impact collisions at intersections. 
In general, 17 year olds have 50% more accidents than 25 year olds who themselves 
have 35% more than do 50 year olds, (Mayhew, Warren, Simpson and Hass 1981, 
Maycock, Lockwood and Lester 1991). The conclusion, therefore, is that younger 
drivers, are for some reason overly represented in the population of drivers having 
RTAs. This is despite the fact that they show generally enhanced perceptual and 
psychomotor skills over the older driver population, Yanik (1985). Careful analysis 
however demonstrates that whilst the perceptual abilities of younger drivers are 
generally superior to older drivers in laboratory type tasks, in terms of real world 
hazard perception, they are generally much inferior, Mourant and Rockwell (1970, 
1972). Additionally, there are data to suggest that younger drivers generally seek 
more dangerous driving situations as they may perceive the increased risk to be more 
intrinsically rewarding, and thus may be differentially exposed to more likelihood of 
an RTA. There is also some evidence to suggest that RTAs per mile increase after 65 
years of age, (Evans 1991, Mayhew et al 1981, Maycock et al 1991); these drivers 
being involved in less accidents than younger drivers, but typically driving 
considerably fewer miles per year on average. This illustrates one of the potentially 
confounding effects when considering the effects of age, younger drivers frequently 
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have high mileages per year as compared to elderly drivers, (Adams, 1985, Evans 
1991, Grime 1987, Ndiit5nen and Surnalla 1976). Young drivers however, on 
average drive less than middle aged drivers and when the effects of these mileages 
are considered, young drivers are still overly represented in RTAs. An additional 
confounding variable, the effect of experience is more difficult to partial out, but the 
data suggest that young drivers are still overly represented in RTAs as compared to 
middle aged inexperienced drivers, (Evans 1991). Even when exposure measures are 
controlled for, younger drivers are differentially overly involved in RTAs (Jonah 
1986). 
2.5.3 Driver skill. 
Deducing the effects of driver training and driver skill is fraught with 
methodological problems; the confounding effects of age and driving experience 
being extremely difficult to partial out, (Evans 1991). In general however, 
evaluations of driver training programmes have demonstrated negative effects. Lund, 
Williams and Zador (1986), and Roberston (1980) showed that high school driver 
education programmes enabled young drivers to attain their licenses earlier than non 
trained teenagers and the overall accident rate thereby increased as would be 
expected by having more young drivers on the roads. Considering the issue of driver 
skill, Williams and O'Neill (1974) demonstrated licensed race car drivers showed 
more violations related to speeding and accidents than average drivers. It is possible 
however, that those drivers that drove in a manner likely to involve them in more 
accidents, and drove in a high risk style sought the special license. The special 
license would therefore be indicative of the predisposition of the driver to drive in a 
more risky manner, rather of a higher than average ability per se. 
2.5.4 Cognitive ahili 
In terms of cognitive abilities, Quimby and Watts (1981) found that potential 
hazards in a driving simulator were responded to less quickly by drivers under 25 
and over 55 as compared to middle aged drivers. Quimby, Maycock, Carter, Dixon 
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and Wall (1986) examined the relationship between hazard perception and accident 
rates when taking other factors, (principally age and mileage) into account. No 
evidence of a relationship between simple reaction time and accident rates was 
found. Additionally, lower detection of hazards in a simulator correlated with an 
above average accident rate. (The use of simulators has subsequently been 
demonstrated to be valid for procedures of this nature, McKenna and Crick 1994). 
In a study of subjective and objective risk of specific roadway locations, Watts and 
Quimby (1980) showed significant agreement between drivers in their ranking of 
subjective risks of a wide range of road locations. When these locations were ranked 
on the basis of relative subjective and objective risk levels, a small but significant 
association was found. There was some evidence however, that hazards at certain 
locations were misjudged consistently. Table 2.1 describes the locations consistently 
misperceived with respect to subjective and objective risk. 
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Table 2.1 Under reported and over reported risk, (from Watts and Quimby 
1980). 
Under rated risks Over rated risks 
Suburban dual carriageway near Hump bridge on a rural road 
pedestrian bridge 
Rural brow on a single carriageway road Level crossing on a rural road 
Left turn off a rural road Suburban shopping centre in a 30 mph 
limit 
De-restricted rural dual carriageway site Right bend at the end of a rural dual 
near a picnic area ageway 
Rural cross roads controlled by traffic Right turn onto a rural dual carriageway 
lights 
The significant agreement between driver's rankings of the locations suggests that 
different drivers are applying essentially the same criterion in estimating risk levels. 
However, both the systematic errors shown, and the number of accidents exhibited 
on the roads attributable to risky manoeuvres, show that errors in risk perception do 
occur. 
Mourant and Rockwell (1972) studied the strategies of visual search by novice and 
experienced drivers and determined that as driving experience increases, fixations 
focused more and more towards the focus of expansion of the visual world. 
Inexperienced drivers however, tended to focus their attention towards the front of 
the vehicle and to the side of the roadway to assist them guide the vehicle. These 
visual search strategies may serve to explain the poor perception of hazards by 
inexperienced drivers noted in the work of McKenna and may serve to explain some 
of the reasons for RTAs as these inexperienced drivers do not search far enough 
ahead of their vehicle for hazards. 
Additionally, Field Independence, (the capacity to overcome embedded contexts in 
perceptual processing) which has been generally taken as a measure of cognitive 
style, has been related to accident involvement. The evidence is conflicting, some 
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have found negative associations between scores on the Embedded Figures Test and 
accident involvement, (e. g. Avolio et al 1985, McKenna et al 1986), whilst others 
found positive associations, (e. g. Mihal and Barrett 1976). McKenna et al (1986) 
also found negative associations between a Dichotic Listening Task and RTA rates 
in 2 years following drivers earning a Public Service Vehicle License. These 
findings imply a difficulty in attentional allocation, itself related to information 
acquisition and processing. 
2.5.5 Risk, dtiving soLle andpersonaIjU factors. 
2.5.5.1 Risk. 
Driving is a self paced activity (Nd5tdnen and Summala 1976), drivers can therefore 
select their speed, routes and the level of risk they are willing to tolerate to their own 
preferences. With respect to the risk that a driver is exposed to whilst driving, 
several models have been proposed to account for driver behaviour. 
Nddt5nen and Summala (1976) proposed that driver's behaviour is mediated by a 
subjective risk monitor, the drivers objective being to maintain the level of perceived 
risk at zero. Compensatory behaviours are therefore initiated when the driver's 
subjective level of risk is not zero, for example a driver may slow down when 
approaching a difficult section in the road so as to lower risk levels. Fuller (1984) 
however questioned the ability of subjective risk assessments being maintained at 
zero and yet having a profound effect on behaviour. Fuller (1984) further proposed a 
theory of driving in which driving is conceptualised as an exercise in threat 
avoidance. Fuller argued that the potential for risky behaviour whilst driving is very 
high and that drivers are motivated to avoid or at worst escape risky situations that 
may occur. Ideally, the level of subjective risk experienced at any time is therefore 
zero. However, at most instances, the level of subjective risk is above zero, and the 
driver is behaving accordingly so as to reduce it to zero. 
Wilde, (1981,1994) acknowledged that driving is inherently risky and proposed that 
drivers act so as to maintain a level of subjective risk that they are comfortable with. 
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Accordingly, drivers continuously make adjustments to their driving so as to 
maintain this level of risk. This risk homeostasis theory has been the centre of 
intense debate, not least because in its earlier forms it implies that traditional 
approaches to traffic safety are ineffective, (see for example Adams 1985, Evans 
1991, Wilde 1994). Whilst the theory of risk homeostasis is relatively new, the idea 
that traditional approaches to traffic safety improvements may be ineffective was 
proposed in the 1940s, (Smeed 1949). Supporters of the theory of risk homeostasis 
have argued strongly for example that the legislation requiring drivers and front seat 
passengers to wear seat belts not only has no effect on vehicle occupant death rates, 
but actually worsens the situation by increasing the risks experienced by other, more 
vulnerable road users, (Adams 1985). Irrespective of the validity of the theory, one 
implication of the theory is that safety may be improved only when road users, 
(specifically drivers) are motivated to behave in a safer manner. However, many 
traditional approaches to traffic safety do not address the motivational aspects of 
encouraging drivers to drive in a safer manner. 
2.5.5.2 Dfiving style. 
The style of driving will obviously be confounded with other factors such as gender, 
age and experience, (for example young inexperienced drivers have been 
demonstrated to drive faster than middle aged drivers, Evans 1991). The effects of 
these confounding variables are extensive, and are sufficient to cause considerable 
confusion as to the effects of individual differences in preferred driving style. 
In terms of the style of driving, perhaps the most obvious characteristic, (and 
certainly one of the most frequently discussed in the popular press), that may be 
associated with RTAs is speed. Speed choice is expected to play a critical role in 
accident involvement, (West et al 1992). Quimby and Watts (1981) produced a 
'safety index' (subtracting braking distances chosen in simulator from required 
stopping distances as evidenced from speed on test track). This measure was found 
to be correlated significantly with numbers of accidents per mile of the same drivers 
in previous two years. 
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There are perhaps two reasons why an individual chooses an unsafe driving style. 
Drivers exhibiting unsafe driving styles may differ from safe drivers with regard to 
their attitudes to driving, (including concern over possibility of an accident), or they 
may differ with regard to their beliefs about what constitutes good and bad driving 
and their own level of skill and ability. It is well established that most drivers feel 
themselves to be above average in terms of skill and ability, (Svenson 1981). 
McKenna (1993) demonstrated that this was due to drivers believing themselves to 
be in control of their vehicles, rather than being overly optimistic about the chance 
of being involved in an accident. The general finding is that faster, more deviant 
styles are associated with being young and male and that these drivers are most 
likely to believe in their abilities as drivers. Wilde's work, (Wilde 1994) suggests 
that only by motivating these drivers to drive in a safer manner will accidents 
involving these drivers be reduced. 
2.5.5.3 Personalityfactors. 
Relationships between personality factors and accident rates have been studied 
extensively, partly due to the search for an accident proneness personality type. 
Shaw and Sichel (1971) for example found higher scores for neuroticism and 
extraversion amongst bus drivers with poor safety records. Few studies have taken 
into account the possible relationship between extraversion, neuroticism and 
exposure, and thus there are significant methodological deficiencies in much of this 
work, (West et al 1992). 
Accident involvement has more reliably been associated with Type A personality 
measures, (this personality pattern typically involves competitiveness, ambitiousness 
and a sense of time urgency). Perry (1986) found significant bivariate correlations 
between Type A behaviour, (as measured with the Jenkins Activity Survey), and 
both numbers of accidents and number of violations. Using a different rating scale, 
Evans, Palsane and Carrere (1987) found that drivers assessed as Type A had more 
accidents than those with Type B behaviour patterns, (the 'opposite' behaviour 
profile). As with much of the work on personality measures, significant 
methodological inadequacies exist with much of this research. Specifically, the 
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accident rate of the drivers being assessed was usually known when assessments of 
personality type were made, (West et al 1992). West et al (1992) suggest that 
accident risk may be related to overall level of social deviance and thus many of the 
personality based assessments will naturally be confounded and of limited use. In 
conclusion, no clear effects of personality irrespective of other variables have been 
demonstrated. 
2.6 RTAs in context: International and national 
statistics. 
Overall, since the 1920s vehicle numbers have increased enormously and to the mid 
1960s injuries have increased in line with this. In general vehicle occupant casualties 
have increased tremendously, whilst death rates per vehicle have declined 
considerably. Thus it can be seen, that although absolute numbers of casualties have 
in some cases increased, decreased death rates per registered vehicle are an 
indication that the vehicles involved in the crashes are somehow safer. A 
manifestation of the increased safety of individual vehicles is that currently there are 
no more deaths on the roads than there were in the 1930s, despite vast increases in 
the numbers of vehicles and road traffic volumes, (Grime 1987). 
2.6.1 Intemational statistics. 
In Europe, there are an estimated 120 million cars as of 1995, this figure being 
expected to rise by 3 to 4% per year, (Stevens 1995). Each year, RTAs in Europe kill 
approximately 50,000, lead to more than 500,000 hospital admissions and cause 
upwards of 1,500,000 casualties, (European Traffic Safety Council 1993). It has 
been estimated that for the Swedish population, RTAs cut average life expectancy by 
6 months and lead to an average of 2.5 years of significant health deterioration per 
head of population, (Tingvall 1997). 
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Of all those dying annually, deaths due to RTAs are a relatively low percentage, 
(slightly over 0.5%, DoETR 1997); road accidents may therefore be viewed to be a 
relatively minor problem. However, in motorised societies, the number one public 
health problem in the 1990s has been argued to be due to road traffic accidents, 
(Evans 1991, Viano, Davis, Bennett, LeFevre, Rasmussen and Scherba 1991, 
Deering and Viano 1994). More pre-retirement deaths are due to traffic crashes than 
to the combined effects of the two leading diseases, cancer and coronary heart 
disease, (Evans 1991). Road accidents are primarily a killer of the young, in the US 
alone, almost half of the 19 year olds dying annually, do so as a result of traffic 
accidents. However, these statistics, in terms of deaths caused are not constant across 
all countries; an impact of a given severity is more likely to be survivable in 
countries with better healthcare and emergency service infrastructures than in a less 
well developed country. This may be due to a number of factors such as the speed of 
the emergency services arriving at the scene, (if they do at all), or the quality of post 
trauma care. Thus global estimates of the size of the problem are difficult to 
accurately quantify. It has been estimated, however, that world wide approximately 
half a million people annually are killed due to road accidents, Grime (1987). In 
addition non fatal injuries, which themselves cost society a considerable amount, out 
number fatalities, estimates being by factors of up to 70 to 1, (Hobbes, Grattan and 
Hobbs 1979). 
Such difficulties in estimates are compounded by confusion as to the varying nature 
of the statistics quoted by different organisations. For example, when considering 
fatality data, some organisations include within these statistics those people involved 
in an RTA that die within 30 days, whilst other organisations use a time period of 
one year, (Evans 1991, Grime 1987). This latter measure not only returns a different 
absolute number of deaths per given time, but the distribution of deaths within the 
driver population may differ. The fatality measure may only record that a death has 
occurred and that the person had previously, within a specified time period, had an 
RTA. Although usually the data contain only those individuals whose death may be 
attributable directly to the RTA, in practice this is not always possible. Thus deaths 
unrelated to the RTA having occurred may be included, and hence a higher 
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proportion of the elderly will be recorded. This is especially noticeable when 
considering longer time frames when more elderly people would be expected to die 
within a given period than younger people. Whilst some statistical manipulations do 
exist to attempt to correct for factors such as these, in the absence of better recording 
techniques with respect to causes of death, with cross cultural comparisons, errors 
will always occur. 
However, fatality numbers are the best estimates of the size of the RTA problem as 
the estimates of absolute number of accidents whilst driving are complicated by 
three additional factors. Firstly, it is readily seen that not all RTAs that occur are 
reported and hence included in published statistics. In general, in westernised 
society, all crashes involving a fatality are reported to the police, fatality statistics 
are then obtained either directly from this source or from vehicle licensing 
authorities or government transportation departments. However, in less motorised 
societies, the infrastructure may not exist for collection and collation of such 
information. However, secondly, even in motorised societies the likelihood of an 
accident being reported decreases dramatically as the economic cost of the accident 
decreases. A very large number of very minor incidents are thought to occur and yet 
never be reported, for example minor impacts whilst reversing into a parking space, 
or minor impacts in closely packed, slow moving rush hour traffic, (Hobbes et al 
1979, Deering and Viano 1994). Fatality numbers are therefore more likely to be 
accurate. Finally, the distributions of accidents with respect to the severity of 
resultant injuries is not constant across all impact severity levels. It can be seen that 
a considerably larger number are injured than are killed, US estimates are that 95% 
of all injuries occur at the lowest two levels of the Abbreviated Injury Scale, (AIS), 
used by the US Department of Transport to collate data, (Evans 1991). (This level of 
injury is such that only minor injuries, not requiring professional treatment, occur). 
In general, the number of fatalities has been used as an indication of the size of the 
RTA problem globally. The picture is severely complicated by the nature of the 
statistics quoted for the relative death rates between for example different countries, 
be it death rate per percentage of the population, per vehicle, or per distance 
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travelled. These differing figures will give a different indication as to the size of the 
problem in any given sample, (Adams 1985). Table 2.2 gives a summary of the data 
presented for the top 5 and bottom 5 of 62 countries ranked in order of their death 
rate per 100,000 population, (Adams 1985). As a comparison measure, the death rate 
and rankings derived from this per 100,000 vehicles is given. It can be seen from 
this that the two rankings do not correlate well, indubitably due in part to the lack of 
rigour in collecting such data in the economically less well developed countries and 
those with lower levels of motorisation. However, additional to this are the effects of 
the nature of the different road traffic environments, (for example the quality of the 
road infrastructure, the nature of law and law enforcement in the country under 
question), and the associated consequences on traffic fatalities. As can be seen for 
example, in countries where low levels of motorisation are found, the death rate per 
100,000 population is low, whereas the rank per 100,000 vehicles is comparatively 
higher. A relationship encompassing these variables, (known as Smeed's Law), has 
been demonstrated between the absolute number of deaths, the population size and 
the number of motor vehicles within a given area, (Adams 1985, Evans 1991, Grime 
1987, Smeed 1949). 
This illustrates a fundamental difficulty in the nature of RTA statistics, namely what 
the appropriate statistics to use are. Whilst no one statistic is demonstrably better or 
worse than any other, the most important consideration is that the same statistic is 
quoted when comparisons between two data sets are required. Radically different 
conclusions have been drawn by different researchers using the same data sets but 
quoting different statistics in terms of accident rates, (either by vehicle, by distance 
driven or by distance driven per time period, see for example Evans 1991, Wilde 
1994). For this reason, the remainder of this thesis will concentrate on absolute 
numbers of RTAs, fatalities, injuries, or damage only accidents. It should be 
remembered however, that these figures are estimates based on current data 
collection procedures, and therefore some systematic errors may be in existence. 
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Table 2.2 Road accident death rates, (by highest and lowest 5 per population 
and by vehicle rate as comparison, from Adams, 1985). 
Death Rates 
Per 100 000 
Population 
Per 100 000 
Vehicles 
Vehicles per 
Population 
Country Rank Rate Rank Rate 
Upper Volta 1 2.27 41.0 3.25 0.007 
Ethiopia 2 3.22 18.84 11 0.002 
India 3 3.38 52.0 5.59 0.006 
Niger 4 3.95 51.0 5.91 0.007 
Pakistan 5 4.65 55.0 9.35 0.005 
Luxembourg 56.5 24.0 13.5 0.43 0.490 
Austria 59.5 26.0 23 .0 0.65 0.400 
France 59.5 26.00 20.6A 0.53 0.48 
Portugal 61 29.0 36.5 2.50 0.12 
South Africa 62 31.85 34.0 2.0 1 0.19 
2.6.2 UK Statistics - STA TS19. 
In the United Kingdom, information on RTAs resulting in personal injuries is 
collected by the police. This data deals only with a limited number of relatively easy 
to obtain facts concerning details of those individuals involved in the RTAs such as 
their age, gender and prior motoring histories. Additionally recorded are such data as 
the nature of the vehicles involved and any damage done to vehicles or other objects 
as well as details of the RTA itself. In the case of more serious incidents some initial 
assessment of blame and decisions to proceed with prosecution are made. In the UK, 
these data are collected by the police on incident report forms known as RT7s and 
are subsequently collated by local authorities and entered into a database known as 
STATS19. This database at a local level contains information in a considerable 
amount of detail concerning the individual incidents and is subsequently collated 
and entered into the national STATS19 database. At a national level however, less 
detail is found in the database due partly to the summation of the data, and partly 
because each individual authority stipulates collection of slightly different data, in 
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addition to the data required for the national database. This additional data is 
therefore lost in the summation process. 
The statistics quoted in the following section are derived from the STATS19 
database from RTAs in 1996, (DoETR 1997). The implications of these data will be 
outlined following a description of some of the major findings. 
In 1996 in the United Kingdom, there were approximately 3600 deaths as a result of 
RTAs. Additional to these, there were approximately 45,000 serious injuries and 
272,000 slight injuries. In comparison with the average figures for 1981-1985, 
deaths were 36% lower and serious injuries were 40% lower. At the same time, road 
traffic rose by approximately 3%. The rate of casualties per 100 million vehicle 
kilometres in 1996 fell by 33.5% over the average from 1981-1985. It should be 
remembered that these figures are based on accidents reported to the police and 
collated through STATS19 procedures, thus the size of the RTA problem in the 
driving population as a whole may be not insignificantly larger. 
Table 2.3 Number of RTAs and percentage of total number of RTAs by severity 
of injuries sustained by type of roads, (from DoETR 1997). 
Severity of Injuries 
Road Class 
Killed Serious Slight All 
Motorways Number 165 1298 11141 12604 
% of total 0.05 0.40 3.48 3.94 
Built up Number 1534 27744 191329 220607 
% of total 0.48 8.66 59.73 68.88 
Non built up Number 1899 1 15431 69761 87091 
% of total 0.59 4.81 21.78 27.19 
All Number 3598 444473 1 272231 1 320302 
% of total 1 1.12 13.88 1 85.00 1 100.00 
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RTAs are neither evenly distributed throughout the driving population, nor different 
road traffic environments. It can be seen that there is a different distribution of 
accident types by severity across different road types, (tables 2.3 and 2.4). 
Thus for example, the popular misconception that motorways are a comparatively 
dangerous mode of transport is not confirmed by these statistics, the death rate as a 
percentage of all accidents is nearly ten times higher on built up roads in comparison 
with motorways. However, given that an accident occurs, the chances of a fatality 
are increased for motorways over other road types due to the generally higher 
average speeds seen on motorways, (Grime 1987). Additionally of note from Table 
2.4, are that the majority of accidents occur on built up roads, (68.9% of all 
accidents), and that fatalities account for only 1.1% of all accidents; the most 
common result of an RTA in 1996 was slight injury, (85.0%). 
Table 2.4 illustrates the numbers of RTAs resulting in different injury levels, 
reported at different junction types. 
Table 2.4 Number of RTAs reported by junction types for different severity 
levels resulting, (from DoETR 1997). 
Junction type Fatal Serious All 
Roundabout 52 1588 18013 
T or staggered 736 11556 76947 
Y junction 84 920 6414 
Crossroads 204 3625 25629 
Multiple junction 34 484 3311 
Other 56 639 5078 
Private drive or 
entrance 
94 1506 10379 
All Junctions 1262 20318 145771 
Not at or within 
20m of ajunction 
2012 16984 90168 
From this, it can be seen that overall 38.5% of all RTAs involving a fatality occur at 
junctions and of these T junctions account for the largest group, (accounting for 
58.3% of accidents at junctions and 22.5% of all fatality RTAs). In terms of all 
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accidents, it can be seen that T junctions are the single most represented accident 
scenario with respect to injury of all levels, with cross-roads being the next most 
represented scenario. 
Table 2.5 Distribution of RTAs by day of the week and time of incident, (from 
DoETR 1997). 
Monday to 
Thursday 
Average 
Friday Saturday Sunday 
00.00 - 03.59 1181 1652 4217 4321 
04.00 - 07.59 2994 2990 1431 1462 
08.00 - 11.59 20553 11087 8712 5471 
12.00 - 15.59 10946 13651 12986 5435 
16.00 - 19.59 13521 15722 11432 10498 
20.00 - 23.59 5943 9133 7219 6221 
Totals 46947 54237 46286 39209 
Table 2.5 shows the distribution of RTAs by day of week. From this, several trends 
can be seen. Firstly, there are peaks of RTAs each weekday at commuting hours, the 
single largest peak being Friday between 16.00 and 19.59. Outside of normal work 
hours, there are also peaks associated with Friday and Saturday evenings. Overall, 
more RTAs occur on Fridays than any other day. As no severity, causation or 
demographic data are presented, these data are extremely limited in their use with 
respect to determining the cause of the RTAs. That the pattern of RTAs and of those 
driving differs from day to day and hour to hour cannot be determined from these 
data. 
Table 2.6 shows the distribution of RTAs of different severities by daylight and 
roadway conditions. It can be seen that fatal RTAs mostly occur during daylight 
hours, 55.9% during daylight compared to 44.1% during darkness. Thus although 
considerably fewer miles are driven during darkness, the risk of being involved in an 
RTA resulting in a fatality is significantly higher during darkness hours. In terms of 
the nature of the roadway conditions, it is readily obvious that the majority of all 
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accidents occur when the roadway is dry and thus the majority of RTAs of all 
severities occur in daylight and on roadways that are dry. 
Table 2.6 Distribution of RTAs by severity, daylight and condition of roadway, 
(from DoETR 1997). 
Fatal Serious Slight All 
Daylight Dry 1288 17923 100579 119790 
Wet/Flood 485 6244 37537 44266 
Snow/Ice 40 604 4151 4795 
All 1820 24783 142396 168999 
Darkness Dry 798 6593 27011 34402 
Wet/Flood 613 5382 23108 29103 
Snow/Ice 41 532 2798 3371 
All 1454 12519 52966 66939 
2.6.3 The use of intemational and national data for detenninine 
accident causation, 
The data summarised in sections 2.5 to 2.6.2 illustrate the nature of those involved in 
RTAs and the typical scenarios in which they occur. These data however, are 
extremely limited in their use for the purposes of designing potential accident 
countermeasures, largely because the data were not collected for this purpose. As 
Frampton (1997) described, it is extremely difficult to utilise data collected via such 
tightly controlled data collection procedures for any other purpose than which they 
were designed to collect. In the case of STATS19 data for example, the data are 
collected by police almost exclusively for the purposes of prosecution. 
Whilst the data collected in this manner are very useful for providing a database 
from which basic accident patterns, national trends and demographic information 
concerning those injured or killed in RTAs can be deduced, (such as that quoted 
above), the data has limited use for the purposes of detailed RTA investigation or 
analysis. This is due to the nature of the time and financial constraints placed upon 
those collecting the data, namely the police in the UK. However, whilst data can be 
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deduced from the police which is of some use in RTA investigation studies, 
typically the police do not have the time or financial resources to collect sufficient 
data to be of use in accident investigations without the addition of more data 
collected from alternative sources. For these reasons, in order to elicit much of the 
information required that is vital to investigate efficiently the numerous factors 
involved in RTA causation, detailed, in-depth studies have occasionally been 
undertaken. 
In the case of the data presented to illustrate the demographic trends within RTA 
patterns, few causative factors may be inferred. The situational data, (section 2.6) are 
useful for determining some strategic issues pertaining to RTA occurrence as they 
describe in what circumstances RTAs typically occur. Thus for example, it is readily 
obvious that a large percentage of RTAs occur at T junctions and thus these 
junctions may be selected for detailed study. 
More detailed understanding of RTAs can only be gained from further analyses of 
this data set and is not possible using published data. STATS19 for example, cannot 
readily be used to determine if a specific population of drivers are differentially 
more likely to be involved in accidents at T junctions, nor for example if there are 
differences in RTA patterns between those in which an RTA involved driver is 
crossing a line of moving traffic as compared to one in which they are joining a line 
of moving traffic. 
A large number of studies have isolated specific RTA scenarios and studied these in 
depth to determine the issues pertaining to these. Examples of such studies include 
vehicle control during curve driving, (Godthelp 1986), single vehicle accidents, 
(McKenna 1987), driver behaviour at T junctions in daylight and darkness, 
(Darzentas, Holms and McDowell 1980) and overtaking manoeuvres, (Bryant 1978, 
Farber and Silver 1967). These studies have illustrated some of the important 
causative factors in specific RTA configurations and have in some cases outlined the 
need for, and possible direction of further research concerning potential 
countermeasures. However, by their very nature, such studies suffer from a tendency 
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to be very specific, and therefore of limited use in a strategic study such as the 
current one. 
2.7 In-depth RTA investigation. 
In-depth investigations may be characterised as being traditional in approach or case 
study based, (Clarke, Forsyth and Wright 1995). Traditional studies rely on large 
scale data collection, typically involving collection and analysis of data on at least 
1000 RTAs which are subject to rigorous statistical analyses to determine the 
relative contributions of various factors in RTA causation, and their prevalence in 
the driving population as a whole. Case study approaches however, may utilise 
significantly fewer individual RTAs but focus on a more qualitative approach by 
grouping clusters of similar RTAs. Rather than describing the dataset as a whole, 
case study approaches therefore typically describe the results in terms of these 
clusters. Traditional approaches can be seen as an attempt to quantify the relative 
proportions of various factors on RTA occurrence, and therefore have limited use in 
suggesting appropriate accident countermeasures. Case study approaches however, 
have proved to be more efficacious in suggesting appropriate accident 
countermeasures. However, due to the nature of the studies, case study approaches 
tend to focus on a narrow range of RTAs in comparison with traditional approaches. 
pth RTA studies. 71 Introduction to in-! Le 
Due to a need to understand in more detail the nature and causes of RTAs, in-depth 
studies of RTAs became popular from the mid 1960s. In-depth studies may be 
defined generally as any RTA study that investigates RTAs in much more detail than 
is commonly performed, (OECD 1980). There are two major subsets of such studies, 
concentrating on either crash avoidance, (primary safety issues, such as Treat 1980), 
or crash worthiness, (secondary safety for example Frampton 1997). In addition to 
gathering data pertaining to either the factors impinging on the causation of the 
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RTAs or the mechanisms producing injury to those affected by the RTA, these 
studies typically have three additional aims: 
0 These investigations are used to provide empirical evidence to determine the 
likely efficacy of potential road safety projects and to suggest new projects and 
countermeasures. 
a These studies are also used to provide and test new research methodologies and 
to provide pointers towards likely new areas of research. 
0 Finally these studies are used to provide data essential to the design of safe and 
efficient roads and vehicles, and subsequently to obtain an empirical and 
objective measure of the relative risks associated with differing aspects of 
highway design, road and vehicle condition. 
A review of the background to in depth RTA studies is first presented, followed by 
consideration of seven studies in specific. 
2 Z2 Data collected in in-de pth studies. 
All in-depth investigations use a number of information sources not normally 
collected in official RTA reporting, (i. e. that normally performed by the police in the 
UK). One of the first information sources sought in any in-depth study is to 
approach those involved in the RTA themselves. This is most often done directly by 
the investigators, either through on the spot interviews or questionnaires or by 
subsequently obtaining data from those involved. However these types of data have 
sometimes been obtained indirectly, (by for example securing the assistance of the 
police attending the scene of an RTA to collect data additional to their normal 
requirements). An additional method of obtaining information pertaining to an 
incident is to examine the files kept by the police authorities concerning the RTAs 
that have been deemed worthy of investigation. Whilst this method does provide 
some valuable information, there exist legal issues relating to the investigation of 
RTAs that may subsequently be the subject of criminal proceedings and 
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prosecutions. Additionally, this sampling frame will naturally result in a biased 
sample. A final method of obtaining data is through examination of the sites of the 
RTAs and the vehicles involved for the purposes of reconstruction. This has been 
most commonly performed immediately after the crash with the vehicles still at the 
scene, however this approach has been applied at some months after the RTA, 
(Carsten, Tight and Southwell 1989). 
The types of data ideally collected in in-depth RTA investigations have been 
characterised as follows, (Grime 1987). 
Information required in every case: 
0 Date, time and place. 
0 Class of road and speed limit. 
0 State of light and weather and road conditions; class of street lighting (if any). 
0A scale plan indicating the scene of the RTA and including gradients, hedges and 
obstructions. A vital aspect of this diagram is to mark accurately the positions of 
the vehicles involved when they have come to rest after the RTA in addition to 
any marks or debris deposits and damage to roadside furniture. 
0 Photographs of the RTA scene and the approaches to it from the perspective of 
the drivers involved. Additionally photographs of marks made on the road by for 
example skidding vehicles, together with any marks to kerbs, verges or other 
roadside furniture. 
0 Photographs of the texture of the road surface may sometimes be useful if the 
road surface is wet due to recent rain or snow. If the road surface is dry, 
photographs of any skid marks are useful in determining whether any avoiding 
action was attempted by the drivers prior to a crash. 
0 Witness statements should be obtained from all RTA participants and from any 
persons that were not directly involved in the RTA that witnessed it. 
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0 Particulars of all injuries. 
In addition, Grime (1987), notes several other types of information that are required 
to be obtained by those investigating different types of RTA. For single vehicle, two 
vehicle or multi-vehicle RTAs involving cars or commercial vehicles, the following 
should be recorded; 
0 Particulars of the make, model, year of registration of each vehicle, and of their 
weights at the time of the RTA. The information concerning the weight of the 
vehicles is of especial importance since the mass ratios of vehicles involved in 
RTAs will be of prime importance in determining injury production, (Evans 
1991). 
0 The results of a vehicle examination performed on each vehicle by a qualified 
vehicle examiner will need to be noted. Depending upon the exact nature of the 
RTA, differing aspects of the vehicles will need to be examined in specific cases. 
The condition of the brakes and steering system of the car need to be determined 
as does the conditions of the tyres which are of especial importance when the 
road conditions are wet. In the case of RTAs occurring at night, the condition 
and aim of the head lamps should be determined if still present and functioning. 
It should be noted, that this data is rarely collected in detail, and so rarely 
subsequently reported. 
0 Photographs of the exterior of the involved vehicles should be obtained to 
determine the extent of damage sustained and to determine the directions of 
impacts on each vehicle in an attempt to determine the sequence of impacts. 
Additionally, in the case of some studies, (the purpose of which is to determine 
the mechanisms of injury causation to those involved in an RTA), photographs 
of the interiors of each vehicle should be taken to determine the nature of the 
injury producing events. Finally evidence as to the use of any safety systems 
such as air bags, seatbelts and seat belt pre tensioners should be sought; the use 
of such devices will have a considerable effect on the nature of any injuries 
caused and may well have some relevance to the nature of the causation of the 
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RTA itself, since it has been demonstrated that there are some differences in the 
risk taking behaviour between groups of drivers either wearing or not wearing 
seat belts, (Evans 1991). 
9 Finally, in other cases information specific to the type of RTA concerned will 
need to be elicited. For example in the case of RTAs involving pedal cycles or 
motor cycles, in addition to the above, special consideration needs to be given to 
the site at which the RTA occurred. Specifically information concerning the 
possible effects of rough or slippery roads, and information concerning 
obstructions in the roadways, for example stationary cars or protruding kerbs 
needs to be obtained. Additionally in the case of RTAs involving pedestrians the 
actions of the pedestrians need to be determined, i. e. whether they were crossing 
the road by but not on a pedestrian crossing, or by walking out between parked 
cars. For RTAs occurring at night, the pattern of illumination of the road surface 
needs to be considered. 
Due to the costs involved in large scale in-depth studies of RTAs, comparatively few 
such studies have been undertaken. The following section reviews those most 
pertinent to the current study. 
2 Z3 Traditional in-depth studies. 
2. Z3. I Transport and Road Research Laboratory, UK. 
The TRRL study involved a multi-disciplinary team of researchers being on call 24 
hours a day for a period of four years between 1970 and 1974 in the area around the 
Transport and Road Research Laboratory in South East Berkshire, UK. The team 
were called to RTA scenes by the police authorities immediately they received 
notification of an incident. At the scene, the investigators recorded brief details of a 
non-permanent nature, such as skid marks and the position of the vehicles involved 
after the impacts, and conducted brief interviews with those involved. At a later date 
some vehicles were examined by a specialist team, partly due to a requirement of an 
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additional project that required in-depth analysis of the effects of brake defects on 
RTA causation, (Sabey and Staughton 1975). 
Subsequently a verbal reconstruction of the RTA was made by the investigation 
team, appraising the role of the different factors recorded for each RTA in 
contributing to it's occurrence. Thus the role of the various factors identified in the 
investigation was deduced by the RTA investigation tearns. 
The total sample employed consisted of 2130 RTAs, which can be broken down into 
3757 drivers, 147 pedestrians, and 3909 vehicles. 1316 of the RTAs involved injury 
to one person or more, of which 1993 persons were injured. This represents 60% of 
all injury RTAs reported to the police in the area and 20% of damage only RTAs 
reported to the police, (Sabey and Staughton 1975, Sabey and Taylor 1980). 
Further analysis showed that the distribution of RTAs within each category, (injury 
or non injury) were not significantly different between these categories. The survey 
was regarded as being representative of South East Berkshire, but not of the country 
as a whole. This was intentional as one of the aims of the study was to determine the 
efficacy of such a method of obtaining information pertaining to RTA causation 
rather than to definitively produce a list of the causes of RTAs. The rural nature of 
the base for the study was expected to demonstrate that specific RTA patterns would 
be overly and underly represented compared to the population norms. This was 
subsequently verified through an analysis of the RTA types studied, (Sabey and 
Staughton 1975, Sabey and Taylor 1980). 
The most important outcome of the study was viewed to be the contributory factors 
assigned to the RTAs studied. This was because this was the first large scale study 
whose aim was specifically to elicit such information. These factors were 
concentrated into three main groups corresponding to the three domains of 
information outlined in Zimmer's (1980) model of driver behaviour and 
informational exchange (Figure 1.1). These factors were respectively; 
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Those concerned with the road design and environment, (road layout, junction 
visibility, adequacy of road signs and markings, weather conditions and road 
surfaces). 
0 Those concerned with the vehicle, its design and condition. 
9 Those concerned with human factors, (driver or pedestrian, driver's skill, 
judgement and perception, fitness to drive). 
SINGLE 
FACTOR 
DOUBLE 
FACTORS 
TREBLE 
FACTORS 
DOUBLE 
FACTORS 
Figure 2.3 Percentage contributions to RTAs (from Sabey and Staughton 1975) 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the proportional contribution of such factors in terms of their 
contribution to the RTA's occurrence as a percentage of overall RTAs. Thus, the 
road user was assigned to be solely responsible in 65% of all RTAs studied, and 
importantly partially responsible for 95% of RTAs studied. It can be seen that in 
comparison with the other factors identified, human factors can be viewed to be the 
major contribution to RTA causation, (adverse road and environment features 
accounting for 28% of RTAs studied and vehicle defects for only 8.5% of those 
studied). 
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Additionally, the investigation allotted responsibility to the drivers or pedestrians 
involved in RTAs by assigning each to an at fault or not at fault category, and 
judged errors made by the drivers according to a series of categories of driver error 
specific to their RTA. In terms of fault, of the drivers, 40% were judged to be at 
fault, 19% partially at fault and 39% not at fault. 
In all, 23 categories of driver error were chosen (Table 2.7), albeit somewhat 
arbitrarily, but on the basis of past experience chosen to cover all likely events, 
(Sabey and Staughton 1975). It was noted that the boundaries between some 
classifications were not always clearly defined and in many cases several factors 
were used to describe the driver's behaviour. Consequently, the factors are not 
mutually exclusive and as such there are many links between the factors; e. g. there 
are strong links between lack of care and looked but failed to see, and between lack 
of attention and following too close. 
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Table 2.7 Human errors contributing to RTAs, (from Sabcy and Staughton 
1975). 
Driver Error Frequency of 
occurrence 
Lack of care 905 
Too fast 450 
Looked but failed to see 367 
Distraction 337 
Inexperience 215 
Failed to look 183 
Wrong path 175 
Lack of attention 52 
Improper overtaking 146 
Incorrect interpretation 
Lack of judgement 116 
Misjudged speed and distance 109 
Following too close 75 
Difficult manoeuvre 70 
Irresponsible or reckless 61 
Wrong decision or reckless 50 
Lack of education or road craft 48 
Faulty signalling 47 
Lack of skill 33 
Frustration 15 
Bad habit 12 
Wrong position for manoeuvre 7 
Aggressive 6 
Total 3704 
An important aspect of this study is that the majority of factors constituting poor 
behaviour relate to some deficiency in the driver's actions rather than deliberate 
aggressiveness or irresponsibility. This contrasts with later work by Parker et al 
(1995) wherein deliberate (though non malevolent), violations of safe driving 
practices are correlated positively with RTAs. However, despite the lack of a 
comprehensive model of human error in accident causation, the role of error in RTA 
causation was clearly paramount in one of the first large scale, in-depth RTA 
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investigations. It was also evident, that in the majority of cases, more than one error 
or failure was implicated in the cause of the RTA. 
These human errors can be described as fitting into one of four categories, namely 
errors due to lack of skill, driver impairment, manner of execution, and perceptual 
error, (Figure 2.4). A notable feature of this is that errors categorised as errors in the 
manner of execution were regarded to be the major human error associated with 
RTAs, (accounting for 75%). 
The next most frequent errors were perceptual errors which were viewed to account 
for 44% of road user errors, (Sabey and Staughton 1975, Sabey and Taylor 1980). 
Mourant and Rockwell (1970,1972) have noted that whilst younger drivers are 
significantly better than their older peers in terms of perceptual skills, they have 
different visual search patterns compared to more experienced drivers. This may 
account to some extent for their over involvement in RTAs as a population of 
drivers. It has subsequently been demonstrated that significant positive correlations 
exist between in vehicle visual demands and RTA rate, (Wierwillie and Tijerina 
1995). 
Vehicle Road User Road 
Failure Error Environment 
9% 95% 
1 
28% 
- 1 
Lack of 
1 I 1 
Perceptual Driver Impairment Ma !r of Execution 
Skill Error (e. g. Drunk) (e. g. Speed) 
1601o 44% 
I 
3301o 75% 
F-T 
Distraction Lack of 
II 
Incorrect *ed But 
I 
Misjudged Speed 
16% Attention Interpretation Failed to See and Dsitance 
6% 5% 17% 5% 
Figure 2.4 RTA causation mechanisms, (from Sabey and Staughton 1975). 
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The most significant result of this study was the establishment of the relative 
importance of different factors as the main contributors to the occurrence of RTAs. 
The majority of RTAs however, whilst having a multiplicity of causes were viewed 
to have human errors as the causative factors. 
2. Z3.2 Indiana. 
The Indiana study (Treat 1980) utilised essentially the same methodology as the 
TRRL study but modified it slightly by using the three level approach to data 
collection thereby allocating each factor as being a definite, probable or possible 
factor in the causal chain of events leading to an RTA. 
Additionally, Treat (1980) produced a definition of a reasonable driver, this being 
someone who is at all times alert, sober and attentive to road use, performing to high 
but not unusual standards of good defensive road use. This definition was used as a 
standard to judge each road user as a means to determine the factors implicated in 
each RTA. 
The results obtained were essentially similar to those of the TRRL study, indicating 
that human factors were definite causal factors in 70.7% of RTAs and as definite or 
probable causal factors in 92.6% of RTAs. 
Z Z3.3 Institute of Transport Studies, UK 
The study performed in Leeds in the late 1980s, (Carsten, Tight and Southwell 1989, 
Southwell, Carsten, Tight and Plows 1990), built on earlier studies in terms of 
methodologies, but focused more tightly on the human factors implicated in the 
causation of an RTA. It was therefore the most comprehensive in-depth RTA study 
to date focusing specifically on the human factors impinging on RTA causation. As 
such, this is the in-depth study of most relevance to the current study and will be 
reviewed in detail. 
The study employed data from interviews and questionnaires, police report forms 
and a site visit, which were combined to determine the human factors behind an 
RTAs occurrence. However, as the main focus of the investigation was to determine 
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these human factors, in contrast to other in-depth investigations, the study did not 
involve an on the scene type investigation requiring the RTA team to be on call 24 
hours a day. A site visit was however undertaken at a later time. The reasoning 
behind this was that the purpose of the site visit was to draw together all the 
information pertaining to a given RTA, and to come conclusions regarding the 
human issues pertaining to the RTA's cause, rather than to measure the outcome of 
the RTA in terms of the final resting position of the vehicles involved. 
The sample employed in the Leeds study was restricted to injury only RTAs. As 
Sabey and Staughton (1975) and Sabey and Taylor (1980) demonstrated that there 
was no difference between RTAs resulting in injury, and those that resulted in 
damage only, and since large under reporting to the police of damage only RTAs has 
previously been demonstrated, (Hobbes et al 1979), this was not felt to bias the 
sample. Additionally this simplified the data collection process as potentially 
sensitive data relating to the cause of an RTA were not required from those that had 
been injured, or had caused injury to others. A requirement of the study was that 
1000 cases were to be investigated and that these cases should fall within the five 
police subdivisions of the Leeds metropolitan area. This contrasts with the largely 
rural nature of the Transport and Road Research Laboratories study, (Sabey and 
Staughton 1975, Sabey and Taylor 1980). 
The most important aspect of the Leeds study was the development and use of a 
hierarchical scheme of 154 contributory factors (outlined schematically in Figure 
2.5. A full list of these factors is presented in Appendix 1). These factors were 
participant based rather than RTA based. In practice, this means that all the 
contributory factors for each participant were coded for a given RTA, rather than 
coding factors for the RTA as a whole. This allows different coding factors to be 
allocated for different participants in the same RTA. For example, one driver in a 
two vehicle RTA may view the road environment immediately before an RTA scene 
as ambiguous, whilst the other driver may view the scene as non ambiguous. A 
coding scheme of this nature which had not been used before in in-depth RTA 
studies allowed these differences to be noted. 
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The contributory factors were defined as road user or traffic systems failures without 
which the RTA would not have happened, (Southwell et at 1990). It was emphasised 
that this way of defining a factor specifically removes the issue of blame from a 
participant by implying that there was some system failure rather than fault on 
behalf of a participant. An example of a commonly assigned factor was 'unable to 
anticipate', which was assigned when a road user was aware that an RTA was 
imminent, but had insufficient time to avoid or prevent the RTA from occurring. 
The factors were arranged in a hierarchy that allowed a structured approach to the 
RTA's causes to be deduced. At the top level were failures, the immediate events 
that precipitated an RTA such as failure to yield when turning right. The next level 
dealt with the road user behaviours or lack of skills that led to the top level failure, 
for example looking, but failing to see an oncoming vehicle at a junction. The lowest 
level of the factors were the explanations for the middle level behaviours or top level 
failures for example distraction or situational problems such as obstruction due to 
the weather conditions. Additionally some factors were coded in an intermediary 
level. These were factors such as driving too fast or following a lead vehicle too 
closely that were neither direct precipitators of the RTA, or behavioural explanations 
for the failures but increased the likelihood of an RTAs occurrence. 
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FAILURES NO NKNOWN I Fu I Braking suddenly FAILURE 
(Reasonably/unreason ably) 
Failure to signal 
Failure to yield 
Situational problem 
Following too close 
Driving too fast for occasion 
SKILLS Unable 
Didn't See to see 
Failed to Look 
(at all / partial) 
Lack of 
judgment 
ATTIT DE ANTAGONISTICI 
Foolhardy BEHAV. IOUR 
U 
Deliberate Aggressive 
I Ibel 
REASONS 
Inexperience (driving/of car) 
Panic 
Distraction (physical external/physical internal/physical pedestrian/mental) 
Brake Defect 
Slippery Road (low skid resistance/weUmud or gravel or oiUice/snow/water) 
Frustration 
Showing off 
In a hurry 
Figure 2.5 A schematic contributory factors coding scheme, (from Carsten et al 
1989, Southwell et al 1990). 
However, there are two caveats to this. The factors were deliberately limited, firstly 
by using the definition of reasonable driver, (Treat 1980), thereby producing a 
standard against which to judge each road user's behaviour, and secondly by setting 
a criterion on how broadly a systems failure could be construed. The standard 
chosen for the second criterion was that of the existing traffic environment at the 
time of the crash. For example brake defects were coded when a vehicle had a faulty 
braking system, whereas an absence of anti-lock brakes was not coded as a factor. 
Secondly, following the Indiana study, (Treat 1980), it was noted that whilst a 
contributory factor may be present, it was not possible to determine with absolute 
certainty that this factor was responsible for a subsequent crash. Whilst the Indiana 
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study utilised three levels of certainty, the Leeds study employed just two, failures 
and their causes that were definite, or that were probable, the third level employed in 
the Indiana study not having been utilised much was therefore excluded. 
Thus using this novel hierarchy of factors, an RTA could be coded from the point of 
view of all participants involved at two levels, rather than just at one level and for 
the RTA as a whole. As a result, a much better understanding of the human factors 
issues underlying RTA causation was arrived at. 
The major findings of this study relate to the contributory factors scheme and its 
applicability to the RTAs studied. This scheme was created especially for the 
investigation and underwent extensive testing in the field before it was used for the 
study. Subsequently the scheme underwent minor revisions during the course of the 
study and was felt by the investigation team to be a substantial improvement over 
previous methodologies employed in RTA research, in that it allowed a far more 
detailed examination of the human factors impinging on RTA causation (Southwell 
et al 1990). 
Of the 1254 injury RTAs studied, the largest fraction were between two vehicles, 
(47.7%), with the next highest category being single vehicle RTAs (35.1%). The 
RTAs were fairly evenly distributed by day of the week, (ranging from 12% on 
Sundays to 19% on Fridays). 69% of RTAs occurred in daylight, 79% in fine 
weather and 59% on dry roads. Of the 2454 participants, 1963 were vehicle drivers, 
(the remainder being adult or child pedestrians or cyclists). Overall the interview and 
questionnaire response rate was 49.4%, however some information on non 
respondents was obtained via police records. 
With respect to the location of RTAs, approximately 70% occurred at junctions. Of 
these RTAs, the vast majority, (72%) occurred at give way signs, the remainders 
being at controlled junctions or stop signs, (12%), or at uncontrolled junctions, 
(16%). When asked about their driving behaviour 35% admitted that they quite often 
exceeded the speed limits in urban areas, though only 4% felt that driving 
excessively fast may have contributed to their RTA. This may reflect positive self 
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biases within the individual driver, (McKenna et al 1991), or may simply reflect that 
the majority of drivers, when asked to compare themselves to the average driver 
view themselves to be both more skilful and safer, (Svenson 1981). 
With respect to previous RTA involvement, one third had been involved in at least 
one previous RTA in the previous three years, the majority of these having been 
involved in only one incident. 
The overall numbers of contributory factors, coded by level are given in Table 2.8. 
The major first level factors, in order of appearance in the data set were unable to 
anticipate, failure to yield (minor to major) and loss of control, with 29.0%, 9.8% 
and 7.4% of the sample falling into these categories. Additionally, 13.9% of the 
sample were coded as no failure at the top level, and 10.8% of the sample were 
coded as unknown. It was seen that substantial differences were found between ages 
and genders with respect to these top level factors. An example of this is factors such 
as failures to anticipate which were coded significantly more for younger drivers, 
(under 24) as compared to older drivers, perhaps relating to a lack of experience of 
these drivers, (Southwell et al 1990), or due to perceptual problems such as poor 
visual search patterns leading to slower perception of hazards ahead, (Mourant and 
Rockwell 1970,1972). In terms of gender differences, a higher proportion of males 
than females suffered from loss of control and manoeuvre problems, whereas a 
higher proportion of females compared to males were coded as no failure or failures 
to yield. 
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Table 2.8 Contributory factors coded by level, (from Carsten et al 1989, 
Southwell et al 1990). 
Failures Definite known No Failure or Total 
Unknown 
First Level 1846 588 2434 
(Failure) 
Second Level 350 0 350 
(Failure) 
Third Level 1214 486 1700 
(Behaviour or 
Action) 
Fourth Level 664 376 1040 
(Reason) 
Totals 4074 1450 5524 
In terms of second level factors, overall the most common were situational 
problems, defined as being a site or environmental situation in which any reasonable 
road user would have difficulty. This concurs with evidence that has been found 
elsewhere, (Watts and Quimby 1980), to suggest that certain environmental sites are 
inherently more risky. 
The other second level factors, driving too fast for the occasion, and following too 
close were coded for approximately 30% and 8% of RTAs respectively. This 
indicates that overall in the population of RTAs, these factors alone account for 5% 
and 1% of RTAs respectively. However, it is expected that both these factors may be 
potentially under reported due to the sensitive nature of disclosing such information. 
The third level factors were coded as being perceptual failures, misinterpretation, 
cognitive failures and unable to see, and accounted for 23.8%, 20.8%, 12.5% and 
10.45 respectively. In contrast to the TRRL study, (Sabey and Staughton 1975), 
perceptual errors account for considerably less errors than suggested by Sabey; the 
TRRL study suggesting 44% of road user errors were perceptual in nature. This 
discrepancy may however, be largely due to the different coding schemes used in 
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each study. No especial differences were noted in terms of the different errors coded 
by age, however a higher proportion of cognitive errors were found amongst females 
as compared to males, (15.7% compared to 11.7% of third level factors). 
Of the fourth level factors, of note is that only 5 contributory factors out of a total of 
1040 coded were vehicle defects. This contrasts with previous RTA studies in which 
higher proportions of RTAs were attributed to vehicle defects, (for example 2.5% of 
single factors for the TRRL study, Sabey and Staughton 1975). It should be noted, 
that of the remaining, human factors, which are in theory explanations of the above 
behaviours and failures, 34% of the factors coded at the fourth level were unknown. 
Thus approximately one third of the explanations of the higher level failures and 
behaviours were not deduced by this analysis and further analysis was therefore 
precluded. However, it was noted that of the third level perceptual errors that were 
explained by a fourth level factor, this fourth level factor was most often distraction. 
In terms of the interactions between levels of the coding scheme, almost half of the 
top level failures to yield were explained by perceptual errors, whereas 14% were 
explained by cognitive errors. However, 27% of these failures to yield could not be 
explained with the available information. Losses of control by drivers were most 
frequently explained by driving too fast, (26.7%) and various types of impairment, 
(13.7%). 
In common with the results of subsequent studies, (for example Parker et al 1995), 
variations in the patterns of links between top level failures and lower level 
explanations were found between genders and ages. Top level failures explained by 
driving too fast were more common for males and younger drivers than females and 
older drivers. Additionally, there is some indication from the data that younger 
drivers lost control of their vehicles more often than older drivers because of skills 
errors, this being more common amongst females than males. 
In terms of faults however, whilst 41.0% of drivers were considered to be at fault, 
there were no gender differences between those assigned to be at fault and those not 
at fault, but the faults themselves differed with more males than females responsible 
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for culpable faults, (such as driving too fast), whereas females were more 
responsible for non culpable mistakes type faults. With respect to age, fault 
decreased to a low at 50-59 years, then rose for those over 60. Since categorisations 
of fault were performed for all participants, (including those from whom an 
interview or questionnaire was not obtained), it was possible to determine whether 
there was a difference between attributions of fault on the basis of whether or not a 
participant agreed to an interview. As the interview data was used to assign fault in 
some cases, a higher rate of unknown fault was found amongst those who did not 
give an interview as compared to those that did. Using the cases with known fault, it 
was found that of the refusals, 60.4% were deemed to be at fault, compared to 52.9% 
of non refusals. 
Whilst this approach to categorising the human factors impinging on RTA causation 
has made a significant improvement in methodological terms there are some 
limitations to this approach, (Southwell et at 1990). Specifically; 
0 As the study relied upon a case-by-case basis, it cannot assess the extent to 
which these factors act in the driving population as a whole. An example given, 
is that without a parallel exposure study, this method cannot account for the 
increased risk of an RTA due to inexperience or fatigue, (Carsten et al 1989, 
Southwell et al 1990). 
0 Due to the above, and the nature of the interaction effects expected between the 
contributory factors outlined, it is therefore not possible with this method to 
gauge the effects of the interactions between the contributory factors in the 
population as a whole. Thus for example, the increased risk due to the 
interactions of the factors affecting a young, mate driver who has been drinking 
and subsequently drives home on a wet Friday night, in terms of his elevated risk 
of an RTA compared to a sober, 50 year old female driver who is driving mid 
week during daylight hours cannot be deduced. It has been suggested elsewhere 
however, (Evans 1991), that these effects will be multiplicative in nature and that 
the worst case illustrated above will be resulting in an elevated risk of 
62 
Literature reviews. 
approximately 1000 times that of the best case. Whilst this is certainly a very 
large increase in risk, it would seem from the published RTA data that these 
risks are not borne in mind by these at risk drivers. 
0 The study did not go into great detail regarding the psychological factors 
associated with the fourth level failures. This was partly due to the design of the 
study; the interview techniques chosen were straightforward and rather factual in 
nature, (Southwell et al 1990), and as such did not readily allow such data to be 
elicited. Additionally, it may have been due to the large number of factors that 
were coded as unknown at this level. Several reasons may exist for this latter 
element. Due partly to the traumatic nature of RTAs and partly to the fact that 
something unexpected occurred, (else the driver would have been able to take 
prior avoiding actions), it may not have been possible for those involved to 
accurately give an assessment of such contributory factors. Thus, they may be 
able to state that the situation was visually misleading or distracting, they may 
not be able to state what was the cause of the distraction or confusion. 
Additionally, some factors such as inexperience, impairment due to alcohol or 
drugs may not be readily admitted. 
0 Finally, the study relied on the judgement of the team in deciding upon the 
contributory factors for each RTA participant, and upon deciding between 
conflicting statements of drivers. Both of these effects may lead to errors in the 
results. 
2.7 4 Case study Wroaches. 
Z 74.1 Institut National de Recherche surles Transports etleurSicupiti, France. 
Between 1980 and 1987, the Department of Accident Mechanisms at the Institut 
National de Recherche sur les Transports et leur Securite, (INRETS), conducted an 
in-depth investigation of RTAs in the Salon de Provence region of France. Over the 
course of this study, 400 RTAs were examined in detail. The aim of this study was 
to reduce the number and severity of RTAs, (Girard 1993) by gathering data relating 
63 
Literature reviews. 
to the causes of accident in an attempt to design appropriate countermeasures. In 
contrast to other in-depth studies, the INRETS methodology made specific reference 
to the cognitive functioning of the driver by adopting a model of driver behaviour as 
a basis for their research, (Girard 1993). The model assumes that as drivers gain 
experience, they store a catalogue of roadway situations which act as prototypes for 
categorising subsequent situations. Whilst driving environmental information is 
filtered, this filtering process becoming gradually more automatic as skill increases. 
RTAs are viewed to result due to failures at some level in the sequence of 
information processing. As a consequence of this, the INRETS methodology both 
paid particular attention to the drivers account of the road scenario prior to the RTA 
and the interpretation the drivers made of these scenarios. In addition, the data 
collection was geared towards factors that may have influenced information 
processing. 
The data collection was geared towards reconstructing the scenario that resulted in 
an RTA, and identifying mechanisms and interactions that made up the scenario. 
Since much of this information is temporal in nature, the investigators were required 
to examine the RTA scene as soon as possible after the incident. In practice, the 
INRETS team were alerted to an RTA at the same time as the emergency services 
and collected as much information as was possible at the scene of the accident. This 
on the scene data collection focused on vanishing data, (Girard 1993), such as skid 
marks, final locations of the vehicles involved, weather and roadway conditions. 
These data, together with preliminary assessments of the vehicles were collected by 
a trained technician. A psychologist assisted with this data collection and 
interviewed the driver on the scene if possible, or as soon as was possible 
afterwards. The driver was asked to describe firstly what happened, then was 
interviewed in detail concerning their intentions at the time of the RTA, what they 
had seen and were aware of and the nature of the actions they had taken. 
Subsequently, a second phase of data collection was undertaken which concentrated 
on demographics of the driver, details of the journey being undertaken and a 
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technical vehicle inspection. An initial reconstruction was then undertaken which 
was the basis for a full kinematic reconstruction of the scene. 
The analysis proceeded in two phases. Firstly, the sequence of events leading to the 
RTA was explicitly described with special reference to the triggering event and any 
emergency manoeuvres undertaken. Secondly, the mechanisms contributing to the 
sequence of events were identified having divided the RTA scenario as a whole into 
four phases. These phases were the driving phase, (the normal driving situation); the 
discontinuity phase, (the unexpected event interrupting the normal driving); the 
emergency phase, (the time between the discontinuity and accident in which the 
drivers may attempt any avoiding actions); and the crash phase, (in which the crash 
and its consequences occur). It can be seen that a number of parallels between these 
phases and the accident sequence model presented in Figure 2.1 therefore exist. 
One of the most important results of this study was the description of what was 
described as 'prototypical accident scenarios', (Fleury, Fline and Peytavin 1988, 
Fleury and Brenac 1997, Lechner and Ferrandez 1990, Malaterre, Fontain and van 
Elslande 1992). The prototypical accident scenarios were described as a series of 
processes 'corresponding to a series of accidents which are similar in terms of the 
chains of facts and causal relationships found throughout the various accident 
stages', (Fleury and Brenac 1997, pp. 1). The concept of prototypical scenarios 
allows data from a number of RTAs to be combined to allow knowledge to be 
generalised across a number of studies. In practice, cases with overall similarities 
were grouped into categories before the sequential analysis was undertaken, thus this 
process was essentially qualitative in nature. Since the focus of this work was to 
provide a basis to design countermeasures, the RTAs in the database were split at a 
very gross level into global RTA types, (for example RTAs involving HGVs, Fleury 
and Brenac 1997, or RTAs involving elderly pedestrians in urban areas, Yerpez 
1996, Yerpez and Girard 1996). Each of these global types lead to a different 
number of prototypical scenarios, HGV RTAs for example resulting in 5, (Fleury 
and Brenac 1997), RTAs at roadworks resulting in 6, (Mercier 1993). Due to the 
variety of possible factors influencing RTA causation across different global RTA 
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types, it should not be expected that different global accident scenarios would 
produce the same number and structure of prototypical accident scenarios. A similar 
position has already been stated with respect to the failure to produce a single 
universally acceptable theory of human error. 
2. Z4.2 Transport Research Laboratories, United Kingdom. 
Three case study based RTA investigations have been carried out and published by 
Transport Research Laboratories, (TRL, formerly TRRL), since 1995, Clarke, 
Forsyth and Wright (1995), Broughton and Markey (1996) and West (1997). 
Clarke et al (1995) studied 200 police reports of right turn accidents provided by 
Nottinghamshire constabulary in the UK. The main purpose of this study was to 
attempt an in-depth study that clustered accidents in a systematic manner using a 
computer based sequential analysis of the accident reports, (utilising a specially 
devised Transport Related Accident Analysis Language). Clarke et al (1995), had 
argued that many of the previous RTA studies had suffered from the problem of 
subjectivity in coding RTA types and causal factors. It was demonstrated that using 
the algorithms devised RTAs could be categorised meaningfully into a natural 
taxonomy of scenarios which could then be used as the basis for future interventions. 
For example, the severity of an incident could be determined with 77% accuracy 
from consideration of the nature of the other vehicle involved, the season and 
junction type and from whether the driver noticed another road user or not, (Clarke 
et al 1998). Some problems existed however with the algorithms which resulted in 
specific failures. For example, no distinction could be made between RTAs 
involving young or old drivers, nor could a distinction be drawn between mate and 
female drivers. Given the number of other studies making these distinctions, both of 
these can be viewed as serious methodological failures. 
Broughton and Markey (1996) specifically aimed to provide guidance to motor 
manufacturers about the nature of equipment they could provide to drivers to reduce 
the number of RTAs. To achieve this, they studied two samples of 1000 RTAs, one 
sample of fatal accidents reported to the police and accessed through their records, 
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and one of non fatal accidents reported to the drivers' insurance company. This latter 
sample was accessed directly through the insurance company involved. Thus the 
final sample comprised approximately one fifth of all fatal RTAs in the UK in 1994 
as well as a range of severities from the insurance company. The majority of the 
RTAs accessed from the insurance group, (88%) involved damage, but no personal 
injury. 
A single causation factor list was drawn up from a review of previous studies and 
similarly to the Leeds study a hierarchy of factors was produced. This hierarchy was 
simpler than that of the Leeds study as this was felt to be unnecessarily complex. 
Broughton and Markey (1996) distinguished between precipitating and causation 
factors, the former being the failures and manoeuvres that immediately lead to the 
RTA and the latter being the causes of these failures. 
Broughton and Markey (1996) identified 7 accident clusters by cross tabulating the 
most common precipitating and causation factors. These clusters were as follows; 
Fatal RTA: Driver looses control due to driving too fast, (224 cases). 
Fatal RTA: Driver looses control because of a lack of judgement about their own 
path, (77 cases). 
Fatal RTA: Pedestrian fails to give way to driver, (262 cases). 
Non-fatal RTA: Driver hits object in carriageway due to distraction, (61 cases). 
Non-fatal RTA: Driver hits object in carriageway due to failure to judge another 
vehicle's speed, (60 cases). 
Non-fatal RTA: Driver looses control on slippery surface due to ice or snow. 
Non-fatal RTA: Other driver hits an object in the carriageway due to excessive 
speed, (112 cases). 
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Additionally, each RTA cluster was associated with specific situational and 
demographic factors, for example cluster 1 was more likely than the average to 
involve a single vehicle, driven by a young male driver on a wet road and at night 
with no street lights. 
Whilst demonstrating the efficacy of their procedure in clustering accidents, some 
methodological problems existed. Firstly, as the insurance company data were 
collected over winter months, Broughton and Markey (1996) acknowledged that the 
role of poor weather appears to be more prevalent in their data than would be 
expected. Secondly, the samples in the police and insurance company datasets were 
not equivalent. The fatal RTAs were sampled exclusively from vehicles with a 
registration prefix of G or later whereas the insurance company dataset had no such 
restriction. Demographic differences between the two datasets and temporal 
differences between the occurrence of the two sets of RTAs may have influenced the 
distribution of the final clusters. 
Finally, analyses of data collected initially for other purposes are problematic as 
Frampton (1997) described. In the current case, it was not possible to obtain more 
detailed information regarding specific accidents in the data sets. By necessity 
therefore, some accidents were excluded from the analyses. It is likely therefore that 
less severe RTAs would have differentially been excluded from the results as these 
are in general not recorded as completely as more severe accidents. Although no 
differences in causation have been found in fatal compared to non fatal RTAs, 
(Sabey and Staughton 1975, Sabey and Taylor 1980), significant advances in 
methodology since these findings may call this conclusion into question. 
West (1997) described the results of two studies started in 1987 and 1990 in which 
drivers were asked to describe RTAs that they had recently been involved in. Drivers 
were asked to provide brief written statements concerning RTAs as part of a national 
driver survey. These descriptions were then rated into 'scripts' by trained judges 
who were in general in agreement concerning the nature of the script assigned for 
each RTA, (80% of the cases being rated similarly). Additionally, the drivers were 
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rated as being active or passive in the RTA depending on the role they played in its 
causation, (passive drivers being those hit by another who was regarded as causing 
the RTA whilst active drivers were those responsible for the cause of the RTA). The 
resultant scripts were; 
0 Shunts. 
* Right of way violations. 
* Accidents involving loss of control of the vehicle. 
0 Accidents while reversing. 
0 Accidents caused by lane changing. 
0 Hitting pedestrians on the roadways. 
a Hitting animals on the roadways. 
0 Hitting objects on the roadways. 
0 Hitting open car doors. 
A comparison of 8900 drivers replying in 1987 and 1990 revealed that involvement 
in certain types of RTAs in the years preceding 1987 differentially increased the risk 
of being involved in the same RTA types between 1987 and 1990. Active and 
passive shunts, active right of way violations and active loss of control RTAs all 
showed this pattern. In addition, examination of demographic characteristics across 
these scripts showed that different types of drivers are more likely to be involved in 
different RTA scripts, young mate drivers for example being at more risk of active 
shunts and active loss of control violations. Overall drivers were concluded to be 
reliable both in their reporting of the RTAs in which they were involved and in the 
consistency of the type of these RTAs over time. 
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2. Z5 Data collected in in-depth in vestigations. 
2.7.5.1 Reliability and validity of data. 
The reliability of the data obtained in any investigation is of paramount importance. 
The data themselves can be split into three categories; factual evidence from 
observation, evidence based on interviews or questionnaires administered to either 
those involved or witnesses, and the evidence based on the assessment of errors 
made by the road users, (most commonly performed by the investigation team, for 
example see Sabey and Staughton 1975). Whilst considerable efforts are made to 
ensure that all of these data are accurate and reliable, errors can and do occur within 
the data. Factual evidence such as the age or gender of the individuals involved in an 
incident are usually subject to little error. However errors of this type have been 
demonstrated to occur in the STATS19 database, (Southwell et al 1990). 
The quality of the evidence obtained from interviews or questionnaires will vary 
greatly, much of the reliability depends on the honesty and reliability of the 
interviewee, (Sabey and Staughton 1975, Clarke et al 1995), but additionally the 
skill of the interviewer in administration if applicable. A common technique to 
ensure inter-rater reliability is to record a number of the interviews and have another 
member of the RTA investigation team score an interview independently. Any 
serious differences between the two assessments are resolved by the two 
interviewers concerned and where necessary some retraining has been done. This 
technique has been used by most in-depth studies with good effect, (Sabey and 
Staughton 1975, Southwell et al 1990, Treat 1980, West 1997). However, it has been 
argued that over learned behaviour such as driving may be inaccessible to verbal 
reports by drivers and that therefore such approaches are inherently flawed, (Clarke 
et al 1995). 
A notable feature of all large scale, in-depth studies is that they involve a team of 
researchers, usually with varied backgrounds. Such studies are usually referred to as 
Multidisciplinary Accident Investigations, (MDAI), the members of the teams 
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involved typically varying widely, and have included; trained accident investigators, 
mechanical engineers, automotive engineers, interviewers, doctors, sociologists, 
accident reconstruction specialists, police and psychologists, (Grime 1987, Evans 
1991, Southwell et al 1990). 
An important feature of such teams is that by increasing the variety of different team 
members, potential biases within the team due to a narrow range of experience 
within a group of given profession are lessened (Southwell et al 1990), i. e. the 'stop 
rules' applied in any given accident investigation are less likely to be biased towards 
a particular domain. However, in large scale studies, strenuous efforts must be made 
to ensure that the team members are consistent with their data collection, (Southwell 
et al 1990). As has been noted, there exists a potential bias wherein inexperienced 
interviewers may in inadvertently lead a person being interviewed, (Carsten et al 
1989, Evans 1991, Grime 1987, Southwell et al 1990). Similarly inexperienced RTA 
investigators may well miss some aspect of the vehicles condition that would have 
contributed to the RTA's causation. When the required efforts to ensure reliability 
and consistency have been made, it is generally assumed however, that with in-depth 
investigations involving some aspect of reconstruction, such large multidisciplinary 
teams are worthwhile, though expensive undertakings. Clarke et al (1995) however 
note the possibility of heterogeneous teams resulting in differing interpretations of 
the events surrounding an RTA which may lead to an obscuration of the actual 
events. 
In-depth studies may be categorised according to the length of time between the 
RTA's occurrence and the time of the investigation. The majority of studies are 
performed 'on the spot', i. e. at the site of the RTA and at the time, or as near as 
possible after the time of the RTA's occurrence, (for example Fleury et al 1988, 
Fleury and Brenac 1997, Lechner and Ferrandez 1990, Malaterre, et at 1992, Sabey 
and Staughton 1975, Sabey and Taylor 1980, Treat 1980). These studies are thus 
arranged such that the researchers attend the scenes of the RTAs as soon as possible 
after the RTA has occurred. 
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The reason for on-the-spot investigations is that the quality and accuracy of the data 
obtained is potentially enhanced over studies in which data are obtained in a 
different manner. Thus accurate measurements of the positions of debris and of the 
vehicles themselves after the crash can be obtained rather than for example relying 
on sketches from drivers. Finally, interviews may be attempted at the scene with 
those that have been directly or indirectly involved in the RTA, (either RTA 
participants or witnesses). This has the advantage that those interviewed will have a 
recent memory of the events and will not have had the time to modify their version 
of the events in an effort to shift the blame to another person involved in the RTA. 
This can be demonstrated by the fact that a majority of drivers report that they 
viewed the RTA was the other driver's fault, and that consequently the other driver 
could have prevented the RTA by some action that was not performed, or by 
performing some aspect of the driving task differently, (Southwell et a] 1990). 
The major disadvantages to on-the-spot investigations are the costs involved in 
having a team on standby for 24 hours a day and the logistics of obtaining 
notification of the RTAs sufficiently quickly for the research team to be able to 
arrive on scene. Studies have addressed the second issue by using a variety of 
methods of obtaining RTA notifications, for example direct phone links with the 
police or ambulance services or by monitoring the emergency service radio 
frequencies, (Southwell et al 1990). Due to the requirement of large scale studies to 
be statistically representative of the whole population of RTAs, no large scale 
studies have addressed the first issue by specifically comparing in depth the factors 
impinging on RTA causation throughout different times of the day. Grayson and 
Hakkert (1987) suggested that on-the-spot investigations are inherently biased 
towards RTAs involving injury and those occurring during office hours as few 
efforts are made to perform these studies in any other manner. 
An alternative methodology to obtaining the information from the scene, is to 
interview those involved at some time after the RTA. In practice, this means that the 
vehicle would be looked at within one week of the RTA, the interviews or 
questionnaire distribution is then carried out at some time, (usually within three 
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months) of the RTAs occurrence, (Carsten et al 1989, Southwell et a] 1990). The 
RTA scenes may be viewed at any time afterwards. The obvious advantage of such a 
method is that the team members do not have to be on call 24 hours a day in order to 
arrive at the scene in sufficient time to record the necessary information. 
However, as the scene is not investigated with the vehicle in situ, no non-permanent 
information regarding the RTA are preserved, (for example the final position of the 
vehicles, the position of any debris and the environmental and road traffic conditions 
at that time). Such data may however be obtained from the police report forms, 
(RT7s), but it should be borne in mind that this form of data collection cannot be 
viewed as one hundred percent reliable. The degree of completion of such forms will 
vary depending on several factors such as the individual officer filling the form out, 
the severity of the RTA and the time constraints under which the officer is acting. 
Additionally, examination of several weeks worth of RT7s, (by the current author), 
has demonstrated that there is a tendency for the more severe RTAs and those in 
which fault can easily be attributed to one participant or another to be accompanied 
by more detailed RT7s. 
Importantly, when those involved are not interviewed at the time of the RTA there is 
the potential of biases being introduced into the data obtained from the RTA 
participants or witnesses. 
These biases may be of several forms, and may be consciously or unconsciously 
generated. Examples of deliberate biases are those resulting when one of the 
participants intentionally misleads the investigation team as to the sequence of 
events leading to the RTA. This is most commonly seen where drivers each blame 
the other for an RTAs occurrence. Whilst in some cases the attribution of fault may 
be either unclear or shared amongst the RTA participants, undoubtedly in some 
cases, one or more involved in an RTA will deliberately lie in order to shift blame 
from themselves to another party and thereby attempt to reduce or remove possible 
effects of punitive measures from the police or insurance companies. 
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Additionally, unconscious biases may exist within the data. These result largely 
from those involved not knowing exactly what happened and attempting to form a 
plausible explanation for their actions and those of others. Whilst these 
rational isations may be a correct representation of the sequence of events, they may 
potentially introduce large, and potentially difficult to detect biases in the data. 
In terms of the size and type of RTAs investigated, in-depth studies have varied 
widely. Due to the complexity of RTA scenarios and the number of factors involved, 
(a total of 5793 factors amongst 1254 RTAs were identified in the Leeds study, 
Southwell et al 1990), very large sample sizes are generally required for such studies 
to be statistically representative. Most RTA investigation studies have aimed to have 
a sample size of at least 1000 cases. In practice, these studies are often larger, with 
the sample sizes for the TRRL study and the Leeds study being respectively 2130 
and 1254 RTAs, (Carsten et al 1989, Southwell et al 1990, Sabey 1975, Sabey and 
Taylor 1980). 
The Indiana study was unusual in that it dealt with the RTAs at three interrelating 
levels, a baseline study involving police records, on-site investigation by RTA 
investigators, and an in-depth investigation by a multi-disciplinary RTA 
investigation, (MDAI) team, Treat (1980). Each of these data collection programmes 
was investigated by a separate team and due to the differing types of data collected 
and the consequential different data collection procedures different numbers of cases 
were investigated in each phase of the study, the baseline, on-site and MDAI phases 
each accounting for 13,568,2258 and 420 cases respectively. Whilst RTA causation 
studies have generally attempted to study in excess of 1000 cases, others have 
concentrated on in-depth analyses of much fewer cases. Van Elslande and Faucher- 
Alberton (1996) for example studied 177 RTAs drawn from the INRETS database in 
an analysis of errors related to rigid expectations on behalf of the drivers involved. 
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2.75.2 Summation of data: The case conference. 
A feature of all RTA investigations is a case conference concerning each particular 
RTA under investigation. Typically a team of between two and five members of the 
RTA investigation team will gather all of the information on a specific case and 
review it. This has two purposes, the first of which is to check the accuracy of the 
data between sources as errors have been demonstrated in a variety of official data 
sources for example within the STATS19 dataset, (Southwell et al 1990). 
A second important aspect of the case conference is that it is at this stage that the 
contributing factors for any given RTA are decided upon and assigned by the RTA 
investigation team. Whilst most RTA investigation studies have asked the RTA 
participants questions pertaining to their perceptions of the cause of the RTA, (for 
example had they been drinking and did they feel this was a factor that my have lead to 
the RTA? ), in all cases to date, the contributory factors have been assigned by the RTA 
investigation team. As such there is potential for biases and subjective error, amongst 
those not witnessing the RTA assigning the cause, (Sabey and Staughton 1975, Sabey 
and Taylor 1980, Southwell et al 1990). However, using a multidiscplinary team in a 
case conference should alleviate this to some extent. 
2.8 Potential accident countermeasures. 
2.8.1 How is technology entering the car market? 
Recent advances in sensor, communications and computing technology have led 
motor manufacturers and their suppliers to consider introducing high technology 
driving aids into vehicles. This has led to a vast increase in the potential information 
available to drivers, as well as to the facilities and functions that their vehicles may 
perform for them. In order to achieve this, two research programmes have been 
conducted in Europe, PROMETHEUS and DRIVE. 
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Both of these research programmes focused on the issues underlying the 
implementation of advanced technology into vehicles and were undertaken to perfect 
these technologies. Nevertheless, in practice, these research programmes were 
technology led, focusing on the design and eventual implementation of what was 
technologically feasible, (Broughton and Markey 1996, Galer Flyte 1995). These 
technologies have largely been transferred from other domains, principally 
aerospace. As a consequence, issues of safety, in particular primary safety have not 
been addressed specifically. In effect, any positive safety benefits may be regarded 
as a by product of the desire to implement such technologies into vehicles. 
A vast body of research literature concerning these technologies has been published. 
This literature may be divided roughly into two parts, that concerned with the basic 
human factors issues of interface design, (and to a lesser extent the desired 
functionality of the technology), and that concerned with the behavioural effects of 
such technologies when implemented into vehicles. It is beyond the scope of the 
current review to describe these technologies in detail, however they have been 
categorised as follows, (Table 2.9, from Galer Flyte 1995): 
Table 2.9 Taxonomy of high technology in vehicles, (from Galer Flyte 1995). 
Category. Examples of systems. 
Systems that directly impinge on the Collision avoidance 
driving task Lane keeping 
Intelligent cruise control 
Vision enhancement 
Systems that provide information Dynamic route guidance 
relevant to components of the driving Vehicle condition monitoring 
environment, vehicle or driver Driver condition monitoring 
Systems that are unrelated to driving Mobile data terminals 
In-car telephones 
When considering potential accident countermeasures, Sabey and Staughton (1975) 
noted that the most effective remedy is not necessarily related directly to the main 
cause and may even lie in a different domain, particularly in the case of RTAs in 
which the road user fails to cope with the road environment. Additionally, even in 
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circumstances in which human error or impairment has been judged to be the sole 
contributor, it may be possible to influence human behaviour more readily by 
engineering means than by education or enforcement of legislation. However, it can 
be readily seen that the technologies above have been designed without reference to 
the needs of the drivers with respect to preventing RTAs, the results of the RTA 
investigation studies described above have largely been overlooked when 
considering these technologies, (Broughton and Markey 1996). 
As a consequence, motor manufacturers are faced with a plethora of technologies at 
various stages of development but they have no means to determine which of these, 
if any, will have significant effect in reducing the toll of RTAs, (Broughton and 
Markey 1996). The situation is even worse with respect to long term strategic 
decision making concerning which of these technologies should be further 
researched with a view to implementation in the next generation of vehicles. No 
method to achieve this has been published as Yet. However, two in-depth RTA 
studies have specifically addressed the issue of RTA prevention by considering the 
requirements of drivers and the implications of these requirements on technology 
development and implementation, (Malaterre et al 1992, Broughton and Markey 
1996). 
Malaterre et al (1992) performed an analysis of driver needs on the basis of RTA 
data derived from the INRETS database with a view to determining how effective 
the PROMETHEUS technologies would be. The research proceeded in four phases, 
definitions of driver needs, definition of potential system functional ities, correlation 
of needs with functionalities and evaluation of the effectiveness of systems using 
real life RTA data. 
Initially, 3200 RTAs were reviewed on a case by case basis to identify the driver's 
errors immediately prior to the RTA. From a description of these errors, a list of 
needs was deduced. Needs were defined as the critical information or function that 
was required, that had it been satisfied 'the error and therefore the accident, could 
have been avoided', (Malaterre et al 1992, pp. 6). 17 needs were identified across the 
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RTAs studied, each backed up by a description of a case requiring this need. The 
needs were as follows; 
0 Normal level of driver alertness. 
0 Normal level of mechanical functions of vehicle. 
0 Detection of road related difficulty ahead, (for example dangerous bend). 
0 Fixed or mobile obstacle detection. 
Detection of an oncoming road user, (when vision obscured by environmental 
factors). 
Detection of road user on intersecting path, (side or rear impact when other user 
seen too late to take avoiding action). 
* Detection of a road user outside of the normal frontal field of view. 
Detection of unseen pedestrian, (either because of obscuration of vision or due to 
driver's poor attention). 
0 Appropriate speed adaptation to roadway conditions. 
0 Maintaining appropriate headway to vehicle in front. 
Estimation of collision at intersection with another road user, (when neither road 
users had halted). 
0 Gap assessment when overtaking or changing lanes. 
0 Gap assessment when joining traffic flow or cutting across a traffic flow. 
0 Predicting that other road user will allow self to move at intersection. 
0 Predicting manoeuvres of another road user. 
0 Predicting pedestrian behaviour. 
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0 Maintaining control of vehicle. 
As part of the PROMETHEUS programme, a series of demonstrator vehicles were 
developed by the motor manufacturers heading the projects each of which served as 
a platform to illustrate and research a specific system. From a review of the literature 
pertaining to PROMETHEUS and an analysis of these vehicles, a list was produced 
of the functions that the systems would perform if introduced into the vehicle fleet as 
they were. In total, 23 functions were identified, 14 of which Malaterre et al (1992) 
deduced were related to primary safety. These were as follows; 
* Obstacle detection. 
* Monitoring of environment and road. 
* Monitoring the driver. 
0 Monitoring of the vehicle. 
* Vision enhancement. 
0 Safety margin determination. 
0 Critical course determination. 
0 Dynamic vehicle control. 
0 Supportive driver information. 
0 Intelligent manoeuvres. 
0 Intelligent cruise control. 
* Intelligent intersection control. 
0 Medium range pre- information. 
Emergency warning. 
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Driver needs were then cross referenced with PROMETHEUS functionalities to 
produce a matrix illustrating which needs would be served by which functions. Two 
raters then coded 3179 RTA case studies from the INRETS database for 1989 to 
determine the relative numbers of the different needs previously identified. 
Two main results were evident. Firstly, a comparatively large percentage of the 
RTAs could not be coded sufficiently well given the information available, 12.5% 
were coded as indeterminate, (a specific need could not be identified) and 17.2% 
were coded as no need, (no need required). These were coded thus because the 
nature of the data presented to the raters did not always allow a specific need to be 
identified, the raters being presented with case study summaries of the RTAs. 
Secondly, it was noted that comparatively few of the needs would be addressed by 
the functions identified from the PROMETHEUS demonstrators. It would seem that 
this was largely due to issues relating to the implementation of the technologies; 
whilst in theory many of the needs would have been satisfied by the functions 
outlined, in practice the technical specification of the systems precluded their use in 
a large number of cases. Malaterre et al (1992) did note the difficulties in foreseeing 
the effectiveness of driving aids which had not yet been developed and were 
consequently not yet in the vehicle fleet. However, Malaterre et al (1992) concluded, 
(pp. 53); 
'It would seem a pity, however, the choice of demonstrators appears to have been 
motivated more by technological considerations than by taking actual needs, 
supported by accident analysis or on-the-spot studies, into account'. 
This is not to say that the PROMETHEUS work would be potentially ineffective in 
reducing the number of RTAs experienced on the roads, merely that the functions 
performed by the demonstrator vehicles would have limited effect. Broughton and 
Markey (1996) however were more critical of the previous work on advanced 
technologies being introduced into the vehicle fleet, stating that, (pp. 1); 
'much of the earlier research had failed to pay sufficient attention to the actual 
requirements of the car driver in respect of safety. Many research projects have 
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developed new technology, and only then considered the potential safqy 
implications'. 
Broughton and Markey (1996) therefore adopted the reverse and they argued the 
more natural approach of identifying real needs from an analysis of RTA data, then 
specifying functions, (described as Logical Solutions), that a driver would need to 
avoid the RTA in which they were involved. Table 2.10, represents a summary of 
the Logical Solutions identified. 
Table 2.10. Summary of RTA clusters and associated Logical Solutions, (from 
Broughton and Markey 1996). 
RTA Clusters. Logical Solutions. Action. 
1. Fatal RTA: Driver loses Monitors friction, predicts Speed advice, speed 
control due to driving too fast. imminent friction requirement warning, automatic 
and assesses maximum safe intervention. 
speed. 
2. Fatal RTA: Driver loses P redicts trajectory and checks Warning of 
control because of a lack of for potential conflicts with collision, automatic 
judgement about their own vehicles, infrastructure etc. intervention. 
path. 
3. Fatal RTA: Pedestrian fails Detects pedestrians and Automatic 
to give way to driver. checks for potential conflicts. intervention. 
4. Non-fatal RTA: Driver hits Checks ahead of car for Warning, automatic 
object in carriageway due to potential collision. braking. 
distraction. 
5. Non-fatal RTA: Driver hits 
object in carriageway due to 
failure to judge another 
vehicle's speed. 
7. Non-fatal RTA: Other 
driver hits an object in the 
carriageway due to excessive 
speed. 
6. Non-fatal RTA: Driver Checks ahead of car for snow Warning. 
loses control on slippery and ice. 
surface due to ice or snow. 
It is apparent from the above table that to have an effect on the 7 RTA clusters 
identified, only 5 Logical Solutions would be required. Broughton and Markey 
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(1996) additionally considered the level of intervention that any systems should 
perform, some of the Logical Solutions by necessity automatically intervening by for 
example automatically braking when a requirement is detected whilst others merely 
warn the driver of an impending hazard. In addition, assessments were made of the 
likely uptake of these systems into the vehicle fleet and the expected costs and 
benefits of such systems. Based on an economic model of the costs of various 
clusters of accidents, it was concluded that only those systems that would reduce 
RTAs in clusters 1,4,5 and 7 would be commercially viable and therefore likely to 
be introduced in cars. However, suggestions for effective accident countermeasures 
effecting the other RTA clusters were made. 
2.8.2 Implications of case stydýy based RTA countermeasure 
assessments. 
Malaterre et al (1992) demonstrated that the PROMETHEUS demonstrators as they 
function at the time of writing, would have comparatively few benefits with respect 
to reducing the number of RTAs experienced on the roads. Broughton and Markey 
(1996) suggested that when systems are devised based upon the functional 
requirements of drivers in a specific RTA scenario, the systems when implemented 
appropriately could reduce the likelihood of the RTA occurring. Additionally, they 
demonstrated that such systems could be economically viable and that thus they may 
enter the vehicle market and effect a real reduction in the toll of RTAs. 
However, there are three considerations from these studies. Firstly, the effectiveness 
of any system based upon a clustering of RTA scenarios is subject to the potential 
bias inherent in clustering. In effect, statistical procedures may force the data into 
clusters spuriously and therefore the resultant systems would not be generalisable to 
the RTA population as a whole. It is for this reason that statistical approaches to this 
technique should only be performed on appropriately large sample sizes. 
Secondly, even if all new vehicles are equipped with such devices, it will take many 
years for such systems to reach full saturation within the vehicle fleet. The potential 
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benefits of systems requiring interaction between similarly equipped vehicles will 
thus be sub-optimal during this period. 
Thirdly, whilst any warning or intervention based system may reduce the likelihood 
of an RTA occurring, (or even prevent it completely), unless these systems are fully 
automated, to some extent the probability of an RTA being prevented will depend 
upon the driver behaving in a reasonable manner, (see Treat 1980). Certain classes 
of drivers may for example choose to ignore warnings. There is the suggestion in 
addition, that drivers will actively drive in a more dangerous manner so as to 
maintain their subjective level of risk, (Adams 1985, Deering and Viano 1994, 
Wilde 1991,1994). The implication is, that as well as being educated in the use of 
such systems, drivers should in addition be motivated to drive in a socially more 
responsible manner, (Wilde 1994). 
In conclusions, new technologies, when implemented appropriately show great 
potential for reducing the number of accidents through provision of advisory 
information or interventions. Currently however, advanced technologies may prove 
ineffective due to a failure to account for the actual needs of the drivers. 
2.9 Chapter conclusions and summary. 
The conclusions from this chapter are as follows. 
0 It is clear that human factors and specifically errors play a major role in RTA 
genesis. However, no single model of human error is appropriate for all domains 
and within a given domain more than 1 model may be applicable. Ramsey 
(1985) and Rasmussen (1987) both provide workable frameworks for current 
study that may be applied to RTAs. However, Ramsey's (1985) model describes 
the sequence of events in a generic accident, whilst Rasmussen's (1987) model 
describes the errors made. Neither model is therefore complete and each 
therefore requires elements of the other before a full picture of any given 
accident may be derived. 
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Demographic studies of those involved in RTAs and where these RTAs occur 
are useful only as descriptions of these factors. Largely due to the methods that 
are employed in collecting these data, few conclusions with respect to 
appropriate accident prevention technologies are possible. Additionally, the issue 
of the nature of the statistics quoted complicates the situation with respect to the 
size of the RTA problem, and hence of any possible effects of the 
implementation of accident countermeasures. Due to the inaccuracies in data 
recording it would seem sensible to limit consideration to absolute numbers of 
accidents, and in specific to fatalities. 
Early in-depth studies of RTAs are similarly of limited use. Whilst it is clear that 
human error plays a significant role in RTA causation, for the most part the 
factors were described vaguely which in itself leads to imprecise conclusions. 
Few suggestions for accident prevention measures were offered as a result of 
these studies. 
0 The study undertaken at the Institute of Transport Studies, Leeds was a 
significant breakthrough in terms of understanding the factors impinging on 
RTAs. In contrast to earlier studies, the factors were explicitly defined and 
placed in a hierarchy that allowed causal chains to be inferred. This study 
therefore most closely matches a composite of the models of Ramsey (1985) and 
Rasmussen (1987). The study was of limited use otherwise, concentrating as it 
did purely on urban accidents resulting in non injurious outcomes. In addition, 
no accident countermeasures were suggested. 
The INRETS and TRL case studies both suggested appropriate accident 
prevention measures. INRETS demonstrated the use of clustering of accident 
types and illustrated concept of needs with respect to the drivers. This was 
advanced further by the TRL work. To some extent, both studies suffer from the 
problem of how appropriate the categories used were, and little consensus was 
achieved between these studies in terms of suggested technologies. Use of more 
reliable data from a wider database, (for example fatalities from STATS19) 
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should allow a single strategic approach to accident reduction to be achieved. 
Additionally, concentration on RTAs resulting in fatalities for the purposes of 
accident prevention measure deduction will result in the most costly and serious 
RTAs being addressed by the limited resources available. 
0 Using a functional definition of the needs of the drivers and hence of the 
performance of the accident prevention measures will allow these technologies 
to be developed in a more driver centred manner. This has been demonstrated by 
Malaterre et al (1992) and Broughton and Markey (1996). 
The aim of this project is to develop a methodology for assisting primary safety 
decision support. Ultimately this will assist designers or engineers to design and 
build usable accident prevention technologies based on the functional requirements 
of the drivers. A first stage in the design of such technologies is to gain an 
understanding of what's going wrong in critical situations leading to RTAs. Data 
must therefore be collected on a sample of RTAs in order to the critical failures 
leading to the RTA. Once these failures have been deduced, appropriate accident 
prevention measures may be designed. 
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3.0 Study 1: RTA data collection. 
3.1 Chapter summary. 
The overall aim of this thesis is the development of a methodology to determine 
primary safety strategy with respect to the choice of appropriate RTA prevention 
measures that a motor manufacturer may develop and implement to effect a 
reduction in the number of RTAs. This chapter addresses the second objective 
outlined in Chapter 1, namely to collect information pertaining to the causes of 
RTAs. To achieve this, a method to collect information on the causes of RTAs was 
devised and a study was conducted to collect this information. 
This chapter firstly reviews the aims and objectives of this phase of the work and 
describes the RTA data collection study conducted. The pilot work and main data 
collection are outlined and this chapter then describes the contribution of the studies 
detailed herein to the thesis as a whole. 
3.2 Introduction to the RTA data collection. 
The aim of this thesis is methodological; to develop and operationalise within a motor 
manufacturer a procedure, the application of which will aid that motor manufacturer 
when making strategic decisions in respect of the development of appropriate primary 
safety technologies. This was needed as although there is a considerable body of 
research literature relating to the potential effects of high technology in vehicles and 
on driver behaviour in general, currently no methodology to aid such decision making 
exists. 
As such, this research was conceived to develop and operationalise this methodology 
so that it could subsequently be used by the motor manufacturer, rather than 
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specifically to collect data to determine the causes of a sample of RTAs. The methods 
and procedures outlined in this thesis are therefore a description of the whole 
methodology that was developed during this research. 
In order to develop this methodology, two forms of data were required. Firstly, data on 
the causes of RTAs was needed, as a more complete understanding of the factors 
impinging on RTA causation was required before the reasons for the RTAs 
occurrences could be addressed by technological interventions. Secondly, with the 
addition of data relating to the nature of technologies that may be introduced in 
vehicles, these RTA causation data could be subsequently used in a decision support 
system to enable decisions to be made concerning the appropriateness of any given 
technology. 
However, as has been described, currently published data on the causes of RTAs are 
insufficient for determining the efficacy of potential RTA countermeasures. In 
addition, a motor manufacturer would not have ready and on going access to data 
concerning the causes of RTAs unless they were to collect these data themselves. 
A new data collection procedure was therefore developed that not only facilitated a 
better understanding of the antecedent events relating to RTAs than was previously 
available, but could be conducted within the normal business of a motor manufacturer. 
Following this, two suitable populations of drivers were identified and a study was 
undertaken using the RTA data collection procedure to determine the causes of a 
sample of RTAs. The data collected in this study was then used to develop and 
operationalise the decision support procedure within the motor manufacturer. 
This chapter specifically addresses the development of the RTA data collection 
procedure. It firstly reiterates the need for a novel data collection procedure, before 
describing the development, piloting and testing of this procedure. As an illustration 
of the use of this procedure, the data collected from a study conducted within the 
motor manufacturer is then described. 
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3.3 Aims and objectives. 
The aim of the RTA data collection study was to collect in-depth RTA data to 
inform a motor manufacturer of the causes of RTAs. This information was required 
to enable a methodology to be developed to devise a primary safety strategy for this 
motor manufacturer. The objectives of this study were therefore; 
0 To devise a data collection tool to obtain information on the causes of RTAs; 
0 To find suitable populations of drivers from whom to obtain data; 
e To collect data on RTA causation; 
* To provide information to enable a methodology to devise primary safety 
strategy to be developed. 
The first two objectives were addressed by the pilot work in which a questionnaire 
was devised and two populations of recently RTA involved drivers were identified. 
The subsequent work was concerned with the collection and analysis of data. 
3.4 RTA data collection: Pilot study. 
3.4.1 Aims of the pilot study. 
The aims of the pilot work for study 1 were to determine a methodology for 
collecting information on the causes of RTAs and to identify a population from 
which these data could be collected. 
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3.4.2 Pilot studv method. 
3.4.2.1 Data collection method. 
The factors identified in the Leeds study were employed in the current project as a 
basis from which to develop a data collection tool. The Leeds study provided a 
significant advance in the technology of determining the factors impinging on RTA 
causation. This was due both to the hierarchical nature of the factors, (enabling the 
resultant data to be similarly ordered) and to the number of factors identified. 
Potentially, the top level failures may be each caused by many of the lower level 
errors, either singly or in combination. A hierarchy of factors as described allowed 
such interactions to be described whereas previously identified factors were listed 
with no systematic links. The factors identified were used to produce a data 
collection method in which a structured approach to determining factors impinging 
on RTA causation was used. 
There were several possibilities for the data collection method that could have been 
employed in the first phase of the study. These include observational methods, 
interview techniques and questionnaires. 
Observational methods can be argued to have the strongest ecological validity of any 
of the techniques potentially available. Using observational techniques it would 
therefore be possible to study a great number of variables and their interaction with 
dependant variables simultaneously, as well as these techniques having the 
advantage of not being as open to abuse as interview studies potentially may be, (for 
example due to deliberate biasing by the respondents). There are however, four 
major problems associated with the use of observational techniques in the current 
study. 
Firstly, the problem of the inferences that an observer can draw from simply 
observing behaviour needs to be addressed, (Poulton 1975). Whilst the observer may 
draw conclusions about behaviours on the basis of observation rather than simply 
observing and recording the behaviours, these techniques suffer from the weakness 
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of subjectivity on the part of the observer. As has been noted, the majority of the in- 
depth studies to date have the potential weakness in the subjectivity on behalf of an 
albeit experienced RTA investigator or team of investigators. There is some question 
as to whether someone not at the scene of the RTA would be in a position to 
accurately assess the factors leading to an RTA. 
This itself is linked to the second and third issues, those of validity and reliability. A 
given behaviour may be coded by two different researchers in two different ways, 
for example by including an underlying cause of behaviour or not. There is a 
question in any case involving an assumption of an underlying behaviour as to the 
validity of the assumption of the behaviour. Similarly, it is essential if such 
assumptions are to be made by the team that two or more observers agree on the 
behaviours observed if the results are to have any reliability. For some types of data, 
statistical procedures exist to assess the reliability of the data obtained, for example 
by using such tests as Cronbeck's Alpha, or Cohen's Kappa, (Hays 1994, Tabachnick 
and Fidel 1989). 
The final issue associated with the use of observational techniques in the current 
study is related to the frequency of the events to be studied. In a study of drivers' 
risk perceptions, it was noted that even the worst RTA blackspot studied had only 8 
RTAs in a period of four years, (Watts and Quimby 1980). Additionally, given that 
the average driver will have an RTA rate of one every ten years, (Evans 1991), it is 
simply not practical to use a direct observational technique, as the period of the 
current project is insufficiently long to guarantee sufficient data would be collected 
by the use of observational methods. 
Indirect observational techniques, such as using police or traffic authority videos of 
RTAs, (which may then be presented to drivers to describe), present three problems. 
Firstly, due to the nature of the recordings, i. e. having been made and stored by 
police authorities, these RTAs may be of the sort that the police would want to 
proceed with prosecutions for. Thus for legal reasons, it may not be possible to 
obtain additional data pertaining to the cause of the crash from those involved within 
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a sufficiently short time period from the RTA. Additionally, it is very doubtful that 
those involved would be willing to help by giving an unbiased assessment of the 
events leading to an RTA if they were to have been approached through this manner. 
Finally, the sample that could be obtained through this process would be fairly 
small, spread potentially nationally, and would be highly biased towards RTAs 
occurring on major roads such as motor ways and urban dual carriageways. 
A second method of obtaining data from those involved in RTAs is to utilise 
interview techniques. Essentially there are four types of interview, unstructured 
qualitative interviews, semi-structured qualitative interviews, standardised open 
interviews and interviewer administered open questionnaires or check lists. Each of 
these will now be briefly discussed in turn. 
Unstructured qualitative interviews are the method of choice when developing 
hypotheses and may be performed either as individual in-depth interviews or as 
group interviews/group discussions. The advantages of unstructured interviews are 
that they may be used in a very flexible manner to obtain data that are rich in detail 
and reflect the respondent's individual perspectives and perceptions. Unstructured 
group interviews may help decrease the power relationship that may occur between 
an interviewer and interviewee, and may facilitate full expression of true opinions 
due to group support. Additionally, group interviews of this sort are cheaper and 
quicker to obtain large sample size than individual interviews. However, both 
individual and group unstructured interviews require data to be collected in an 
unstructured manner and as such the data may reflect very diverse aspects of the 
topic in question. As such, the collation and analysis of the data can be extremely 
difficult and time consuming which would thus put heavy time constraints on data 
collection and hence necessitate a reduction in sample size obtained. 
Semi-structured qualitative interviews are similar in essence to unstructured 
interviews but they are expanded to ensure particular topics are addressed by all 
respondents. Additionally, the benefits of informal, individual orientations being 
deduced are retained, whilst ensuring more consistent data sets are obtained. 
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However, imposition of a researcher's conceptual framework may distort a 
respondent's perspective and miss aspects of importance to the target population. 
Sequencing and flexibility of wording questions may effectively result in different 
questions being asked of different respondents with adverse implications for 
response comparability. Additionally, although by comparison with unstructured 
interviews semi-structured interviews are quicker to administer and analyse they are 
still time consuming compared to alternative methodologies. 
Standardised open interviews involve the use of a formal interview schedule in 
which all required topics are introduced to each respondent in a structured form and 
sequence, thus facilitating data organisation, comparability and analysis and 
reducing interviewer effects. However, imposition of such a rigid format may omit 
areas of importance to the target population. Additionally, a lack of flexibility in 
wording and sequencing reduces the ability to adapt an interview to particular 
individuals and circumstances. Nevertheless an open interview of this type does 
allow the respondents to reply in an open ended manner, the respondents are thus 
able to determine the length and orientation of their replies. This suffers the 
disadvantage however that analysis of open answers is time consuming, and may 
still be open to interviewer effects. 
The final interview technique that may be applicable in the current project is an 
interviewer administered open questionnaire or check list. This technique allows 
collection of standardised quantitative data in response to standardised, pre- 
determined questions. All questions are therefore accompanied by pre-determined 
answer sets, and interviewers ask the questions as it appears on the interview 
schedule. This is thus less time consuming than other techniques and thus is most 
commonly employed where large sample sizes are required and a probability 
sampling technique is used. This technique allows responses to be aggregated and 
directly compared and greatly reduces interviewer effects and recording biases. 
There is the potential danger with this technique that as the respondents must adapt 
their perspectives and perceptions to fit into those of the response categories which 
although will have been tested and piloted, may seem irrelevant to an individual 
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respondent. Restriction of responses may thus mean that the data obtained may not 
reflect the respondents true feelings and intentions, and the technique may seem 
impersonal and mechanistic which may limit response willingness. 
An alternative method of obtaining the required data for the first phase of the project 
is to utilise a self completion questionnaire design. Self completion questionnaires in 
general require a tight definition of the research problem and are thus designed to 
address a specific research problem. The information required from a questionnaire 
is normally of a known form beforehand in that the questionnaire will have been 
designed, usually from a set of pilot studies in which the participants from the 
prospective sample will have been interviewed as an aid to design the questionnaire. 
Thus before the questionnaire is administered, it will be possible to design the 
analysis from a set of tables detailing the nature of the expected information. 
Several considerations must be born in mind when designing a questionnaire, (as 
outlined by Sinclair 1975, Brigham 1975, Wright and Barnard 1975). The overall 
plan of the questionnaire should be logical and flow from one section to the next, 
and the items within each section must be similarly ordered. It is necessary to avoid 
an overly complex questionnaire design, such as those in which questions are so 
ordered that necessitates referral from one question to previous questions or 
conditioning of later responses by earlier ones. The phrasing of questions is also a 
crucial concern, the questions must be appropriate to the target population and 
unambiguous. There are certain types of questionnaire phrasing which should be 
avoided, namely ones that are vague, negative questions, (especially double 
negatives), in addition to leading questions and those that are loaded. Consideration 
must be given to the nature of the answers that the respondents are to give, either 
open or pre-coded. Additionally, instructions to the respondents must be clear, for 
example filter techniques are generally preferable to wordy instructions on each 
question. The questionnaire should additionally be kept as short as is practicable to 
attempt to maintain response rates as high as possible, thus for example, the 'for 
interest' type questions should be avoided. In terms of the nature of the data to be 
collected, in general, it is better to collect the highest form of data, (i. e. continuous) 
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as these data may subsequently be collapsed into categories, but not vice versa. 
Finally, there must be a differentiation between the different types of missing data, 
i. e. true missing data and data that are missing due to the inappropriateness of a 
question. This will facilitate coding of the data onto the pre designed coding sheets 
and will therefore allow the analysis to be more readily performed. 
The methodology chosen for the RTAs data collection was a self completion postal 
questionnaire, distributed to a sample of drivers drawn from a population who had 
recently been involved in an RTA whilst driving. Rather than a single mailshot of 
drivers, an ongoing process to collect data over an extended time period was used. 
Data collection throughout an extended period thus enabled a wider range of RTA 
causation mechanisms, to be collected, (for example weather conditions prevailing 
at the time of the RTA). This method ensured that the questionnaire would be as 
effective as possible with respect to determining the underlying reasons for car 
RTAs. A large sample of drivers who had recently been involved in an RTA was 
required to ensure the data gathered was representative, but was in addition on going 
in nature. In effect, a notification system was required that facilitated identification 
of recently occurring RTAs. 
3.4.2.2 Questionnaire development. 
To develop the questionnaire, a literature review of previous studies concerned with 
RTA data collection and RTA causation was performed. From this, a number of 
factors of importance in RTA causation were listed and structured using the 
hierarchy devised by Carsten et at (1989). An iterative development process was 
then undertaken to produce and refine a postal questionnaire. This entailed 
progressing from unstructured interviews, to semi-structured interviews, to a 
questionnaire being administered to a sample of recently RTA involved drivers. 
Whilst questionnaires are normally developed in this manner, (e. g. Sinclair 1975), a 
somewhat more lengthy procedure than is usual was required necessitating a gradual 
move from an interview format to a questionnaire completed by the driver in the 
presence of the experimenter. There were three reasons for this. Firstly, the number 
of antecedent factors are such that the situations prior to RTAs are both complex and 
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varied. A significant amount of questionnaire development work was therefore 
required at the piloting phase to ensure that the questionnaire could be easily 
completed by drivers involved in a very wide variety of RTAs with a wide variety of 
causative factors. 
Secondly, the sensitivity of the topic required that the questionnaire underwent 
extensive work prior to distribution. All drivers were required to describe not only 
the situation immediately prior to the RTA but in addition any mistakes they 
themselves made as well as anything they may have been able to do to try to avoid 
the RTA. 
Thirdly, whilst apportioning blame to the drivers was not an issue, pains were taken 
both in the questionnaire and the covering letters to ensure that the drivers did not 
feel that the data they provided was going to be categorised in this manner. 
However, in order for the results to be representative, data were required from both 
drivers who were in actuality at fault for the RTA, (by for example failing to give 
way at an intersection), as well as those who were not at fault, (for example a driver 
whose car was hit by another failing to give way). This was necessitated by the 
nature of the required results in terms of strategic decision making with regards to 
potential RTA countermeasures. Traditional approaches to investigating the 
potential of accident prevention measures to reduce the number of RTAs have 
concentrated on providing information or assistance to the driver that may be 
considered to be at fault in the RTA. In the above example, the driver failing to give 
way at an intersection may be assisted by having warning of the intersection 
presented in the vehicle, or the automatic application of brakes may prevent the 
driver from proceeding. In either case however, those travelling on the road with 
right of way would not be provided for by current technology. If the vehicle 
approaching the intersection from a minor road was not equipped with any accident 
prevention technologies, an RTA may still occur. If those on the main road however 
are provided for appropriately, it may be possible for an RTA to be prevented. In 
order to provide appropriate accident prevention technologies to these drivers, the 
reasons for the RTA from their perspective must be deduced. 
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Thus, those drivers that were at fault had to be encouraged to describe the RTA in 
which they were involved in a non threatening manner. Additionally, those drivers 
that were not at fault were required to describe the RTA in as best a manner as they 
could. 
Throughout the course of this initial work, the participants completed the 
questionnaire and gave feedback including wording and the order of questions. 
3.4.2.3 Participants. 
Participants were obtained from three different populations during questionnaire 
development and the postal pilot. 
The participants in the pilot were all aged 17 or over, who had been involved in 
RTAs as drivers whilst they had a full driving licence. 
Loughborough Campus Pilot: The population from which drivers were obtained for 
the original questionnaire development pilot work comprised staff and students from 
Loughborough University. Initially, a sample of 12 drivers were interviewed to 
refine the list of factors impinging on the causation of RTAs. The questionnaire was 
then drawn up and an additional 12 drivers from this population were subsequently 
contacted to refine the questionnaire. Finally, this population was extended to 
include an additional 24 undergraduate students for the final campus based piloting 
once the questionnaire was complete. 
Since the questionnaire was aimed to be distributed to recently RTA involved 
drivers, initially only those who had an RTA in the previous 3 months were 
contacted. However, it soon became obvious that a sufficiently large sample to 
adequately pilot the questionnaire could not be obtained by using such a population. 
The population was therefore extended to include those drivers who had been 
involved in an RTA more than 3 months ago. Ultimately, the population from which 
the drivers were taken for this phase of the pilot was extended to include those that 
had an RTA as a driver within the previous 18 months. 
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Postal Pilot: The participants for the postal pilot study were drawn from two 
different populations; notification of recent RTA involved drivers was an on going 
process for each of these. One of these populations was of drivers drawn from the 
insurance group of a major motor manufacturer. The insurance group handles the 
motor insurance for all vehicles owned by the company and leased to company 
employees. In practice, the majority of these employees are managers at the 
company, though it is not infrequent that two or more cars will be leased from the 
company for use by other members of the employee's family. 300 drivers were 
selected for questionnaire distribution from this population. 
The population drawn from police records was identified through the Co-operative 
Crash Injury Study, (CCIS), undertaken by ICE ergonomics Ltd., in Loughborough. 
CCIS was set up in 1983 as an on going, in-depth study to investigate vehicle crash 
performance and the resulting occupant injuries in the UK. As such, CCIS requires 
up to date notifications of the occurrence of car RTAs, and accordingly, ICE receive 
notifications from Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire constabularies of 
all police reported RTAs in their jurisdictions. (The data collection protocols are 
more fully described by Mackay, Ashton, Galer and Thomas 1985). Over a period of 
three weeks, each of these was obtained and reviewed for possible inclusion in the 
current study. Names and addresses of 300 drivers were selected for questionnaire 
distribution. 
3.4.24 Samplingframe. 
The basis for sampling was: 
* Only the drivers involved in an RTA were included, (passengers and witnesses 
were excluded). 
0 RTAs resulting in a fatality, serious head injury, or serious injury to either the 
elderly or young were not included due to the sensitive nature of the RTA. 
0 RTAs with pending prosecutions were not included. 
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Several additional factors required consideration when drawing the samples. 
Insurance Group RTAs: Accessing data through the insurance group offered several 
advantages. Firstly, due to the requirements of the insurance group themselves, the 
RTA claim forms that were received by the insurance group from the drivers were 
readily classified into a number of categories dependent upon the nature of the RTA. 
Thus, distinctions such as the nature of the objects that the driver was in collision 
with, (if any), could be determined. Within the insurance group, each of the possible 
RTA configurations is allocated a unique number. All RTAs conforming to the three 
caveats above and within the specified RTA categories of interest were selected for 
inclusion in the study. 
CCIS RTAs: Names and addresses from the CCIS notification scheme could only be 
obtained retrospectively. All drivers contacted for this study were therefore required 
to have previously agreed to take part in the study by returning an initial contact 
letter signed to indicate their willingness to take part in the study. This procedure 
ensured that the Data Protection Act (1984) was not contravened. 
However, only RTAs that were not required for CCIS itself could be included. This 
was to protect CCIS from any potentially adverse effects of the RTA causation 
study. For example, drivers may have been reluctant to complete a questionnaire 
concerned with the nature and extent of their injuries if they had previously been 
asked to fill out a questionnaire detailing the causes of the RTA. 
3.4.2.5 Equipment. 
RTA causation questionnaire: The questionnaire used in the postal pilot comprised 7 
sections covering 342 variables over 20 pages. Initially, the drivers were asked to 
drawn a diagram of the RTA scene and describe the RTA in their own words, this 
section being designed to ease the drivers into describing the RTA in as non 
threatening a manner as possible. Following this, questions were asked about the 
situation in which the RTA took place, including the nature of the road layout and 
the weather conditions at the time of the RTA. It was then explained that RTAs in 
cars are often caused by errors or misjudgements on the part of any or all of those 
98 
Study 1: RTA data collection. 
concerned and the drivers were asked specifically about which of those errors 
described may have had an influence on the causation of the crash. Additionally, any 
vehicle failures that may have led to the crash were asked about. Finally, 
demographic information was requested. 
The questionnaire by necessity was long and complex, but simple to complete as the 
majority of the questions were of a check box type, (see Figure 3.1). (The final 
questionnaire is presented in Appendix 2). 
2.1. What Sort Of Area You Were In? 
1: 1 City Centre Shopping 
L) Citv Centre Residential 
J City Centre Industrial/Business Park 
Ll Suburban Shopping 
U Suburban Residential 
U Suburban Industrial /Business Park 
LJ Village/Town Shopping 
Ll VillageýTown Residential 
ýj VillageýToxn Industrial /Bus 1 ness Park 
Ll Open Countryside 
Ll Other (Please Describe) ..................... 
Figure 3.1 Extract from the RTA causation questionnaire. 
Covering Letters: In addition to the questionnaires, the purpose and scope of the 
study was described to each driver in a covering letter. This letter also assured the 
respondents of the confidentiality of the data they provided. The covering letters 
were personally addressed in the case of the sample chosen from the CCIS 
population, whereas in the case of the questionnaires distributed to the sample from 
the motor company's insurance group, the covering letters were addressed 'Dear 
Driver'. (The covering letters are presented in Appendix 3). 
Insurance Group Population: Since the insurance group themselves distributed the 
questionnaires, the distribution procedure for this population was comparatively 
simple. Once the desired sample within the population had been identified, a list of 
RTA categories of interest was drawn up. The insurance group themselves 
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RTA categories of interest was drawn up. The insurance group themselves 
distributed the questionnaires with their own acknowledgement slip notifying the 
driver that their claim was being processed. The questionnaires were returned to 
Loughborough via pre-paid envelopes and collated for analysis. 
As no records of to whom the questionnaires were sent were made at the time of 
questionnaire distribution, it was not possible to distribute follow up questionnaires 
to the sample drawn from this population. 
CCIS Population: The CCIS population was sampled over a three week period 
commencing June 1996. The procedure for sampling the CCIS population was as 
follows; 
0 Notifications were received by ICE and reviewed for inclusion in CCIS. 
0 Notifications not required by CCIS were reviewed for inclusion in the current 
study. Those notifications pertaining to RTAs that were to be specifically 
excluded from the RTA causation study were removed. 
* Initial contact letters were sent to those from the cut down sample requesting the 
drivers assistance in the RTA causation study. 300 contact letters were 
distributed. 
0 Questionnaires were posted, together with covering letters to those responding 
positively to the initial contact letter. The returned questionnaires were collated 
for analysis. 
To attempt to increase the overall response rates, follow-up letters were written. 
These were to be sent to the whole CCIS sample two weeks after the initial 
questionnaire was distributed. Since the questionnaire was distributed anonymously 
it was impossible to determine if any given person in the sample had previously 
returned the questionnaire and thus the follow-ups were planned to be sent to the 
entire sample. Instructions to ignore the second mailing were included however, and 
some checks within the dataset to ensure that multiple responses were not received 
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were designed. Following this, the names and addresses of those that were contacted 
were deleted from computer files and all paper records destroyed. 
3.4.2.6 Data management and analyst*s. 
Due to the size of the questionnaire and the number of variables within it, 6 Excel 
spreadsheets were required to enter the data for analysis. A macro was written to 
combine these spreadsheets into a single text file which was then exported to SPSS 
running under UNIX on a Hewlett Packard 9000/827 mainframe. Inevitably, given 
the size of the database, missing values were encountered, techniques to rectify 
some of which were applied accordingly to the data, (Frampton 1997, SPSS 1990). 
The data were thus checked for missing values and error trapped for data punching 
errors using SPSS. 
3.4.3 Results of the pilot studw. 
3.4.3.1 Data sources. 
Insurance Group RTAs: Problems existed in the distribution procedures that the 
insurance group used. This was readily evidenced by the number of questionnaires 
returned by drivers that were not specified in the required sample. Specifically, 
almost 20% of the returns received from the insurance group sample were from 
drivers that were not personally involved in an incident in which damage occurred to 
their vehicle. Principally, these were drivers who were making insurance claims due 
to either vandalism of their vehicle, or due to damage sustained in a car park when 
the vehicle was unattended. (These returns were not counted in the return rates 
presented). 
The population as a whole, did result in a 25% response rate, 75 out of 300 
questionnaires were returned completed sufficiently well for analysis. It was 
apparent that several modifications were required to the sampling frame and the 
manner in which the questionnaires were distributed, but it was decided at this stage 
that this population could be used with a modified questionnaire and distribution 
procedures for the main survey. 
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CCIS RTAs : The response rate for the CCIS sample was poor. Of the 300 initial 
contact letters distributed, only 42 were returned to Loughborough indicating 
willingness to take part in the study. Of these, only 11 returned questionnaires were 
received. It was decided that this population would no longer be used in the 
remainder of the study. Additionally, since the response was so poor, follow up 
letters and questionnaires were not distributed to those that had returned the initial 
letter. 
3.4.3.2 Data collection tool. 
The major finding of the postal pilot work was that the postal pilot method and the 
questionnaire devised were acceptable as a method to collect data regarding the 
causes of RTAs. Overall, of the 342 questionnaires distributed, 86 were returned in a 
sufficiently complete form to be analysed, representing an overall response rate 
between the populations sampled of 25.1%. From an assessment of the quality of the 
questionnaires returned, it was apparent that the majority were completed correctly, 
few for example contained missed pages or inappropriately missed questions. 
Additionally, it was apparent that the majority of the questionnaires were completed 
in a meaningful manner, that is that the data provided were sufficient to gain a 
reasonable understanding of the RTAs in question. 
3.4.3.3 Findingsfrom the postal pilot survey. 
Due to the relative numbers of questionnaires returned compared to the number of 
variables contained within the questionnaire, a full analysis of the results could not 
be meaningfully performed at this time. However, an outline of the preliminary 
preliminary findings is presented below. 
3.4.3.4 Demographics of the sample. 
0 The returned sample did not have an even demographic split 70.9% being male 
with an average age of 41, (SD = 11.75, ranges from 17 to 63). Whilst the 
majority of the sample were married, (71.8%), slightly more than half, (52.3%) 
had no children under 18. 
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* The largest represented group were those with a degree or higher degree, 
(23.3%), the most common job being engineering or management, (accounting 
for 28% of the returned sample). 
0 22.1% of the sample held a motorcycle licence in addition to a licence for 
driving a car, this car licence being held for an average of 19 years, (SD=10.5 
years). There was a large range of time since passing the driving test from only 
just passing the test, (I month), to having passed the test up to 40 years ago, (as 
would be expected most drivers passing their test around the age of 17 or 18). 
0 Nearly 40% of the sample drove over 15,000 miles per year, this figure rising to 
63% when including those drivers that drive between 10,000 and 15,000 miles 
per year. 
0 The majority of the sample, (60.7%), reported they have been involved in no 
major RTAs before as a driver, (a major RTA being one in which the costs were 
in excess of F500). This figure dropped for minor RTAs to 34.1%. The range of 
time from the previous RTA was between 1 month and 30 years, the average 
length of time being 7 years (SD=6.3). 
0 The overwhelming majority of the drivers who had previously been involved in 
an RTA had been involved in only one or two previous RTAs indicating that 
although the drivers have crashed more frequently than may be expected, they 
were not in general frequently involved in crashes. However, of those contacted 
in the pilot work, one driver stated involvement in 7 major RTAs as a driver. 
0 The biased nature of company car drivers sample was also reflected in the range 
of values obtained for the distance driven by the driver in the particular car 
involved in the crash. These values ranged from 120 miles to over 95000 miles, 
(this latter figure representing a privately owned vehicle), with a mean value of 
9600 miles, (SID = 13100). 
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3.4.3.5 RTA scenarios. 
0 The largest group of RTAs occurred in suburban residential areas, (30.2%) and 
accordingly the average speed limit of the crash scenarios were between 30 and 
40 mph (61% of the sample of RTAs occurred in either 30 or 40 mph zones). 
In total 61.2% of the sample were involved in an incident at or within 20 rn of a 
junction, (the values for each of these being 30.6%), the majority of which were 
uncontrolled junctions, (i. e., one at which no traffic controls were present). 
0 Of these junction related crashes, the majority were at T junctions, (40.7%), the 
next most represented junction scenarios being Y junctions, (slip roads), and 
roundabouts, (both occurring 16.7% of the time). The majority of drivers, 
(59.2%), were on the main road at the junction and were therefore not instructed 
to stop. 
0 Most of the RTAs occurred on straight, flat roads and accordingly, the majority 
of the sample (69%) stated that the visibility along the road prior to the RTA 
scenario was not restricted. However, 26.7% suggested that a partial restriction 
in visibility may have contributed to the RTA and 3.6% stated that a severe 
restriction in visibility contributed to the cause of the RTA. These restrictions 
were most commonly due to environmental factors, (such as the weather or 
vegetation at the side of the road), but other vehicles were also frequently cited 
as a cause of restricted visibility. 
0 77.9% of the RTAs sampled involved only another car, of these the largest group 
were those that were involved in a front/rear collision, (35.7%). 
0 The majority of the sample saw what they were in collision with before the 
impact, (56.1%). However, 53.4% of these drivers did not expect the impact to 
occur, these being equally spilt between those that thought they would be able to 
avoid the impact and those that thought the other driver would be able to avoid 
the impact. 
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* 84.9% of the vehicles involved were manufactured by the company whose 
insurance group assisted in the questionnaire distribution. Overall, 56.0% were 
company cars, 0eased through the motor manufacturer), whereas 20% were the 
drivers own vehicle. Some confusion may have existed however as to whether 
the drivers viewed company cars as their own or the companies. Irrespective of 
this, 81.2% drove the vehicle in which they had the RTA every day. 
0 Nearly 85% of the vehicles involved in the RTAs were less than 2 years old, 
61.6% being between one and two years, and 23.3% up to a year since first 
registered. As may be expected from a sample of comparatively new vehicles, 
20% had anti-lock braking systems (ABS), fitted. 
0 Most of the RTAs occurred within 4 miles of the expected destination, although 
the journeys to that point took on average less than half the time the driver 
expected them to take. The standard deviations of both the expected and actual 
estimates of time and distance were large, (respectively 110 minutes and 50 
minutes for time and 80 miles and 110 miles for distance). This is unsurprising 
when considering that the actual lengths of journey planned ranged from 1 mile 
to over 700 miles. 
3.4.3.6 Causativefactors. 
With respect to the causes of the RTAs, the drivers were asked to make an 
assessment of any mistakes they themselves made and of their impressions of any 
mistakes that the other road user involved in the RTA may have made, (if 
applicable). For simplicity, in the following discussion, 'our driver' will refer to the 
driver that received and completed the questionnaire and 'other driver' will refer to 
the most directly involved other road user, (if any). 
0 26.0% of the RTAs were single vehicle RTAs in which our dri'ver was the lone 
RTA participant. It was immediately apparent from an inspection of the returned 
questionnaires that the overwhelming majority of these RTAs involved parking 
manoeuvres, principally in car parks. (Whilst the SPSS analysis at this Stage was 
not designed to analyse these RTAs, it was subsequently modified accordingly. 
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However, parking area RTAs per se were beyond the scope of the RTA 
causation project, and accordingly are not discussed further in specific). 
0 On average, when considering multi-vehicle RTAs, for any specific error type 
more of the other drivers involved than our drivers were attributed to have made 
the error. Whilst our drivers were not specifically asked who was to blame for 
the RTA, few volunteered that the other driver was solely responsible. Of note 
however, is that the errors attributed to be causal with respect to the RTA 
involved were not solely attributed to the other drivers. In effect, approximately 
25% of our drivers admitted that there was something they themselves may have 
been able to do to prevent the RTA from occurring. 
61.6% of the RTAs occurred in daylight and 76.5% occurred when there was no 
precipitation that may have affected the cause. 
In 25.4% of the RTAs the road surface had an effect on the cause of the crash. 
This is a higher figure than may be expected from inspection of the STATS 19 
database and reflects that the data collection was mostly carried out over the 
winter months. 
0 The most common error made prior to the RTA was a failure to judge the speed 
of the other vehicles when present. 24.4% of RTAs had some failure of our 
driver to judge the other vehicle speed and 18.3% of RTAs were caused in part 
by failing to judge another vehicle's distance. 
In summary, the most common RTA scenario in the pilot sample were middle aged 
males, driving in daylight in good conditions. Whilst a larger proportion of drivers 
attributed the RTA to the other road users involved, than to themselves, significant 
numbers admitted at least partial culpability on their part. 
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3.4.4 Discussion of the pilot study. 
The pilot work had two objectives; 
" To devise a data collection tool to obtain information on the causes of RTAs, 
" To find suitable populations of drivers from whom to obtain data. 
Each of these will be addressed in turn. 
3.4.4.1 Data collection tool. 
There were only two viable options for the data collection tool to be employed, face 
to face contact with the drivers involved, (either through interviews or interviewer 
administered questionnaires), or postal questionnaires. Face to face interviews had 
the advantage of being able to probe in considerable detail the exact circumstances 
surrounding an RTA in a manner difficult to achieve in a questionnaire. However, 
interviews are costly in terms of time to administer and analyse. Additionally, 
interviews are not anonymous, and given the sensitivity of the subject under 
investigation, this was a significant drawback. 
A postal questionnaire can be assured to be anonymous once distributed and thus 
does not suffer from the disadvantages of the interviewee feeling social pressure to 
answer in a socially desirable manner due to the presence of the interviewer. Whilst 
the need to respond in a socially acceptable manner will not be completely 
eliminated by using a postal questionnaire, it was hoped that this effect would be 
very much reduced. 
Additionally, postal questionnaires may be sent to a specified sample and 
confidentiality maybe ensured as a given respondent will not be identifiable from the 
data recorded if sufficient precautions are taken. Whilst assurances of anonymity 
and confidentiality could equally be given for interviews, the necessity for face to 
face contact may have made some potential interviewees uncomfortable and thus the 
sample may be compromised further. 
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For these reasons, a questionnaire format was decided upon for the RTA data 
collection tool. 
The questionnaire developed was demonstrated to be effective in eliciting 
information pertaining to the causes of RTAs. In addition to describing the physical 
and roadway environment surrounding the vehicle at the time of the RTA, the 
drivers were able to describe some of the errors made, and the reasons for those 
errors which contributed to the cause of the RTA. In the case of an RTA where our 
drivers admitted for example that they had difficulty in controlling their vehicle and 
skidded, countermeasures such as enhanced road holding may be deduced. 
When our driver states no possible error on their part, (most typically blaming the 
other drivers involved totally), at first thought, it may seem that comparatively few 
countermeasures may be deduced. For example, in the case of our driver colliding 
with another failing to stop at a junction, it may seem that no countermeasures may 
be deduced and accordingly that these drivers should not be contacted. However, by 
the provision of appropriate information or assistance to our driver, irrespective of 
the actions of the other driver, it may be possible to either prevent the RTA from 
occurring, or reduce its severity such that injuries are limited. This may occur 
through a warning being presented to our driver, or an automatic manoeuvre by our 
vehicle to avoid the other vehicle. Thus, the reasons underlying RTAs of this nature 
are as valid for the purposes of determining appropriate countermeasures as for 
RTAs in which our driver played a more active part, and accordingly our drivers 
were contacted for the purposes of this study. 
3.4.4.2 Sampling. 
The samples although initially obtained with the assistance of external agencies 
were approached in a manner that demonstrated the study was independent of these 
agencies. It was anticipated that this would enhance response rates over alternative 
samples obtained directly through the police or an insurance agency wherein 
respondents may perceive that fault or blame may be attributed to them as a result of 
their responses and subsequently reported back to an external agency. Whilst 
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alternative populations were considered, they were not considered to be appropriate 
for the current study and the postal pilot work was conducted with populations 
drawn from CCIS and the insurance group of a motor manufacturer. The sample 
returned from CCIS proved to be insufficient in size to be viable for the main study, 
and was discontinued with. The poor response rate relative to the alternative 
population employed may reflect that members of this population were generally 
unwilling to discuss the nature of the causes of the RTAs they were recently 
involved in. Additionally, the procedures of having to indicate their willingness to 
participate before being sent the questionnaire may have put some drivers off. 
There were several reasons for using the populations described. Most importantly, 
the populations allowed contact with those who have recently been involved in an 
RTA. Alternative samples were considered, for example databases of drivers, such 
as the ones maintained by the AA or by the Transport Research Laboratory. 
However, whilst these databases are large, (the TRL one containing 18000 
individuals), it was likely that an insufficiently large number of drivers who had 
recently been involved in an RTA as a driver would be accessible through these 
populations. In addition, the alternative databases were not specifically designed for 
an RTA investigation study and accordingly were not sufficiently up to date with 
respect to the RTA history of the drivers within the population. Whilst the majority 
of the drivers within these databases could be expected to have been involved in an 
RTA in the course of their driving careers, it was not possible to selectively sample 
these drivers from these databases. 
That the insurance group sample provided a relatively good response rate, (given the 
nature of the study and the size of the questionnaire), may be indicative of the nature 
of the population itself. Being largely drawn from the employees of a motor 
manufacturer, these drivers may by their nature have more interest in motoring 
issues and thus in the study at hand and therefore be more willing to participate. 
Alternatively, as the sample was devised from the insurance group's procedures, 
these drivers may have felt more compelled to complete the questionnaire than they 
would have done had they been contacted in another manner. If this were to be the 
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case, it may seem surprising that up to 25% admitted some culpability for the RTAs 
in question. 
It was felt therefore that the main phase of the RTA data collection could be 
conducted using the notification scheme devised from the insurance group. Whilst a 
biased sample resulted from this population, (in terms of demographic split of the 
respondents and therefore to some extent of RTA causation mechanisms), this 
population was felt to be acceptable for the main phase of RTA data collection. 
3.4.5 Conclusions of the pilot stuqv. 
* Despite extensive piloting, some problems still existed with the questionnaire 
itself, and with the populations employed in the pilot work. 
* Sufficient knowledge was gained throughout the course of the piloting to enable a 
larger scale study to be conducted to elicit more data. 
9 Modifications were made to both the questionnaire and the procedures in which 
the insurance group population was sampled to enable the main study to be 
conducted. 
3.5 RTA data collection: Main study. 
Following on from the pilot work, in the main phase of the data collection a study 
was conducted utilising the data collection method and population piloted. The aim 
of this study was to collect in depth data on the causes of RTAs which would then 
be built upon when devising the primary safety strategy. Sufficient data were 
therefore required to develop and test the decision support tool devised, (described 
in Chapter 4), in order to draw preliminary conclusions pertaining to the most 
effective technical solutions to RTAs. 
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3.5.1 A im. 
The aim of the main data collection phase was to obtain sufficient data about RTAs 
to develop a decision support system to help a motor manufacturer make strategic 
decisions with respect to technological solutions. 
3.5.2 Method. 
3.5.2.1 Experimental design. 
The methodology chosen was a self completion postal questionnaire distributed to a 
sample of recently RTA involved drivers. The returned questionnaires were 
anonymous once completed and data were entered into a series of spreadsheets 
before being combined into a single SPSS data file for analysis. 
3.5.2.2 Participants. 
The participants were drawn from the insurance group of the motor manufacturer as 
before. 
3.5.2.3 Sampling. 
The sampling frame remained the same as for the pilot study, however larger 
numbers than was achieved in the piloting were required. 3000 questionnaires were 
therefore printed and delivered to the premises of the Insurance Group for 
distribution over a period of approximately one year. Given the return rate estimated 
from the pilot study, it was anticipated that approximately 1000 completed 
questionnaires would be returned. Problems with the distribution became evident 
during the course of the analysis of the pilot sample which resulted in only 1000 
questionnaires being distributed. 
3.5.2.4 Equipment. 
The questionnaire contained 124 questions covering a total of 342 variables, (many 
of the questions covering several variables simultaneously), divided into 6 sections. 
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(In the light of experienced gained in piloting, two sections were combined from the 
pilot questionnaire thus reducing the size of the questionnaire at this stage). The 
questionnaire was a self completion format, the majority of the questions being 
simple check boxes with some space for additional comments if required. 
3.5.2.5 Procedure. 
Questionnaires were delivered to the offices of the insurance group packed into their 
distribution envelopes with the return envelopes and covering letters. 
The same sampling frame was employed in the main data collection phase as was 
used in the piloting work. It was emphasised that care was to be taken to ensure that 
the questionnaire was only distributed to those drivers of interest to the RTA 
causation project. The distribution procedure was the same as for the pilot study. 
3.5.2.6 Data management and analysis. 
5 Excel spreadsheets were used to enter the data for analysis and the data exported to 
SPSS running under Windows 95 on a Pentium PC rather than the previous 
mainframe. The data were error trapped and analysed using SPSS in this manner. In 
practice, data were entered in batches of 20 questionnaires at a time and each group 
error trapped individually. 
The data files and analysis programs written to analyse the pilot data were preserved 
for future use. However, a copy of the data file produced in the piloting was 
modified to match the new format required by the final questionnaire. The data from 
the main phase of the questionnaire distribution was therefore appended to this 
modified data file and all analyses carried out on the full data set. 
The data contained a mixture of categorical and interval variables, the analysis 
methodologies for both being well documented, (Hays 1988, Tabachnick and Fidel 
1989, SPSS 1993). The analysis employed predominantly descriptive statistics to 
classify the data according to the frequency of occurrence of certain events in the 
data set. In addition, some inferential statistics, (correlations and cross tabulations) 
were performed as necessary. 
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3.5.3 Results. 
3.5.3.1 Method. 
Overall, the main questionnaire distribution resulted in 241 returns out of the 1000 
distributed, representing a return rate of 24.1%. Of these however, 30 were excluded 
from the analysis due to inappropriate sampling, (the vehicles in question most 
commonly having been hit whilst unattended), resulting in a valid return rate of 
21.1%. When appended to the pilot study data, the final database contained data on 
297 cases. As can be seen from Figure 3.2, overall, the main phase of the 
questionnaire distribution, (IG Main) accounted for 71% of the returns. 
Pilot 
25% 
IG Ma 
71% 
Figure 3.2 Returned questionnaires by sample percentage. 
The results of the main questionnaire distribution work were appended to the pilot 
data for analysis and accordingly the following represent a composite of both 
samples. 
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3.5.3.2 Demographics of the total sample. 
Nature of the drivers involved: The majority of the returned questionnaires were 
from males, (73.6%) with an average age of 41.6 years, (range 17 to 82 years, SD= 
12.3 years). The majority of the sample were British born, (96.7%), and married, 
(70.0%), though the largest group had no children under 18, (58.6%). As would be 
expected of a sample drawn through the insurance group of a motor manufacturer, 
the majority of the sample were in full-time employment, (81.4%), the largest group 
being employed as engineers or managers, (30.3%). The two largest groups of 
respondents who were not in engineering or management, were car assembly 
workers, (6.5%), or nurses (3.4%). In general, the education levels of those 
responding were high, 30.1% having a degree or higher. 
4.8% of the sample (14 drivers) regarded themselves as professional drivers, 
(driving more than 4 hours a day as part of their job), these drivers mostly being 
employed by the motor manufacturer as test drivers. 5 drivers, (1.7%) had not 
passed their driving test at the time of the RTA, the remainder having held a driving 
license for an average of 20.3 years, (SD = 11.6 years). Of those with licenses, these 
had been held for between I month and 65 years at the time of the RTA, and most 
drivers therefore passed their test at the age of 17 or 18 although as some drivers 
passed their driving tests considerably later, the average age of getting a full license 
was 21.3 years. A little over three quarters of the drivers held only 1 license, (that 
being for motor cars), although an additional 20% held a motorcycle license in 
addition. 13.1% of the sample had some form of additional driver training, this 
mostly being vehicle handling courses organised by their employer. 
The drivers were asked about their driving habits, specifically how far they typically 
drove in a year and how frequently they drove on specific road types. 32% of the 
sample drove over 15,000 miles per year and an additional 30% drove over 10,000 
miles per year, (Figure 3.3). The sample obtained thus comprised a high percentage 
of drivers with a high annual mileage as may be expected by the nature of the 
drivers contacted. 
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15000-20000 
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5000-10000 miles 
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24% 
Figure 3.3 Average miles driven per year by percentage of the respondents. 
Figure 3.4 describes the percentages of the respondents stating that they drove 
frequently for each of several classes of road. From this, it can be seen that the most 
frequently driven on road class was rural roads, 32% of drivers reporting they 
frequently drove on them. Additionally, 25% of the drivers frequently drove on 
motorways and 19.4% frequently drove on urban roads. Single carriageway main 
roads were least frequently driven on, 13.3% reporting their frequent use. 
Less than 5000 
miles a year 
14% 
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Dual Carriageways 
Rural Roads 
Other Main roads 
Motorways 
Percentage of respondents 
Figure 3.4 Types of roads frequently driven on by percentage of the 
respondents. 
Drivers were also asked about their RTA records prior to the RTA in question. 
These RTAs were described either as minor RTAs, (in which the costs were less 
than E500), or major RTAs, (resulting in costs of over E500). These are presented 
respectively in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
Table 3.1 Number of prior minor RTAs driver had been involved in. 
Number of RTAs Frequency Percentage of 
sample 
0 88 30.5 
1 54 18.7 
2 68 23.6 
3 46 15.9 
4 14 4.8 
5 9 3.1 
More than 5 10 3.5 
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Table 3.2 Number of prior major RTAs driver had been involved in. 
Number of RTAs Frequency Percentage of 
sample 
0 154 52.6 
1 78 26.6 
2 41 14.0 
3 9 3.1 
4 4 1.4 
5 3 1.0 
More than 5 4 1.4 
Two drivers reported having been involved in 10 minor RTAs over the course of 
their driving career, additionally, one driver reported being involved in 14 major 
RTAs. 
In terms of how long ago these RTAs occurred, just over 20% had an RTA in the 
previous year, whereas slightly less than half, (49.3%) had an RTA more than 10 
years ago. The range of time since the last RTA varied hugely, from 1 month to 65 
years, the average being 8.5 years, (SD=11.3 years). 
The majority of those replying, (83%), had no penalty points on their driving 
license, of those with points, most commonly, (12%) they had three points for 
speeding. 
Only 3 of the drivers, (1.01%), stated that they had some disability that may have 
affected the cause of the RTA, two of these drivers stating a visual disability and one 
stating a physical disability. Of the 126 drivers who normally wore spectacles when 
driving only one stated that this was a factor in the RTA. 
The distribution was initiated in October, and continued with for 9 months. 
Accordingly, a significant number of the questionnaires returned related to RTAs 
occurring in autumn and winter months and a higher than expected proportion of 
RTAs therefore involved poor weather conditions. Thus, data relating to the 
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environmental conditions at the time of the RTA are known to be biased and are not 
discussed further. 
Nature of the vehicles involved: As expected, the majority of the sample drove 
company cars, (67.7%), these vehicles having been driven for an average of 7500 
miles, (SD=12,350 miles). Some confusion may have existed however between 
those drivers that viewed a company leased vehicle as their own as compared to 
those who regarded it as a company vehicle however. Irrespective of this, nearly 
80%, (79.3%) drove the vehicle which they were involved in an RTA in everyday, 
although 4.8%, (14 individuals) were driving a new vehicle that they had not 
previously driven before. 
All but 4% of the drivers who responded to this survey were contacted through the 
insurance group of a motor manufacturer and accordingly 94.2% of the sample 
drove vehicles manufactured by them. To simplify the analysis, vehicles not 
manufactured by this company were excluded from the analysis of vehicles and their 
features. This was justified by the high percentage of vehicles manufactured by this 
company in the dataset which ensured little data were lost by excluding other 
vehicles. Inclusion of vehicles from other manufacturers would have complicated 
the analysis as vehicles from several manufacturers were present in the dataset. 
Figure 3.5 is a breakdown of the nature of the vehicles included in the sample. 
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Figure 3.5 Nature of the vehicles involved in the RTA by percentage of the 
respondents. 
As can be seen from Figure 3.5,43% of the vehicles involved were lower medium 
sized vehicles, (equivalent in size to a Ford Escort or Vauxhall Cavalier). Only 16% 
of the vehicles involved could be classed as large vehicles, (i. e. ones that could seat 
5 adults or more comfortably), whereas 41% were classed as small cars. 
Additionally, 59% of the vehicles were described by their drivers as being 
hatchbacks and 35% as saloons. (Although for reasons of commercial 
confidentiality, data relating to the proportions of these classes of cars in the vehicle 
fleet as a whole cannot be presented, these are in agreement with the figures 
presented above in Figure 3.5) 
With respect to the registration year of the vehicles involved, 12.5% were less than a 
year old at the time of the RTA, 49.5% were between a year and two years old and 
36.5% were up to three years old. Only 1.501o, (4 vehicles) were older than three 
years at the time of the RTA. 
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There was not an even split in terms of the colours of the vehicles involved in the 
RTAs as Figure 3.6 shows. 20% of the sample had RTAs in red cars, the next largest 
proportions being those involved in RTAs in dark blue cars, or light blue cars, 
(13.0% and 10.9% respectively). 
Other 7.2% 
Silver 9.8% 
r=ý 
Burgundy 0 
Bright Red 20.3% 
Dark Green 10. '5% lo* 
Light Green 4.7% 
Dark Blue 13.0% 
Light Blue 10.9% , 10 
1 
Dark Grey 6.5% 
Light Grey 2.2 0 
Black 3 0.0 3.3? 11 
White 0 6.9c%/t 
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 
Percentage of the respondents 
Figure 3.6 Analysis of the colours of the RTA involved vehicles by percentage 
of returned sample. 
As could be expected from a sample of predominantly new vehicles, features such as 
power steering and Anti-lock braking systems were not uncommon, (respectively 
being present in 72.7% and 32.8% of the vehicles in the returned sample). However, 
these figures too must be treated with caution given the problems identified above. 
7 drivers reported vehicle failures led directly to the RTA occurring, 2 of which 
stated that blown tyres and 1 stating total light failure was solely responsible for the 
RTA. The remaining four drivers reported multiple failures including delayed 
braking, (1), pull to one side when applying the brakes, (2); loss of effectiveness of 
the brakes, (3); and play in the steering column, (1). 
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2 drivers stated that a load in their vehicle affected their ability to drive the vehicle 
or altered the vehicle's performance and thereby affected the cause of the RTA. 
3.5.3.3 RTA Scenarios. 
From Figure 3.7 it can be seen that the largest group of RTAs occurred in residential 
areas, with the next largest proportion occurring in open countryside. Accordingly, 
from Figure 3.8 a large proportion of the RTAs occurred on single carriageway A 
roads and B roads as would be expected of largely residential areas. The majority of 
the roads classified as other in Figure 3.8 were parking areas. 
Parking area 
Other 
Open Countryside 
Villagefrown 
Suburban 
City Centre 
Percentage of the respondents 
. 6% 
Figure 3.7 Situations in which the RTAs occurred by percentage of the 
respondents. 
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Other 
One Way Street 
C Road or 
Unclassified 
B Road 
A Road Single 
A Road Dual 
Motorway 
Figure 3.8 Road class on which RTA occurred by percentage of respondents. 
In terms of the proximity to junctions two thirds of the RTAs occurred either at, or 
within 1 00m of a junction, (respectively 40% of the sample and 27% of the sample), 
the most represented junctions being T junctions, (35.18% of junction related 
RTAs). The next largest group were roundabouts, (21.11% of junction related 
RTAs), (Figure 3.9). 
Other 
Driveway or 13.1% 
Enterance 
Roundabout 21.1% 
Y or Slip Road 12.1% 
T Junction 35.2% 
Crossroads ýý 12.1% 
0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 
Percentage of the respondents 
Figure 3.9 Nature of junction RTAs by percentage of junction RTAs. 
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Figure 3.13 shows the directions that the drivers were heading at junctions when the 
RTA occurred. Interestingly, 52% of the drivers were heading straight on the road 
they were currently on rather than turning. Of those that were turning, fewer were 
crossing a line of traffic than those that were merging with a line of traffic, (i. e. 19% 
were turning right compared to 22% turning left). 
Other 
7% 
Turning Left 
22% 
Straight on 
52% 
Turning Right 
19% 
Figure 3.10 Direction heading at junctions by percentage of junction RTAs. 
A similar pattern was seen when considering the priority of the roadway on which 
the drivers were travelling at the time of the RTA, half of the drivers were heading 
straight on at this junction. Of the remaining drivers, 43% were either expected to 
stop or specifically instructed to stop at this junction, (Figure 3.11). 
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Explicit 
7% 
Secondary 
Road Expected 
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26% 
Main Road Not 
Expected to 
Stop 
50% 
Main Road 
Instructed to 
Stop 
17% 
Figure 3.11 Roadway priority at junction by percentage of junction RTAs. 
Figure 3.12 shows the nature of the traffic controls if any, present at each junction. 
Of the 194 junction involved RTAs, 124 junction controls were mentioned. Of these, 
only 14 had two or more controls mentioned, the majority, (109) had only one 
mentioned. 
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Frequency of response 
Figure 3.12 Frequency of occurrence of traffic controls at junction RTAs. 
Of those drivers involved in RTAs at junctions, whilst 53.3% stated they stopped at 
the junction, only 37.9% stated that they didn't stop. The distinction between those 
that didn't stop and were not expected to, and those that simply didn't stop was 
made in the questionnaire, but was not sufficiently reliably reported. 
Table 3.3 below describes the speed limits of the areas in which the RTAs occurred. 
The 30 mph or less category includes parking RTAs, (from Figure 3.7, 
approximately 14% of all RTAs), typically occurring in areas with speed limits 
regulated to be less than 30 mph. Irrespective of these parking RTAs therefore, 
approximately 50% of the RTAs in the returned sample occurred in a 30mph zone. 
Table 3.3 Percentage of the sample in each speed limit category. 
Speed limit Percentage of the sample 
30mph or less 63.4 
40 11.9 
50 5.4 
60 10.3 
F- 70 9.1 
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In terms of the configuration of the roadways around the RTA scene, Tables 3.4 and 
3.5 respectively describe the frequency of occurrence of each of the roadway types. 
More data were missing for areas after the RTA scene than for areas before and at 
the RTA scene and thus percentages of the responses would have distorted the true 
nature of the data. The data presented are therefore frequencies of respondents 
answering for each question rather than percentages of those answering the question 
positively. However, as is clear from both tables, the majority of the RTAs occurred 
on straight, flat roads. Additionally, 86.46% of the drivers reported that there were 
no road signs to indicate the presence of a difficult or dangerous section of the 
roadway ahead of the RTA scene. 
In only 21 cases were any significant roadway changes in the areas before the RTA 
and the area of the RTA noted, (12 being road width decreases and the remaining 9 
road width increases). In terms of the area of the RTA and areas after the RTA, 29 
cases noted any significant change, (these being 14 width increases and 15 
decreases). 
Table 3.4 Horizontal bends in roadway around RTA scene. 
Before RTA scene 
(frequency) 
At RTA scene 
(frequency) 
After RTA scene 
(frequency) 
Straight 177 172 171 
Single Wide Curve 42 37 34 
Multiple Wide 
Curves 
14 14 12 
Single Narrow 
Curve 
17 28 15 
Multiple Narrow 
lCurves 
9 5 7 
ITotal 259 256 239 
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Table 3.5 Vertical bends in roadway around RTA scene. 
Before RTA scene 
(frequency) 
At RTA scene 
(frequency) 
After RTA scene 
(frequency) 
Flat 164 182 176 
Uphill Slope 35 23 23 
Downhill Slope 51 41 39 
Top of Hill 3 5 6 
Bottom of Hill 3 6 1 
Hump 1 2 0 
ITotal 257 259 245 
3.5.3.4 Factors leading to the RTAs. 
The specific details of the RTAs in the database will now be discussed. These will 
be split into several sections for clarity. 
Situational factors affecting the drivers ability to control the vehicle: Only 23 cases 
described any significant visibility restrictions that affected their driving and may 
have helped to cause the RTA in question. In 8 of these cases, multiple restrictions 
were noted, the remaining 15 cases noting only one cause of lack of visibility, 
(Figure 3.13). 
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Figure 3.13 Summary of the frequency of visibility restrictions along roadway 
at RTA scene. 
In general, glare from external sources was not reported as a problem, 93.1% of 
those returning the questionnaire stating that glare was not a factor leading to the 
RTA. Of those for whom glare was a problem, glare from the sun, (most typically 
when low in the winter months) was a problem in 9 cases, and glare from other 
vehicle's headlights at night a problem in 8 cases. Of the 33 drivers reporting that 
some vehicle related restriction to visibility out of the vehicle contributed to the 
RTA, the largest group of these, (10 cases, 33%), reported that the restriction was 
due to misting on the windows of the vehicle they were driving. 54.4% of the drivers 
when asked about vehicle related restrictions to visibility however stated that 
restrictions were caused by factors outside of the vehicle, these mostly being 
restatements of the factors described previously. 
When asked if the driver saw the object they were in collision with, 55% reported 
that they had seen the object and 4101o that they had not. 171 drivers therefore saw 
what they were in collision with prior to the RTA. These drivers were asked, what, if 
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any actions they undertook to try and avoid the RTA, and were asked about any 
other drivers involved as to whether they tried to avoid the RTA as well. In total, 80 
of these drivers, (46.78%) stated that they could not avoid being in the RTA 
irrespective of their actions. 
Of those that did not view the collision to be inevitable, more drivers thought that 
they themselves could slow down sufficiently or would avoid the RTA than thought 
that the other driver would do this. Those whose responses were categorised as 
'Other' most frequently stated that they saw the other vehicle, but just assumed that 
the driver of the other vehicle saw themselves and would have avoided the RTA. 
Most commonly comments such as 'I did not expect the other driver to hit me' were 
made by these drivers. These are shown in Figure 3.14. 
Other 
Thought self could 
avoid collision 
Thought other 
would avoid 
Self could slow 
down sufficently 
Other would slow 
down sufficiently 
Frequency of occurrence 
Figure 3.14 Driver's perceptions of actions that would have avoided the RTA, 
(by frequency of occurrence). 
The majority of the RTAs involved collisions between cars, (Table 3.6). Similarly, 
the vast majority of the RTAs involving other vehicles had only one other vehicle 
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involved, (95.43%), the remainder having 2, (11 cases), or 3 vehicles involved, (1 
case). 
Table 3.6 Summary frequencies of objects hit in RTAs. 
Object hit. Frequency of occurrence. 
Car 217 
Van 16 
Truck 13 
Bus or coach 4 
Construction vehicle 1 
Bicycle 4 
Moped or motorbike 0 
Pedestrian 1 
Object on roadway 4 
Animal on roadway 4 
JObject at side of roadway 21 
10ther in roadway 12 
Figure 3.15 describes the nature of the impacts experienced by the vehicles. As can 
be seen, 42% of the impacts were front to rear collisions wherein one of the vehicles 
ran directly into the back of the other vehicle concerned. The next largest group of 
collisions, front to side collisions accounted for half of the number of collisions that 
the front/rear collisions did, (21%). The majority of the collisions in the 'other' 
category were parking area RTAs. 
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Figure 3.15 Nature of the impacts of the vehicles in the returned sample. 
In only 18 cases, (6.1 101o) did our driver admit to having driven too close to a vehicle 
in front prior to the RTA, the majority of the respondents (159 cases, 53.901o) stating 
that they were not following a vehicle in front too closely. 
Figure 3.16 describes the volume of traffic at the time of the RTA. As can be seen, 
the majority of the sample, (52%) were involved in RTAs with a low traffic volume, 
(this includes a high proportion of the parking area RTAs). 
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Figure 3.16 Volume of traffic at the time of the RTA, (by percentage). 
The drivers were asked if there were any hindrances to the usual flow of traffic at the 
time of the RTA and 44 of them, (15 %) replied that this was the case. Figure 3.17 
describes the causes of these hold-ups where known. Most of the drivers stated only 
one cause of traffic hold-ups, and the largest group of them, (23 drivers, 52.27%) 
stated that the hold-ups were due to factors other than those mentioned in the 
questionnaire. Most commonly, these were related to either just the volume of traffic 
at the time of the RTA, or the weather conditions. 
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Figure 3.17 Nature of the hold-ups in the traffic flow, (by frequency of 
occurrence). 
In 9 cases, (3.06%), the RTA in question followed closely from a previous RTA. 
Psychological factors leading to the RTA: At several stages throughout the 
questionnaire, drivers were asked about any errors they themselves may have made 
in addition to those of others prior to the RTA. Additionally, psychological factors, 
(such as fatigue and distraction), were asked about. The following section is 
concerned with these factors. 
25 drivers, (8.4%) stated that they felt that more experience of their own vehicle 
would have helped them to avoid the RTA. 
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Table 3.7 Our driver's perceptions of the other drivers intentions prior to the 
RTA. 
Other Driver Careless Other Driver Confusing Or 
Ambiguous 
Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency 
No 28.7 85 66.2 194 
Yes 57.4 170 19.4 57 
Not Sure 7.8 23 8.2 24 
From Table 3.7 it can be seen that the majority of our drivers felt the other driver to 
be careless, (57.43%), however only 19.45% of our drivers felt the other driver to be 
confusing or ambiguous. 
Our drivers were asked to assess any actions that they performed immediately prior 
to the RTA that may have contributed towards it. These actions were presented as 
being actions that they felt were reasonable to perform at the time, but that other 
road users may have felt to be unexpected, thus emphasising both that the actions 
were not blameworthy errors, but simply may have been misunderstood by other 
drivers. Additionally, they were asked to describe the reasons for these actions and 
were asked to make an assessment of whether these actions were also performed by 
the other road user in the RTA, (if there was one). The results are surnmarised in 
rank order of the frequency of occurrence, in Tables 3.8 to 3.10. These results are 
simplified by including in the action performed category, those actions that our 
driver felt maybe were performed in addition to those that were definitely 
performed. Thus these results are overly inclusive and deliberately cautious. 
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Table 3.8 Reasonable but potentially misleading actions by our driver, (in rank 
order by percentage for those answering the question). 
Action. Action Action not Don't know if 
performed or performed. action 
maybe performed. 
performed. 
Braked really hard 13.3 86.2 0.7 
Had difficulty braking effectively 8.5 91.1 0.3 
Vehicle was either stationary or 7.4 92.0 0.3 
barely moving and in a position 
that would have endangered itself 
or other road users, e. g. waiting to 
turn at a busy junction 
Lost control of the vehicle e. g. by 5.5 94.1 0.3 
skidding on ice 
Had difficulty steering effectively 4.0 95. 
Deliberately drove in an erratic 3.3 96.2 0.3 
course, e. g. swerving to avoid 
something 
Reversing in an inappropriate 1.7 98.3 
place, e. g. onto a main road 
Made some manoeuvre that you 1.7 96.6 
normally would not have done, 
e. g. you overtook in a more risky 
situation than you would normally 
have done 
Made a turn or other manoeuvre 1.3 98.6 
from the wrong lane, e. g. turning 
left from the outside lane of a 
roundabout 
Gave a misleading signal e. g. 0.3 99.7 
signalled and failed to turn or 
turned without signalling 
Made aU turn or 3 point turn in an 0.3 99.7 
inappropriate place 
Overtook another vehicle where 0.3 99.7 
you would not normally do 
Drove the wrong way up a one 100.0 
way street or other restricted road 
From Table 3.8, it can be seen that the most frequent actions performed involved 
braking, 38 drivers stating they had to brake really hard which may have helped to 
cause the RTA and 25 drivers stating they had difficulty in braking effectively, 
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(respectively 13.3% and 8.5% of the sample). 22 of our drivers stated that their 
vehicle was stationary or slow moving and in a position in which it was endangered, 
(8.5% of the sample). These vehicles were typically attempting to turn or were in 
slow moving traffic and were hit by other vehicles as they waited. 12 of our drivers, 
(4.0%), experienced difficulty in steering effectively and 10 drivers stated they 
deliberately drove in an erratic manner by for example swerving. 
Table 3.9 shows the responses given by our driver when they were asked to assess 
the frequency of the same actions being performed by the other driver involved. The 
53 RTAs that were single vehicle RTAs are excluded from the table and thus the 
percentages given are based on the number of multi-vehicle RTAs not the whole 
sample. 
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Table 3.9 Unexpected actions by other driver, (in rank order by percentae for 
those actions performed). 
Action. Performed or Not performed Don't know 
maybe 
performed 
They did not brake effectively 22.1 75.6 2.2 
Braked really hard 17.5 80.6 1.8 
They did not steer effectively 16.1 81.2 2.2 
Their vehicle stationary or 13.4 86.2 0.5 
barely moving in a position 
that would have endangered 
itself or other road users e. g. 
waiting at a junction 
They made a manoeuvre that 13.4 85.9 0.9 
you would not have done, e. g. 
risky overtake 
Lost control of the vehicle 9.0 88.7 2.2 
They made a manoeuvre from 6.3 92.2 1.3 
the wrong lane, e. g. turned left 
from the outside lane of a 
roundabout 
Signalled in a misleading 5.8 91.4 2.7 
manner, e. g. signalled and 
failed to turn, turned without 
signalling 
Deliberately drove in an erratic 5.4 92.8 1.8 
course, e. g. swerving to avoid 
something 
They were reversing in an 3.7 95.4 0.9 
inappropriate place, e. g. onto a 
main road 
They overtook another vehicle 3.2 95.9 0.9 
in a place that you would not 
normally do 
They ran off the road 1.9 97.7 0.5 
They made aU turn or 3 point 1.4 98.2 0.5 
turn in an inappropriate place 
They were driving the wrong 1.4 98.2 0.5 
way up a one way street or 
other restricted road 
As with manoeuvres performed by our driver, the most frequent manoeuvres 
performed by the drivers that may have contributed to the RTA occurring were those 
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associated with braking, 49 stating that the other driver did not brake effectively and 
39 stating that the other driver braked really hard prior to the RTA, (respectively 
22.1% and 17.5% of the sample). Steering ineffectively by the other driver was 
stated to be an issue by 36 (16.1%), of our drivers and 29, (13.4%), stated that the 
other vehicle was either stationary or slow moving and this may have contributed to 
the RTA. In addition, 29 of our drivers, (13.4%), stated that the other driver made a 
manoeuvre that they themselves would not have done. 
Two trends can be seen from these two tables. Firstly, in all but one of the 
manoeuvre types, at least one of our drivers admitted performing some action that 
may have been misinterpreted by any other road users and thus this may have helped 
to cause the RTA. Secondly, for all manoeuvres, more of the other drivers than of 
our drivers were attributed to have made the manoeuvre. In the case of multi-vehicle 
accidents, up to 22% of RTAs therefore have some contributory factors associated 
with a road user making a manoeuvre that was unexpected. 
The drivers were asked for the reasons for these errors being made. The results are 
presented in Table 3.10. 
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Table 3.10 Driver based reasons for our driver's errors, (in rank order by 
percentage of RTAs). 
Did any of the following affect the 
cause of the RTA? 
Yes No Don't know 
Overconfident in your driving 
abilities 
11.4 87.6 1.0 
Felt tired or fatigued 8.9 90.4 0.7 
Were late and in a rush 8.2 90.7 1.0 
Distracted by problems on your 
mind at the time 
7.2 91.8 1.0 
Difficulty in concentrating on 
driving 
5.5 94.1 0.3 
Felt angry or annoyed 4.5 94.5 1.0 
Frustration 3.4 82.8 7.4 
Distracted by looking fo 
something in the vehicle 
3.5 96.2 0.3 
Distracted by disturbances in your 
vehicle, e. g. children 
1.3 98.3 0.3 
Felt depressed 1.3 97.9 0.7 
Felt panicked 1.3 97.2 1.4 
You were nervous when driving 1.0 98.3 0.7 
Felt unwell 0.7 98.6 0.7 
Receiving encouragement 0.7 91.6 1.0 
Driving to impress other_ 91.9 1.4 
Table 3.10 illustrates some of the reasons for the errors being made by our drivers. 
Of note, is that 11.4% of our drivers stated that overconfidence in their own driving 
abilities contributed to the cause of the RTA. Additionally, fatigue and being in a 
rush accounted partially for up to 8.9% and 8.2% of the RTAs. 
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Table 3.11 Environment based reasons for our driver's errors, (in rank order 
by percentage of RTAs). 
Did any of the following affect the 
cause of the RTA? 
Yes No Don't know 
You could not avoid being in an 
RTA 
49.9 48.1 2.0 
There was another road user 
present who caused the RTA 
10.2 89.1 0.7 
The road surface made the car 
difficult to control 
7.9 91.7 0.3 
The road layout was misleading 5.1 94.8 
Street lighting 4.3 92.1 3.6 
Unfamiliar with road layout 3.7 3.7 4.3 
Distracted by looking for street 
names or route directions 
3.1 96.6 0.3 
Road signs were missing 2.8 96.6 0.7 
Poorly placed road signs 2.8 96.9 0.3 
Traffic lights were not working or 
were misleading 
2.0 97.9 
Being chased 1.4 90.9 
The road signs were misleading 1.0 98.3 0.7 
Pedestrians were crossing in an 
inappropriate place I 
0.7 
I 
99.3 
I 
With respect to environmental reasons for the RTA, when asked, approximately half 
of our drivers, (49.9%), stated that they could not avoid being in the accident. 
Additionally, 10.2% of the drivers, (30 drivers) stated that there was another road 
user present who caused the RTA without themselves crashing. Problems with the 
road were associated with a number of RTAs, poor road surface accounting for up to 
7.9% of the RTAs and misleading road layout accounting for up to 5.101o of the 
RTAs. Other road factors such as being distracted by looking for route directions 
accounted for RTAs associated with drivers who were in general unfamiliar with the 
road they were driving along at the time. 
3.5.4 The use of collected data to infer a 
-prima! 
y safety stratggy. 
The data above illustrate the nature of the scenarios in which the RTAs studied 
occurred, the nature of the involved drivers and some issues relating to the errors 
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made by these drivers and the reasons for these errors being made. In terms of the 
approach described by Malaterre et al (1992), the needs have thus been described. In 
order to deduce a strategy for primary safety system development these needs must 
now be cross tabulated with potential accident countermeasures, (this work will be 
described further in Chapter 4). However, in order to achieve this, the RTAs were 
grouped into similar categories. Correlating needs with potential accident 
countermeasures for individual RTAs would have served only to illustrate the 
countermeasures for these RTAs. Additionally, in order to produce a strategic 
approach to system development, it was necessary to deduce how frequently each of 
the implied systems would be required. Weightings were therefore required to 
illustrate which systems would be more beneficial to the driver population as whole. 
Two RTA taxonomies were possible given the data presented above, based either on 
the nature of the errors and reasons for these errors, or based upon the scenario in 
which these errors occurred. 
The latter categorisation was chosen as the quantity of data collected precluded an 
error based approach to categorisation that would be generalisable to the driver 
population as a whole. Given the number of questionnaires returned, (approximately 
300), they cannot be generalisable to the estimated 500,000 RTAs occurring 
annually. 
Secondly, the data relating to the scenarios in which the RTAs occurred is more 
reliable and more easily verifiable. The frequency of RTAs in different scenarios, 
(for example motorways or T junctions), are known and obtainable from large 
national and international databases. Additionally, data relating to fatalities that 
occur at each of these scenarios are obtainable, and as has been noted, in general 
likely to be more accurate than other available data. 
It is for this reason, that the categorisation system used to deduce strategy was based 
upon the scenario in which the accident occurred and the weightings used to 
determine the relative efficacy based upon fatality data. 
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Table 2.4 illustrates the relative numbers of RTAs of varying severity at different 
accident scenarios. These data are surnmarised below for fatalities with the addition 
of the currently collected sample, (Table 3.12. This table excludes parking area 
incidents, thus the total sample size on which the percentages are based is 279). 
Table 3.12 Fatal RTA frequency and percentage of total RTAs from STATS19 
compared to the current sample (by rank ordering of RTA scenario for 1996). 
RTA Scenario Frequency Frequency Percentage Percentage 
of RTAs, of returned of total, of returned 
(from data (from data, 
STATS19) STATS19, (N=279) 
N=3274) 
Not at junction 2012 64 61.4 22.9 
T Junction and 940 95 28.7 34.1 
Crossroads 
Private drive or 94 39 2.8 13.9 
entrance 
Y Junction or slip 84 24 2.6 8.6 
roads 
Other 56 15 1.7 5.4 
Roundabout 52 42 1.6 15.1 
Multiple Junction 34 N/A 1.0 N/A 
All junctions 1262 215 1 38.5 77.1 
Totals 3274 279 1 100.0 100.0 
From this and analysis of the returned questionnaires, the scenarios considered for 
the strategy derivation were as follows: 
e Non junction 
*T junction and Crossroads (combined) 
eY junctions or slip roads 
o Roundabouts. 
Significant differences can be seen between the two samples as would be expected 
from the differing nature of the populations sampled. For example, the current study 
firstly excluded contact with any drivers involved in an RTA resulting in a fatality 
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and included a large number of low speed damage only RTAs. However, given the 
relatively small sample of the current study, a comparison with a larger data set is 
required to illustrate the distribution of the two samples across RTA scenarios. A 
statistical comparison however, is not appropriate due to the differences in the 
population sizes. 
T junctions and Crossroads were combined due to the similar nature of the tasks that 
drivers must perform at both; they must either assess the state of traffic in one 
direction before either crossing it or merging with it, or assess the state of traffic in 
two directions before crossing either one or both traffic flows. Similar reasoning 
may be applied to roundabouts and slip roads in that drivers must merge with a line 
of traffic moving in the same direction that the merging traffic wishes to take. 
However, in the case of slip roads, both major and minor roads will be moving and 
the minor road is not expected to stop. As slip roads are a characteristic mainly of 
high volume roads, (usually dual carriageways or motorways), the traffic on the 
major road may attempt to allow other traffic to merge by moving into adjacent 
lanes. On roundabouts however, no such manoeuvres are possible on the roundabout 
itself and merging drivers are instructed in the highway code to stop unless it is safe 
to proceed, (Department of Transport 1996). Roundabouts and slip roads therefore 
differ and were grouped in separate categories accordingly. 
Private driveways and entrances were excluded from this analysis because the nature 
of these within the data collected was atypical of those within STATS19. Inspection 
of the returned questionnaires showed that a large number of these RTAs in the 
database were low speed impacts, largely related to commuting traffic around the 
sites of the company sponsoring this research. In addition, a number of low speed 
parking related incidents were noted which could not sufficiently reliably be 
distinguished from parking area incidents which were specifically excluded from the 
analysis. This is unsurprising given that the single largest group of RTAs found in 
the current study, (37.6%) were in suburban areas and the data themselves were 
derived from an insurance group. 
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Each of these scenarios were analysed separately from the main dataset to determine 
if any differences between the scenarios or between the scenarios and the dataset as 
a whole existed. First order cross tabulations of the RTA scenario and other 
variables are presented below. These allow a comparison of the percentage of 
occurrence of the various factors across the scenarios used. It will be readily 
apparent that the numbers of cases for the same scenario in different tables are not 
constant due to the varying numbers of missing responses across the questionnaire. 
A comparison based on the percentage of valid responses for each scenario will 
allow these missing values to have a minimal effect on the trends demonstrated. For 
each of the following tables, the numbers presented in parentheses are the 
frequencies of the cell counts. The other numbers presented in each cell are the 
percentage occurrence of the frequencies when compared to the scenario in the 
column heading. Thus the factors in the rows may be assessed across scenarios with 
different absolute frequencies in the returned sample to determine if any of these 
factors are differentially associated with different scenarios. The variables chosen 
for this analysis were those that may have some relevance to the production of 
accident countermeasures when considering the differing scenarios. Additionally, 
only those variables with sufficiently large frequency counts when considering the 
whole sample were employed. Other variables were not entered into this analysis. 
Due to the low sample size and corresponding cell counts, much of the data in the 
following tables could not be analysed statistically. Therefore, the following tables 
are presented to illustrate the trends found within the data. 
3.5.4.1 Demographics of the sample by scenario. 
A Chi square analysis of the numbers of cases within each scenario indicated 
significant differences, (Chi-Square = 48.9, D. F=3, p=0.00). Although some 
differences did exist in the demographic breakdown of drivers across RTA 
scenarios, no significant effects were found. This is unsurprising given the relatively 
homogeneous nature of the sampling frame employed. 
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Table 3.13 Scenarios by age of driver. 
Open 
Roadway 
(N=65) 
T junction or 
Crossroads 
(N=94) 
Y Junction or 
Slip road 
(N=24) 
Roundabout 
(N=43) 
Upto 20 years 3.1 (2) 8.5(8) 4.20) 2.30) 
21 to 25 years 9.2(6) 6.4 (6) 4.20) 9.3(4) 
26 to 30 years 6.1 (4) 5.3 (5) 12.5 (3) 16.3 (7) 
31 to 40 years 27.7(18) 23.4(22) 16.7(4) 27.902) 
41 to 50 years 35.4(23) 25.5(24) 25.0(6) 27.902) 
51 to 60 years 15.400) 28.7(27) 33.3(8) 9.3(4) 
61 years and 
above 
3.1 (2) 2.1 (2) 4.2(l) 6.9(3) 
Conclusions from this table are difficult to draw due to the variance in ages 
throughout the sample obtained; the majority of drivers being company car drivers 
and being aged on average 41.6 years. It would appear that drivers aged 50 and 
above are involved in proportionally more RTAs at T junctions and slip roads than 
open roadways and rounclabouts. A similar pattern exists for drivers aged under 25 
years. Both of these may be expected from inspection of STATS 19. 
Table 3.14 Scenarios by gender of driver. 
Open T junction or Y Junction or Roundabout 
Roadway Crossroads Slip road (N=42) 
(N=65) (N=94) (N=24) 
Male 83.1 (54) 70.2(66) 66.7(16) 73.8(31) 
Female 16.901) 29.8(28) 33.3(8) 26.201) 
Proportionally fewer females were involved in RTAs on open roadways than at 
junction related scenarios. Overall, males represented between 66% and 83% of all 
RTAs. 
Table 3.15 Scenario by was our driver impaired before the RTA? 
Open T junction or Y Junction or Roundabout 
Roadway Crossroads Slip road (N=43) 
(N=65) (N=94) (N=24) 
Yes 6.1 (4) 3.2 (3) 4.2(1) 4.6(2) 
No 93.9(61) 96.8 (91) 95.8 (23) 95.4(41) 
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Across the 4 scenarios chosen, in over 90% of the RTAs driver impairment was not 
felt to be a factor in the causation of the RTA. Whilst the absolute numbers of 
drivers that felt impairment was an issue was small and it is therefore difficult to 
generalise, it is curious that the highest proportion of drivers that were influenced by 
impairment of some kind were on open roadways. It might be expected that the tasks 
involved in negotiating junctions being more complex would lead to higher 
proportion of impaired drivers being involved in RTAs at these scenarios. 
Table 3.16 Scenarios by did our driver have any additional driver training? 
Open T junction or Y Junction or Roundabout 
Roadway Crossroads Slip road (N=43) 
(N=65) (N=92) (N=23) 
Yes 12.3(8) 7.6(7) 8.7(2) 13.9(6) 
No 87.7 (57) 92.4(85) 91.3(21) 86.1 (37) 
Overall, few drivers had any additional driver training; on a scenario by scenario 
basis slightly more drivers that were involved in RTAs at rounclabouts or on open 
roadways had additional driver training as compared to T junctions or slip roads. 
Table 3.17 Scenario by would more experience of driving in general would have 
helped? 
Open 
Roadway 
(N=65) 
T junction or 
Crossroads 
(N=93) 
Y Junction or 
Slip road 
(N=24) 
Roundabout 
(N=43) 
Yes 1.5(1) 2.2(2) 4.2(1) 4.7(2) 
No 90.8(59) 92.5(86) 91.7(22) 90.7(39) 
Not applicable 7.7 (5) 5.4(5) 4.2(1) 4.7(2) 
Unsurprisingly, most of the drivers stated that they felt they would not have 
benefited from more experience of driving in general. However, of those feeling that 
more experience may have helped, a higher percentage of the sample were present in 
the junction RTA scenarios than the open roadway. 
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Table 3.18 Scenario by how often our driver had driven the particular vehicle 
prior to the RTA. 
Open T junction or Y Junction or Roundabout 
Roadway Crossroads Slip road (N=43) 
(N=64) (N=92) (N=24) 
Daily 81.3(52) 85.9(79) 87.5(21) 74.4(32) 
Several times 10.9(7) 7.6(7) 4.2(l) 20.9(9) 
a week 
Several times 4.7(3) 4.4(4) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
a month 
Less than once 1.6(l) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
Ia month I L I 
I First time 3.1 (2) 1 2.2(2) 1 8.3(2) 1 4.7(2) 
Across all scenarios, approximately 75% or more of the drivers had driven the 
vehicle in which they were involved in the RTA in daily. With the exception of slip 
road RTAs, the majority of the remainder drove the vehicle several times a week, 
whereas 8.3% of those involved in RTAs on slip roads were driving the vehicle for 
the first time. 
Table 3.19 Scenario by would more experience of vehicle have helped? 
Open 
Roadway 
(N=65) 
T junction or 
Crossroads 
(N=94) 
Y Junction or 
Slip road 
(N=24) 
Roundabout 
(N=43) 
Yes 1.5(l) 3.2(3) 4.2(l) 2.3(1) 
No 87.7 (57) 96.8 (91) 91.7 (22) 95.4(41) 
Not sure 10.7(7) 0.0(0) 4.2(1) 2.3(1) 
In all scenarios, the majority of drivers felt that they would not have been helped to 
avoid the RTA if they had more experience of the vehicle in which they were at the 
time. 
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Table 3.20 Scenarios by number of miles typically driven per year. 
Open T junction or Y Junction or Roundabout 
Roadway Crossroads Slip road (N=43) 
(N=65) (N=92) (N=23) 
Less than 9.2(6) 20.6(19) 13.0 (3) 6.9(3) 
5,000 
5,000 to 18.502) 29.4(27) 17.4(4) 23.3 (10) 
10,000 
10,000 to 32.3(21) 30.4(28) 30.4(7) 37.2(16) 
15,000 
15,000 to 7.7 (5) 8.7(8) 8.7 (2) 13.9(6) 
20,000 
Over 20,000 32.3 (21) 10.8(10) 30.4(7) 18.6(8) 
miles 
For all road scenarios, the percentages involved in RTAs increase as distances 
driven per year increase to 15,000 miles per year. With the exception of roundabout 
RTAs, the percentage of those involved in RTAs at specific scenarios is least for 
those who typically drive between 15,000 and 20,000 per year. The percentage 
involved by scenario then increases again for those that typically drive over 20,000 
miles per year. 
Table 3.21 Scenario by years since last RTA. 
Open 
Roadway 
(N=65) 
T junction or 
Crossroads 
(N=94) 
Y Junction or 
Slip road 
(N=24) 
Roundabout 
(N=43) 
Up to 1 year 13.9 (9) 17.0 (16) 20.8 (5) 18.6 (8) 
2y ears 4.6 (3) 8.5 (8) 4.2 (1) 2.3 (1) 
3y ears 4.6 (3) 8.5 (8) 4.2 (1) 9.3 (4) 
4y ears 7.7 (5) 4.3 (4) 0.0 (0) 4.7 (2) 
5y ears 12.3 (8) 3.2 (3) 0.0 (0) 2.3 (1) 
6y ears 6.2 (4) 1.1 (1) 4.2 (1) 4.7 (2) 
7y ears 0.0 (0) 6.4 (6) 0.0 (0) 6.9 (3) 
8y ears 4.6 (3) 2.1 (2) 8.3 (2) 2.3 (1) 
9y ears 1.5 (1) 4.3 (4) 0.0 0 0.0 (0) 
10 years or 
more 
44.6 (29) 44.7 (42) 58.3 (14) 48.8 (21) 
In the case of open roadway and T junction RTAs, approximately 45% of those 
involved were involved in an RTA 10 or more years previously. For these scenarios, 
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approximately 14% and 17% of the drivers were involved in an RTA within the 
previous year. These figures are slightly higher for roundabout RTAs, 49% being 
involved in an RTA10 or more years ago and 19% being involved in an RTA within 
the previous year. These figures are higher still for slip road RTAs, (respectively 
58.33% and 20.83%) although the relatively small sample must be considered. 
Table 3.22 Scenarios by previous number of minor RTAs. 
Open T junction or Y Junction or Roundabout 
Roadway Crossroads Slip road (N=42) 
(N=55) (N=88) (N=24) 
Upto 3 60.0(33) 75.0(66) 70.8(17) 78.5(33) 
previous minor 
RTAs 
3 to 5 previous 34.5 (19) 21.6(19) 29.2(7) 19.1 (8) 
minor RTAs 
Over 5 5.5 (3) 3.4(3) 0.0(0) 2.4(l) 
previous minor 
RTAs 
In terms of junction RTAs, no significant differences existed between the scenarios 
when comparing the number of previous minor RTAs a driver had been involved in. 
For open roadways, more drivers had been involved in 1 to 3 minor RTAs whereas 
comparatively fewer had been involved in 3 to 5 minor RTAs. 
Table 3.23 Scenario by previous number of major RTAs. 
Open T junction or Y Junction or Roundabout 
Roadway Crossroads Slip road (N=43) 
(N=65) (N=91) (N=24) 
Upto 3 90.8(59) 94.5 (86) 95.8 (23) 95.4(41) 
previous major 
RTAs 
3 to 5 previous 9.2(6) 4.4(4) 0.0(0) 2.3 (1) 
major RTAs 
Over 5 0.0(0) 1.1 (1) 4.2(l) 2.3 (1) 
previous major 
RTAs 
Of those involved in junction related RTAs, approximately 95clo had been involved 
in up to 3 previous major RTAs, whereas 90% of those involved in open roadway 
RTAs had been similarly involved. 
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3.5.4.2 Analyses of the RTA scenarios. 
Table 3.24 Scenario by roadway on at time of the RTA. 
Open Roadway T junction or Y Junction or Roundabout 
(N=64) Crossroads Slip road (N=42) 
(N=93) (N=24) 
Motorway 12.5(8) 0.0 (0) 29.2(7) 2.4(l) 
A road dual 10.9(7) 7.5 (7) 29.2(7) 52.4(22) 
carriageway 
A road single 17.2(11) 30.1 (28) 16.7(4) 21.4(9) 
carriageway 
A road signed 1.6(l) 5.4(5) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
overtaking 
lane 
B road 28.1 (18) 34.4(32) 4.2(l) 9.5 (4) 
C or 20.3 (13) 12.9(12) 8.3 (2) 0.0(0) 
unclassif ied 
One way street 3.1 (2) 2.2(2) 4.2(1) 0.0(0) 
Other 6.3(4) 7.5 (7) 8.3 (2) 14.3 (6) 
Table 3.24 shows the nature of the roadways our drivers were on at the time of the 
RTA. B roads are the most common road types for open roadway scenarios and T 
junctions, whereas A road dual carriageways are mostly associated with roundabout 
RTAs. Motorways and A road dual carriageways are equally associated with slip 
roads. It can be seen that half of the motorway RTAs occur on the motorway itself 
with the remainder either on slip roads or on rounclabouts next to the motorway. 
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Table 3.25 Scenario by road class approaching. 
T junction or 
Crossroads 
(N=92) 
Y Junction or 
Slip road 
(N=24) 
Roundabout 
(N=31) 
Motorway 0.0(0) 33.3 (8) 3.2(1) 
" road dual 8.7(8) 29.2(7) 64.5(20) 
" road single 34.8(32) 4.20) 32.3 (10) 
" road signed 
lane 
2.3 (2) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
B road 32.6(30) 16.7 (4) 12.9(4) 
C or 
unclassified 
10.9(10) 4.2(l) 3.3 (1) 
One way street 2.2(2) 4.1 (1) 1 0.0 (0) 
Other 8.7(8) 8.3 (2) 1 16.1 (5) 
Unsurprisingly, with respect to the nature of the roadway the driver was approaching 
at the time of the RTA, motorway RTAs are most commonly associated with slip 
roads and dual carriageway RTAs with roundabouts. T junctions RTAs are most 
commonly associated with single carriageway A roads. 
Table 3.26 Scenario by direction heading at junction. 
T junction or 
Crossroads 
(N=94) 
Y Junction or 
Slip road 
(N=24) 
Roundabout 
(N=42) 
Straight on 53.2(50) 66.7 (16) 54.7 (23) 
Turning right 23.4(22) 12.5 (3) 7.1 (3) 
Jurning left 20.2(19) 16.7 (4) 30.903) 
Other 3.2(3) 4.20) 7.1 (3) 
In all junction manoeuvres, Table 3.26 shows that T junctions are the most 
represented scenarios, the majority of drivers proceeding straight on at these 
junctions. Overall, the largest group of drivers at each scenario were driving straight 
on at these junctions. Table 3.27 shows that for each scenario, more drivers did not 
stop than stopped, this being especially evident in the case of roundabout RTAs. 
This concurs with the results presented in figures 3.10 and 3.11. 
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Table 3.27 Scenario by did driver stop? 
T junction or 
Crossroads 
(N=87) 
Y Junction or 
Slip road 
(N=22) 
Roundabout 
(N=40) 
Yes 16.1 (14) 27.3 (6) 10.0(4) 
No 47.1 (41) 40.9(9) 77.5 (31) 
Not sure 3.5 (3) 4.6(l) 0.0(0) 
Not applicable 33.3(29) 27.3 (6) 12.5 (5) 
Table 3.28 Scenario by did vehicle run off road? 
Open Roadway T junction or Y Junction or Roundabout 
(N=64) Crossroads Slip road (N=42) 
(N=93) (N=23) 
Vehicle ran off 17.2(11) 4.3(4) 13.1 (3) 7.1 (3) 
road 
Vehicle did not 82.8(53) 95.7 (89) 86.9(20) 92.9(39) 
run off road 
Across the differing scenarios, Table 3.28 shows that more vehicles ran off the 
roadway when on open roads than on the other scenarios. The majority of vehicles 
across all scenarios did not however run off the roadway. 
Table 3.29 Scenario by was the driver changing lanes? 
Open Roadway T junction or Y Junction or Roundabout 
(N=65) Crossroads Slip road (N=42) 
(N=92) (N=23) 
Was changing 6.2(4) 5.4(5) 13.0(3) 7.1 (3) 
lanes 
Not changing 93.8(61) 94.6(87) 87.0(20) 92.9(39) 
lanes 
As a percentage of the RTAs at a given scenario, slightly more were changing lanes 
on slip roads than at other scenarios. 
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Table 3.30 Scenario by speed limit at RTA scene. 
OpenRoadway 
(N=59) 
Tjunctionor 
Crossroads 
(N=84) 
Y Junction or 
Slip road 
(N=20) 
Roundabout 
(N=33) 
Upto 30 mph 52.2(31) 78.6(66) 25.0(5) 39.4(13) 
40 10.2(6) 9.5 (8) 15.0 (3) 18.2(6) 
50 1.7 (1) 3.6 (3) 15.0 (3) 16.2(5) 
60 16.9(10) 5.9(5) 20.0(4) 15.2 (5) 
_70 
16.6(11) 2.4(2) 25.0(5) 12.1 (4) 
Table 3.30 shows that all of the roadway scenarios are associated more with speed 
limits of up to 30 mph. In terms of absolute numbers, the largest groups of RTAs on 
60 and 70 mph roads were associated with open roadways whereas 30 and 40 mph 
zones were more commonly associated with T junctions. 50 mph zones however, 
were more frequently associated with roundabouts. 
Table 3.31 Scenario by speed of driver. 
Open 
Roadway 
(N=65) 
T junction or 
Crossroads 
(N=94) 
Y Junction or 
Slip road 
(N=23) 
Roundabout 
(N=39) 
0-15 mph 41.5(27) 60.6(57) 56.5 (13) 74.4(29) 
. 16-20 mph 12.3 (8) 6.6(9) 4.4(l) 10.3(4) 
21-30 mph 24.6(16) 18.1 (17) 13.1 (3) 10.3(4) 
31-40 mph 1.5(1) 8.5 (8) 17.4(4) 5.1 (2) 
41-50 mph 3.1 (2) 0.0(0) 4.4(l) 0.0(0) 
51-60 mph 4.6(3) 1.1 (1) 0.00 0.0(0) 
61-70 mph 1.5(l) 0.00 4.4(l) 0.0(0) 
71 or more 
mph 
10.8(7) 2.1 (2) 
II 
4.4(l) 10.3(4) 
II 
For each scenario, the majority of drivers estimated they were travelling at less than 
15 mph prior to the RTA, the next largest proportion estimating their speed to be 
between 20 and 30 mph. The absolute numbers of drivers travelling at higher speeds 
are insufficient to make reliable comparisons across scenarios. However, of note is 
that in total 14 drivers, (6.33% of the drivers within these scenarios) admitted to 
driving in excess of the speed limit at the time of the RTA. 
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Table 3.32 Scenario by nature of impact with other. 
Open Roadway 
(N=60) 
T junction or 
Crossroads 
(N=91) 
Y Junction or 
Slip road 
(N=22) 
Roundabout 
(N=41) 
Front to front, 
(head on) 
11.7 (7) 4.4(4) 4.6(l) 0.0(0) 
Front to side 10.0(6) 36.3 (33) 4.6(1) 14.6(6) 
Side swipe 16.7(10) 14.3 (13) 13.6(3) 9.7(4) 
Front to rear 35.2(21) 38.5 (35) 63.6(14) 68.3(28) 
Multiple 
impacts 
6.7(4) 3.3 (3) 4.6(l) 0.0(0) 
Other 18.3(11) 3.3 (3) 4.6(l) 7.3 (3) 
Not sure 1.7(l) 0.0(0) 4.6(l) 0.0(0) 
Overall, the most frequent impact configuration across the scenarios was front to 
rear collisions accounting for between 35% and 68% of all impacts. These front to 
rear collisions are more common in slip road and roundabout scenarios, the next 
most common scenarios being side swipes and front to side collisions for these two 
scenarios. For T junctions, nearly as many RTAs occur in front to side 
configurations as front to rear with the next most common being side swipes. On 
open roadways, front to rear impacts account for 35.2% of all collisions whereas 
side swipes, (the next most common impact configuration), account for less than 
half of this number, (16.7%). 
Table 3.33 Scenario by time of the day. 
Open 
Roadway 
(N=63) 
T junction or 
Crossroads 
(N=92) 
Y Junction or 
Slip road 
(N=24) 
Roundabout 
(N=41) 
Dawn 4.76(3) 5.43(5) 4.170) 4.88(2) 
Day 66.67(42) 68.48 (63) 54.17 (13) 70.73 (29) 
Dusk 4.76(3) 6.52(6) 16.67(4) 9.76(4) 
Night 23.81 (15) 19.57(18) 25.00(6) 14.63(6) 
For open roadways, T junctions and slip roads, between 54% and 68% of the RTAs 
occurred during the day, with between 19% and 25% occurring at night; only 10% 
of the RTAs occurred during dusk or dawn hours. A lower percentage of RTAs 
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occurred during the night for roundabout RTAs and a higher percentage during the 
day, (respectively 14.6% and 70.7%). 
Table 3.34 Scenario by time of RTA. 
Open 
Roadway 
(N=61) 
T junction or 
Crossroads 
(N=94) 
Y Junction or 
Slip road 
(N=30) 
Roundabout 
(N=39) 
00.00-03.59 1.6(l) 1.1 (1) 0.0(0) 0.00 
04.00-07.59 16.4(10) 9.6(9) 10.0(3) 15.4(6) 
08.00-11.59 19.7(12) 28.7(27) 26.7 (8) 18.0(7) 
12.00-15.59 34.4(21) 28.7(27) 26.7(8) 18.0(7) 
16.00-19.59 23.0(14) 29.8(28) 33.3 (10) 41.0 (16) 
20.00-23.59 4.9(3) 2.1 (2) 3.3(1) 7.7 (3) 
Across all scenarios, the majority of RTAs occur between 08.00 and 19.59. No 
particular trend can be seen from these data although it would appear that more 
RTAs occur on open roadways between the hours of 20.00 and 03.59 than on 
junctions. 
Table 3.35 Scenario by temperature. 
Open 
Roadway 
(N=64) 
T junction or 
Crossroads 
(N=93) 
Y Junction or 
Slip road 
(N=24) 
Roundabout 
(N=43) 
Hot 1.6(l) 0.0(0) 4.2(1) 2.3(1) 
Warm 11.0 (7) 14.0 (13) 4.2(1) 18.6(8) 
Neutral 21.9(14) 26.9(25) 33.3 (8) 32.6(14) 
Cool 43.8(28) 32.3 (30) 37.5 (9) 34.9(15) 
Cold 18.802) 22.6(21) 16.7(4) 9.3(4) 
Not sure 3.1 (2) 4.3 (4) 4.20) 2.3(1) 
In all scenarios, the largest group of RTAs occurred when the temperature was 
described as cool; the vast majority of all RTAs occurring when the temperature was 
described as neutral, cool or cold. As with the pilot work, the majority of the 
questionnaires were distributed over the winter months and so a higher than may be 
expected proportion of RTAs were associated with poor environmental conditions. 
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Table 3.36 Scenario by road surface. 
Open T junction or Y Junction or Roundabout 
Roadway Crossroads Slip road (N=42) 
(N=65) (N=94) (N=23) 
Yes it 29.209) 14.9(14) 17.4(4) 19.1 (8) 
influenced 
RTA 
No it did not 60.0(39) 83.0(78) 60.9(14) 71.4(30) 
influence RTA 
Not sure 10.8(7) 2.1 (2) 21.7 (5) 9.5(4) 
Across all scenarios, the majority of RTAs occurred on roadways that did not 
influence the causation of the RTA. However, nearly a third of open roadway 
accidents were influenced by the condition of the roadway, whereas less than 20% 
of the RTAs occurring in the other scenarios were influenced by the condition of the 
roadway. 
Table 3.37 Scenario by visibility restriction along the road. 
Open Roadway T junction or Y Junction or Roundabout 
(N=65) Crossroads Slip road (N=42) 
(N=93) (N=22) 
Not restricted 56.9(37) 63.4(59) 81.8(18) 83.3 (35) 
Partially 30.8(20) 26.9(25) 9.1 (2) 16.7(7) 
restricted 
Severely 12.3(8) 9.7(9) 9.1 (2) 0.0(0) 
restricted 
As may be expected from Figure 3.11, the majority of the RTAs occurred in 
situations in which no visibility restrictions were present. In terms of visibility 
restrictions that were in evidence, open roadways exhibited a higher percentage of 
both partial and severe restrictions as compared to the other scenarios. These 
visibility restrictions were most commonly due to other vehicles on the roadway. 
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Table 3.38 Scenario by did driver see other road user? 
Open Roadway 
(N=65) 
T junction or 
Crossroads 
(N=92) 
Y Junction or 
Slip road 
(N=22) 
Roundabout 
(N=41) 
Yes 64.6(42) 50.0(46) 68.205) 68.3 (28) 
No 30.8(20) 42.4(39) 27.3 (6) 31.7(13) 
Not Sure 4.6(3) 7.6(7) 4.60) 0.0(0) 
The majority of drivers across all scenarios stated they could see the other road user 
involved in the RTA. Of those that did not see another road user in the RTA, 50% 
were at T junctions and approximately a quarter were on open roadways. 
Table 3.39 Scenario by was our driver unable to see other until too late? 
Open Roadway T junction or Y Junction or Roundabout 
(N=64) Crossroads Slip road (N=41) 
(N=91) (N=23) 
Yes, unable to 48.4(31) 42.9(39) 30.4(7) 29.3(12) 
see until too 
I ate 
No, could see 37.4(22) 53.9(49) 52.2(12) 65.9(27) 
Not sure 7.8 (5) 2.2(2) 4.40) 2.4(l) 
Not applicable, 9.4(6) 1.1 (1) 13.0(3) 2.4(l) 
(single vehicle 
RTA). 
For T junctions, slip roads and roundabouts the majority of our drivers could see the 
other driver involved. However, the largest group of drivers involved in RTAs on 
open roadways could not see the other driver in sufficient time, (31 drivers, 
48.44%). 
Table 3.40 Scenario by did driver see it too late to avoid collision? 
Open T junction or Y Junction or Roundabout 
Roadway Crossroads Slip road (N=18) 
(N=16) (N=33) (N=9) 
Yes 100.0(16) 87.88(29) 100.0(9) 94.44(17) 
I No 0.0(0) 12.12 (4) 0.0 (0) 5.56(l) 
When subsequently asked, the majority of drivers in all scenarios stated that they 
saw the vehicle they were in collision with too late to avoid an RTA. 
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Table 3.41 Scenario by did driver expect collision? 
Open Roadway 
(N= 19) 
T junction or 
Crossroads 
(N=31) 
Y Junction or 
Slip road 
(N= 11) 
Roundabout 
(N= 16) 
Yes 68.403) 71.0 (22) 72.7 (8) 81.3 (13) 
No 0.00 19.4(6) 9.1 (1) 0.0(0) 
Not Sure 31.6(6) 9.7 (3) 18.2(2) 18.7 (3) 
Of those that did see the other road user prior to the RTA they were asked if they 
expected the collision prior to its occurrence. For each scenario, the majority of our 
drivers expected the collision once the other vehicle was seen. 
Table 3.42 Scenario by was driver driving too close to vehicle in front? 
Open 
Roadway 
(N=65) 
T junction or 
Crossroads 
(N=94) 
Y Junction or 
Slip road 
(N=24) 
Roundabout 
(N=41) 
Yes 6.2(4) 5.3 (5) 12.5 (3) 12.2(5) 
No 55.4(36) 56.4(53) 54.2(13) 58.5 (24) 
Not sure 3.1 (2) 1.1 (1) 4.2(1) 2.4(l) 
Not applicable 35.4(23) 37.2(35) 29.2(7) 26.801) 
The majority of drivers across all scenarios were not driving too close to a vehicle in 
front prior to the RTA. The next largest group across all scenarios were those that 
stated this question was not applicable as they were not following a lead vehicle. Of 
those junction related RTAs in which the drivers stated they were following a lead 
vehicle and were too close, twice as many, (by percentage across the scenarios) were 
at roundabouts or slip roads as compared to T junctions. 
Table 3.43 Scenario by traffic volume. 
Open 
Roadway 
(N=64) 
T junction or 
Crossroads 
(N=93) 
Y Junction or 
Slip road 
(N=24) 
Roundabout 
(N=40) 
Low 60.9(39) 51.6 (48) 37.5 (9) 20.0(8) 
Medium 15.600) 24.7 (23) 25.0(6) 40.006) 
High 14.1 (9) 17.2 (16) 33.3 (8) 35.0(14) 
Traffic jam 9.4(6) 6.4(6) 4.2(l) 5.0 (2) 
In general, most of the RTAs on open roadways, at T junctions and on slip roads 
occurred when the traffic volume was low. 
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Table 3.44 Scenario by hindrance to traffic flow. 
Open T junction or Y Junction or Roundabout 
Roadway Crossroads Slip road (N=42) 
(N=64) (N=94) (N=23) 
No unusual 87.5(56) 83.0(78) 87.0(20) 88.1 (37) 
hindrance 
Some 12.5(8) 17.0 (16) 13.0 (3) 11.9(5) 
hindrance to 
traffic fI ow 
Table 3.44 shows that between 12% and 17% of the RTAs occurred when there was 
some unusual hindrance to the traffic flow. 
Table 3.45 Scenario by frequency of drivers passage along the route in 
question. 
Open T junction or Y Junction or Roundabout 
Roadway Crossroads Slip road (N=43) 
(N=64) (N=92) (N=24) 
Daily 31.2(20) 48.9(45) 33.3(8) 32.6(14) 
At least once a 23.4(15) 26.1 (24) 33.3(8) 27.9(12) 
week 
At least once a 3.1 (2) 7.6(7) 0.0(0) 9.3(4) 
month 
Several times 21.9(14) 12.0(11) 29.2(7) 23.3 (10) 
a year 
Extremely 9.4(6) 4.4(4) 4.20) 2.3 (1) 
rarely 
First time 10.9(7) 1.1 (1) 0.0(0) 4.7(2) 
In terms of the frequency of drivers passage along the route they were on at the time 
of the RTA, the largest faction for each scenario had driven along that route daily or 
at least once a week. When these two frequencies are combined, they account for 
between 55% and 75% of the RTAs. In general, across the scenarios, comparatively 
few drivers were involved in RTAs on roads they had driven along at least once a 
month or less frequently than that. However, for all scenarios, RTAs were more 
common on roadways that the drivers have used several times a year than at least 
once a month or extremely rarely. Of note is that of those driving along the route in 
question for the first time, the largest group were on open roadways; 10% of all open 
roadway accidents were on roads that the driver had never driven along before. 
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Table 3.46 Scenario by how well driver knew road at time of RTA. 
Open 
Roadway 
(N=65) 
T junction or 
Crossroads 
(N=93) 
Y Junction or 
Slip road 
(N=24) 
Roundabout 
(N=43) 
Very well 58.5(38) 77.4(72) 66.7(16) 67.4(29) 
Quite well 16.901) 16.1 (15) 29.2 (7) 23.3 (10) 
Not very well 12.3(8) 1 4.3(4) 1 0.0(0) 7.0(3) 
Not at all 12.3(8) 1 2.2(2) 1 4.2(1) 2.3(1) 
As may be expected from Table 3.46 a similar pattern exists when considering how 
well the driver knew the road at the time of the RTA. 
Table 3.47 Scenarios by model of vehicle involved. 
Open T junction or Y Junction or Roundabout 
Roadway Crossroads Slip road (N=37) 
(N=52) (N=83) (N= 16) 
Mini/supermin 11.5(6) 30.1 (25) 25.0(4) 16.2(6) 
i 
Small 21.201) 21.7 (18) 6.3 (1) 27.0(10) 
Lower 40.4(21) 43.4(36) 43.8 (7) 43.2(16) 
Medium 
Upper 25.0(13) 4.8(4) 12.5 (2) 25.0(4) 
Medium 
Luxury 1.90) 0.0(0) 12.5 (2) 2.70) 
Executive II I 
For any given scenario, the most frequently represented vehicles were medium 
family sized cars. Small cars were proportionally more likely to be involved in 
RTAs at T junctions, whereas luxury or large family sized vehicles were more likely 
to be involved in RTAs on open roadways. 
3.5.4.3 Contributoryfactors analysis by scenatios. 
The following section describes the contributory factors in the RTAs in question 
categorised by scenario of the RTA. These include the behaviours of our driver and 
the other driver, (if applicable), that contributed to the RTAs occurrence. 
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Table 3.48 Scenario by did another person behave in a careless manner? 
Open 
Roadway 
(N=66) 
T junction or 
Crossroads 
(N=94) 
Y Junction or 
Slip road 
(N=24) 
Roundabout 
(N=43) 
Yes 45.5(30) 70.2(66) 54.2(13) 65.1 (28) 
No 36.4(24) 20.2(19) 20.8(5) 30.2(13) 
Not applicable 13.6 (9) 2.1 (2) 12.5 (3) 2.3 , 
1) 
Not sure 4.6(3) 7.5 (7) 12.5 (3) 2.30) 
For junction related incidents, the majority of our drivers stated that the other driver 
involved drove in a careless manner. Whilst this was also the case for open roadway 
incidents in a much higher proportion of these drivers stated that another driver was 
not driving in a careless manner. 
Table 3.49 Scenario by did another behave in a confusing manner? 
Open 
Roadway 
(N=66) 
T junction or 
Crossroads 
(N=92) 
Y Junction or 
Slip road 
(N=24) 
Roundabout 
(N=42) 
Yes 13.6(9) 20.7 (19) 20.8(5) 33.3 (14) 
No 71.2(47) 65.2(60) 62.5 (15) 61.9(26) 
Not applicabl 136(9) 3.3 (3) 12.5 (3) 2.4 1 
Not sure 10.9(10) 4.20) 2.4(l) 
In contrast however, the majority of drivers in all scenarios felt that the other drivers 
involved did not behave in a confusing manner. Up to one third of our drivers 
however did state that the driver was behaving in a confusing manner which may 
have helped to cause the RTA. 
Table 3.50 Scenario by did our driver misjudge speed of other? 
Open 
Roadway 
(N=56) 
T junction or 
Crossroads 
(N=88) 
Y Junction or 
Slip road 
(N= 19) 
Roundabout 
(N=38) 
Yes 10.71 (6) 5.68(5) 21.05(4) 21.05 (8) 
No 85.71 (48) 90.91 (80) 73.68 (14) 78.95 (30) 
Not applicable 3.57 (2) 3.41 (3) 5.26(l) 0.0(0) 
The majority of those drivers answering this question felt that they did not misjudge 
the speed of the other driver involved in the RTA. However, over 20% of the slip 
161 
Study 1: RTA data collection. 
road and roundabout RTAs and 10% of open roadway RTAs were associated with 
our driver stating that they misjudged the speed of another road user. 
Table 3.51 Scenario by did our driver misjudge distance to another. 
Open 
Roadway 
(N=26) 
T junction or 
Crossroads 
(N=39) 
Y Junction or 
Slip road 
(N=12) 
Roundabout 
(N= 15) 
Yes 19.2(5) 7.7 (3) 25.0(3) 40.0(6) 
No 76.9(20) 92.3(36) 75.0(9) 60.0(9) 
_Not 
applicable 3.9(1) 0.0 (0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
Similarly, the majority of our drivers felt that they did not misjudge the distance to 
the other road user involved. The absolute numbers of responses for this question are 
lower than for the comparable questions and therefore conclusions from these data 
are tentative. However, it would seem that up to 40% of our drivers felt that they 
misjudged the distance to another road user and that this may have helped to cause 
the RTA. The rank ordering of scenarios between Tables 3.50 and 3.51 in terms of 
the percentage within each that felt speed or distance misjudgements were an issue is 
the same. This may indicate that there are specific, consistent problems across the 
scenarios. 
The following tables represent summary tables for the errors made by both our 
driver and the other driver and reasons for our driver making these errors. Multiple 
errors may of course be made in any RTA and consequently may occur in 
combinations when considering scenarios. The percentage values given therefore 
represent the proportion of RTAs in each scenario in which the individual errors 
occurred. For each scenario, N represents the number of occasions in which this 
particular scenario occurred in the dataset as a whole. 
Table 3.52 describes the nature of the errors made by our driver that may have led to 
the RTA. By far the most common behaviours noted are those associated with 
vehicle control. On open roadways, approximately 16% of RTAs were associated 
with our driver braking hard, and approximately 9% felt that they were unable to 
brake effectively prior to the RTA. A similar situation existed for T junction RTAs 
with approximately 14% stating problems associated with braking hard and 7% not 
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being able to brake effectively. Roundabout RTAs were also associated with failures 
in braking, but in contrast to the other scenarios, the proportion stating they could 
not brake effectively exceeded that of those who felt they braked excessively hard. 
Of all the scenarios, slip road RTAs are most associated with braking problems, 
29% stating that braking hard was an issue and 12.5% stating that they were unable 
to brake effectively. 
The proportions stating a failure to be able to steer effectively were more similar 
across scenarios, with between 7% and 12.5% stating this was an issue in the RTA 
in which they were involved. 
Overall, relatively few drivers stated they made a manoeuvre from the wrong lane, 
however, 8.3% of those on slip roads did, equating to 50% of those who made this 
manoeuvre. In terms of those that were stationary or barely moving, the highest 
proportion by scenario were on roundabouts, (6 drivers, 14.3%), equating to 43% of 
those that were in this situation. An additional 7 drivers involved in RTAs at T 
junctions stated this factor was an issue in the RTA in which they were involved in. 
Due to the relatively low numbers of drivers in the sample as a whole, definitive 
conclusions are difficult to draw, but it would seem that being stationary in a 
position in which the vehicle is endangered by others is not an infrequent problem in 
RTAs amongst the population sampled. 
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Table 3.52 Scenario by our drivers own errors. 
Error Open T junction Y Junction Roundabout 
Roadway or or Slip road (N=42) 
(N=64) Crossroads (N=24) 
(N=95) 
Braked really hard 15.6(10) 13.7(13) 29.2(7) 9.5(4) 
Deliberately drove in an 4.7(3) 3.2(3) 4.2(l) 4.8(2) 
erratic course, e. g. 
swerving to avoid 
something 
Lost control of the vehicle 10.9(7) 4.2(4) 12.5(3) 0.0(0) 
e. g. by skidding on ice 
Had difficulty steering 9.4(6) 1.1 (1) 12.5 (3) 0.0(0) 
effectively 
Had difficulty braking 9.4(6) 7.4(7) 12.5 (3) 11.9(5) 
effectively 
Made a turn or other 1.6(l) 0.0(0) 8.3(2) 2.4(l) 
manoeuvre from the 
wrong lane, e. g. turning 
left from the outside lane 
of a roundabout 
Made aU turn or 3 point 0.0(0) 0.00 4.2(l) 0.0(0) 
turn in an inappropriate 
place 
Reversing in an 1.6(l) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 0.00 
inappropriate place, e. g. 
onto a main road 
Vehicle was either 4.7(3) 7.4(7) 4.2(l) 14.3(6) 
stationary or barely 
moving and in a position 
that would have 
endangered itself or other 
road users, e. g. waiting to 
turn at a busy junction 
Drove the wrong way up a 0.00 0.0 (0) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
one way street or other 
restricted road 
Made some manoeuvre 1.6(l) 2.1 (2) 4.2(l) 0.00 
that you normally would 
not have done, e. g. you 
overtook in a more risky 
situation than you would 
normally have done 
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Across all the scenarios, Tables 3.52 and 3.53 show that in general, the errors 
attributed by our drivers to other drivers involved were more frequent than those our 
drivers attributed to themselves. Of note especially are that 23.8% of drivers 
involved in RTAs at roundabouts and 25.0% of those involved at skip roads stated 
that the other driver involved braked really hard and this may have contributed to the 
RTA. 
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Table 3.53 Scenario by others actions. 
Action. Open T junction Y Junction Roundabout 
Roadway or or Slip road (N=42) 
(N=64) Crossroads (N=24) 
(N=95) 
Braked really hard 12.5(8) 10.5(10) 25.0(6) 23.8 (10) 
Deliberately drove in an 7.8(5) 3.2(3) 8.3(2) 0.0(0) 
erratic course, e. g. 
swerving to avoid 
something 
Lost control of the vehicle 6.3(4) 10.5(10) 0.00 7.1 (3) 
Signalled in a misleading 3.1 (2) 5.3 (5) 4.2(l) 11.9(5) 
manner, e. g. turned 
without signalling 
They did not brake 7.8 (5) 22.1 (21) 8.3(2) 26.201) 
effectively 
They did not steer 12.5(8) 11.6(11) 4.2(l) 16.7(7) 
effectively 
Made a turn or other 4.7(3) 5.3(5) 0.00 14.3(6) 
manoeuvre from the 
wrong lane, e. g. turned 
left from the outside lane 
of a roundabout 
They made aU turn or 3 1.6(l) 2.1 (2) 0.00 0.0 (0) 
point turn in an 
inappropriate place 
They overtook another 3.1 (2) 4.2(4) 8.3 (2) 0.0(0) 
vehicle in a place that you 
would not normally do 
They were reversing in an 3.13 (2) 1.050) 0.00 0.00 
inappropriate place 
Their vehicle was in a 6.3 (4) 9.5 (9) 4.2(l) 19.1 (8) 
position the would have 
endangered itself or other 
road users 
They were driving the 1.6(l) 0.00 0.00 0.0 (0) 
wrong way up a one way 
street 
They ran off the road 1.6(l) 2.1 (2) 0.0 (0) 0.00 
They made a manoeuvre 10.9(7) 12.602) 8.3(2) 9.5 (4) 
that you would not have 
done, e. g. they overtook in 
a risky situation 
166 
Study 1: RTA data collection. 
Problems associated with the other driver not braking effectively were associated 
with 22.1% of T junction RTAs and 26.2% of roundabout RTAs. However only 
8.3% of slip road RTAs were associated with this factor. 
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Table 3.54 Scenarios by reasons for the error. 
Open T junction / Y Junction Roundabout 
Roadway Crossroads or Slip road (N=42) 
(N=64) (N=95) (N=24) 
Distracted by looking for 4.7(3) 6.3(6) 0.00 2.4(l) 
something in the vehicle 
Distracted by looking for 1.6(l) 2.1 (2) 0.0(0) 7.1 (3) 
street names or directions 
Distracted by disturbances 1.6(l) 2.1 (2) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) 
in your vehicle, e. g. 
children 
Distracted by problems on 7.8(5) 6.3 (6) 8.3 (2) 7.1 (3) 
your mind at the time 
Felt tired or fatigued 12.5 (8) 5.3 (5) 12.50 7.1 (3) 
Felt angry or annoyed 6.3(4) 2.1 (2) 4.2(l) 7.1 (3) 
Felt unwell 1.6(l) 0.00 4.2(l) 0.0(0) 
Felt depressed 3.1 (2) 1.6(l) 4.2(l) 0.0(0) 
Difficulty in concentrating 0.0 (0) 2.6(2) 8.3(2) 2.38(l) 
on driving 
Were late and in a rush 6.3(4) 6.3(6) 4.2(l) 7.14(3) 
Felt panicked 1.6(l) 1.1 (1) 0.0(0) 0.00 
Overconfident in your 10.9(7) 10.5(10) 12.5(3) 9.5(4) 
driving abilities 
The road surface made the 15.600) 6.3(6) 8.3(2) 4.8(2) 
vehicle difficult to control 
The road layout was 3.1 (2) 4.2(4) 4.20) 0.00 
misleading 
The road signs were 1.6(l) 0.00 0.0(0) 4.8(2) 
misleading 
Road signs were missing 3.1 (2) 0.0 (0) 4.2(l) 2.4(l) 
Poorly placed road signs 6.3(4) 0.0(0) 0.00 2.4(l) 
Traffic lights were not 1.6(l) 2.1 (2) 0.00 2.4(l) 
working or were 
misleading 
There was another road 17.2(11) 12.6(12) 12.5 (3) 2.4(l) 
user who caused the 
accident without 
themselves crashing 
You were nervous when 1.6(l) 0.00 4.2(l) 0.00 
driving 
You could not avoid being 60.9(36) 53.7 (51) 41.7 (10) 54.8 (23) 
in an accident 
Pedestrians were crossing 1.6 (1) 1 .1 
(1 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 
in an inappropriate place 
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In terms of those viewed to have made a manoeuvre from the wrong lane, 14.3% of 
the roundabout RTAs were associated with this factor, accounting for the single 
largest proportion of RTAs across the scenarios. 
Errors associated with improper driving practices, such as overtaking in dangerous 
places or making manoeuvres that our driver would not normally do were more 
frequent than those same behaviours exhibited by our driver. However, in general 
given the sample size and the relatively low numbers assessed to make such errors 
firm conclusions across scenarios may not be made from these data. Whilst this 
contrasts with the work of Parker et al (1995) who associated RTAs with non 
malevolent violations of the highway code, it can be expected both that drivers may 
be unwilling to report all of these errors in a questionnaire of this nature, and, when 
given the option to report these behaviours in other drivers would do so. 
Table 3.54 shows the reasons attributed by our drivers for the RTAs occurrence. Of 
note, is that between 41.7% and 60.9% of the drivers stated they were in a situation 
in which they could not avoid being involved in an RTA, and between 2.4% and 
17.2% stated there was another road user present who effectively caused the RTA 
without themselves being involved. Additionally, between 9.5% and 12.5% of the 
drivers stated they were overconfident in their driving abilities and that this 
overconfidence may have contributed to the RTA. Thus although on face value these 
data suggest the major reasons for the RTAs relate to the driving of other drivers, a 
proportion of our drivers were prepared to admit that they were partially culpable by 
attempting manoeuvres that in retrospect they were not capable of. Finally, some of 
our drivers also admitted some degree of temporary impairment such as distraction 
or fatigue that affected their ability to drive the vehicle they were in. 
3.5.5 Discussion of the main RTA causation study. 
The aim of the main phase of the RTA data collection was to collect sufficient data 
to develop a decision support system to help a motor manufacturer make strategic 
decisions with respect to the development and implementation of primary safety 
technologies. In order to achieve this, sufficient data that would allow deduction of 
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the factors underlying a range of RTAs were required. In addition, to facilitate a 
strategic approach to the development of primary safety technologies, sufficient data 
were required to determine the incidence of these factors in the causation of RTAs in 
the general driver population. The data collection tool employed was a self 
completion postal questionnaire and it was decided that in line with previous in- 
depth RTA studies, a minimum return sample of 1000 cases was planned for. 
3.5.5.1 Me th o d. 
The pilot study demonstrated that the self completion questionnaire itself was 
effective in eliciting factors underlying the causation of a sample of RTAs. Our 
drivers were able to describe the RTAs in which they were involved, and could 
complete the questionnaire in a meaningful manner. Some problems existed with the 
structure of the questionnaire and the wording of some of the questions. The 
questionnaire was modified in the light of this work and distributed to a sample of 
drivers drawn from the one of the same populations as in the pilot work. 
Although these changes were for the most part beneficial, it became apparent when 
coding the questionnaires for the main phase of the data collection, that additional 
modifications to the questionnaire may have been useful. In general, the 
questionnaires were completed fully by our drivers, however some questions still 
proved problematic and were answered incorrectly, (for example in the case of 
drivers describing visibility restrictions external to the vehicle when asked about 
those internal to the vehicle such as misting on the windscreen). Additionally some 
questions were inappropriately missed. The missing data was not consistent across 
all questions. For example in section 4 some of the respondents only ticked the 
check boxes to indicate that a factor was either definitely or maybe present, or that 
they did not know. The factors that were presumably not present were not always 
indicated to be not present. Percentage values of the factors present are therefore 
given according to the number of valid responses which varied from question to 
question. 
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Some of the precoded responses were misunderstood by our drivers when they 
completed the questionnaire. Any problems with interpretation of these responses 
were thought to have been overcome throughout the piloting phase of the 
questionnaire development. It is likely that misinterpretation of these questions was 
due more to our drivers on occasion not taking sufficient care when completing the 
questionnaire rather than misunderstanding the question or responses. This is backed 
up by a number of discrepancies between the free recall section and section 2 of the 
questionnaire. In a small number of cases, obvious discrepancies occurred, for 
example a diagram of an accident scene at a roundabout may have not been 
subsequently accompanied by the driver ticking the questions relating to junction 
related RTAs appropriately. Additionally, in a number of cases the drivers would 
refer backwards to previous questions when asked about factors they felt that had 
previously answered when in fact a different factor was being questioned. This may 
have been due to the subtle nature of some of the distinctions between the factors 
being misunderstood by our drivers. For example, in the questionnaire, visibility 
restrictions were presented as being either external or internal to the vehicle. This 
distinction may not have been made by those completing the questionnaire and 
therefore each restriction was repeated for each question. 
The respondents may therefore have felt the questionnaire to be too long and 
repetitious due to their misunderstanding of the nature of the factors. However, a 
number of factors were asked about twice since no objective data was present in the 
data set and an indication was required of the honesty of the responses. These 
included questions relating to whether our driver saw the vehicle in which they were 
in collision with and whether they felt tired or impaired before the RTA. Although 
insufficient data were collected to perform a statistical analysis of these responses, it 
would appear from an inspection of the data that these questions were answered 
consistently by the majority of respondents. 
Other problems may have existed with the questionnaire. Our drivers were 
specifically asked to complete the questionnaire as fully as they could and were 
instructed to answer every question they were able to. For the majority of questions 
171 
Study 1: RTA data collection. 
in which ambiguities may have arisen, the drivers were given the option of 
answering 'Maybeor 'Not Sure'. Some respondents may have inclined to answer in a 
more cautious manner, responding that factors may have been present when in 
actuality the likelihood of this was small. Alternatively, some may have been 
inclined to indicate that these factors were not present, (either by indicating so or not 
answering the question) when in actuality they were present but felt to be 
unimportant. 
Many of these effects above would be minimised obtaining a larger sample of 
returned questionnaires. The effects of different biases amongst different 
respondents would thereby be minimised. 
However, two sources of bias may exist that are potentially more problematic for the 
study. Firstly, the respondents may know the reasons for the RTAs but be unwilling 
to state these in a questionnaire. Secondly, the drivers may simply not know about 
the causation of the RTAs in which they were involved and may post hoc make 
attributions of the behaviours of themselves and others prior to the RTA. 
With respect to the first bias, it would seem likely that a proportion of respondents 
acted in this manner. Were those responding to the questionnaire equally likely to be 
the active as passive participants in the genesis of the RTA, equal numbers of 
returned questionnaires would reflect this. However, inspection of the returned 
questionnaires indicates that a higher proportion of these are ones in which our 
driver was passive in the genesis of the RTA and were hit by another road user that 
may be regarded to be at fault in legal sense. This to some extent is inevitable as it is 
expected that our drivers would perceive themselves to be above average in driving 
ability, (see for example Svenson 1981) and therefore not liable for the RTA. 
Additionally, it is reasonable to expect that those that may be regarded to be at fault 
would not be as willing to respond to a questionnaire as those that were not at fault. 
However, it can be seen that a proportion of those answering the questionnaire were 
being honest in their responses to the best of their ability. Some of our drivers were 
demonstrated to have behaved in a manner that would have been unexpected by 
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other road users and may have contributed to the RTA. Additionally, it was 
demonstrated that some were driving whilst impaired in some manner, (for example 
by distraction or fatigue), and that they may have driven in contravention of the 
highway code, (by for example speeding). Collection of more data in this manner 
would allow a direct statistical comparison with the data collected by the Institute of 
Transports Studies in Leeds, (Carsten et al 1989, Southwell et al 1990). As the 
Leeds study concentrated specifically on urban RTAS, (and the factors were 
assessed by a team), an estimation of the relative numbers of the factors present in 
the two data sets for urban RTAs may be arrived at and thus the effects of conscious 
biases deduced. This estimation may then be applied to the data collected in the 
current study for those factors repeated. 
This approach may also be used to deduce the effects of unconscious biases within 
the current sample. Since no objective data was accessible in the current study, a 
comparison with a known data set is the only manner in which the these data may be 
validated. Insufficient data were collected in the current study to justify a 
meaningful statistical analysis of the current data set with regard to previously 
collected data and therefore the effects of unconscious biases remain unquantified. 
Finally, there is an enormous loss of data when coding RTA case files into a 
numerical database, (Clarke 1992, Clarke, Forsyth and Wright 1993). Such data 
include the wealth of qualitative data that cannot be entered into the data files, 
including in this case exact descriptions of the RTA, diagrams of the RTA scene and 
driver's spontaneous comments. The analyses above all rely on a statistical approach 
to determining the relative incidence of the factors and thus the qualitative data are 
not employed other than to check the coding when entering the data. 
3.5.5.2 Sampling. 
The population of drivers involved in RTAs accessible through the insurance 
department of a motor manufacturer was the only population accessible to the 
current study. As was demonstrated, the sample obtained was atypical of the general 
driving population, comprising as it did of a high percentage of middle aged, male, 
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company car drivers. In addition many of these drivers drive over the average 
distance that an average driver may be expected to drive in a year and are 
consequently exposed to more risk and an increased objective chance of being 
involved in an RTA. As was seen, they are typically involved in more RTAs than 
would be expected, and these RTAs occurred more frequently than would be 
expected in a population drawn from average drivers. At least in some part, the 
increased RTA involvement may be explained by these factors, but in addition, the 
nature of the relationship the driver has with the vehicle and the costs that the driver 
incurs may result in some drivers behaving in a more risky manner than the average 
driver. This study cannot therefore be viewed to be generalisable to the driving 
population as a whole, but may potentially be regarded as being representative of 
this population of drivers. 
There are three issues relating to the sampling of the current study. Firstly, whilst the 
return rate was 21.1% and therefore slightly higher than comparable studies, (for 
example 19.7% by Southwell et al 1990) the absolute numbers of returned 
questionnaires was relatively low and was considerably less than was originally 
intended. Generalisations from the current sample to the population of drivers as a 
whole may not be achieved simply because of the sample size resulting. It is 
questionable given the resulting sample size if this study may be generalisable to the 
population from which this sample was drawn. 
Additionally, a significant proportion of the questionnaires were returned by those 
involved in incidents that were not required in the current study, (for example their 
vehicle having been hit whilst unattended in a car park). Some of these inappropriate 
returns were not immediately obvious when reviewing the questionnaire and these 
caused considerable difficulties when coding the data for analysis. Finally, 
preliminary analysis of the insurance groups own data indicated that the required 
sample size was obtainable given the time scale of the current study. In actuality, the 
insurance group distributed one third of the required questionnaires in this time and 
thus a significant proportion of the desired population were not sampled. No 
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information could be gained regarding the nature of the desired population as a 
whole, nor of which of these drivers were actually contacted. 
In order to proceed with this methodology of questionnaire distribution and of data 
collection, the distribution procedures required tightening up, in terms of who the 
questionnaires are distributed to by including within the distribution all that are 
required and excluding those that are not required. As insufficient data were 
collected to determine with any degree of accuracy the relative incidence of human 
factors in the causation of RTAs only preliminary conclusions may be drawn from 
this work. 
3.5.5.3 Results. 
Trends in the pattern of RTAs were drawn from an analysis of the data rather than 
performing full statistical analyses of the RTAs. Descriptive analyses of the data 
showed that the respondents in general performed in a manner that they would have 
been expected to have done. In general for example, they felt that the other drivers 
were more culpable than themselves and felt that they would not have benefited 
from more experience of driving or of the vehicle in which they were travelling. 
The RTAs studied were distributed between urban and rural areas and between roads 
characterised by low mean traffic speeds and higher traffic speeds. The single largest 
proportion of the drivers were involved in RTAs in urban residential areas, but open 
roadways were also highly represented. Approximately a quarter of the returned 
questionnaires related to RTAs not occurring in the vicinity of junctions whereas 
overall 3501o were associated with T junctions. The majority of the sample involved 
at junctions were on the main road and not expected to stop at this junction. Overall, 
the RTAs were most commonly on straight, flat roads in the daylight, with good 
visibility and good weather conditions. In common with previous in-depth RTA 
studies, the situations in which our drivers were involved in an RTA could be 
described as those commonly found during normal driving. 
The human factors associated with the genesis of these RTAs were deduced in more 
detail than has previously been published, and from the point of view of those 
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involved rather than an independent investigation team. Other drivers were 
perceived to be careless, although for the most part not confusing in their actions. A 
proportion of our drivers admitted to misperceptions of the others speed and 
admitted to speeding. Although not common, failures such as having difficulty in 
braking or steering effectively were admitted by our drivers. These same failures 
however were more frequently attributed to have been made by other drivers across 
all scenarios. Errors were attributed to have been caused in some part by a number 
of failings on the part of our drivers, for example distraction by problems on their 
mind at the time or feeling fatigued. Finally, although our drivers were involved in 
RTAs in situations which may be described as normal and everyday the majority of 
our drivers stated that the situations they were in were ones in which they could not 
avoid being in an RTA. 
The RTAs did however, occur in a variety of different roadway scenarios. When 
analysed across the scenarios, patterns in the data emerged that may have been 
expected, for example front to rear impacts were more commonly associated with 
slip road and roundabout scenarios and front to side impacts with T junctions. In 
common with previous studies, the RTAs were distributed unevenly throughout the 
day and throughout the week, although the majority of the RTAs occurred when the 
traffic volume was assessed to be low. 
Given that these situations were predominantly straight, flat roads, in good weather, 
and with no visibility restrictions, it would seem likely that either our drivers were 
simply not aware of the hazards sufficiently quickly, or either themselves or another 
driver made either dangerous manoeuvres or ones that brought about a conflict. In 
either case, our driver was not able to perform corrective actions sufficiently 
quickly. Given that it has been demonstrated that a better understanding of the 
antecedent events may be arrived at, and thus an understanding of these factors may 
be achieved, it is argued that appropriate RTA countermeasures may be designed. 
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3.6 Chapter conclusions and summary. 
*A data gathering procedure was developed that allowed deduction of the factors 
underlying the causation of RTAs from the point of view of the driver concerned 
and in greater detail than has previously been possible. 
9 This self completion postal questionnaire was piloted successfully and modified 
accordingly. 
- In parallel, a population of recently RTA involved drivers was identified and 
procedures established to allow this questionnaire to be distributed to these 
drivers shortly after they had been involved in an RTA. 
e The questionnaire was then distributed to a sample of drivers and data was drawn 
to illustrate the nature of the human factors underlying RTA causation. 
- The returned questionnaires were entered into a database for analysis and 
preliminary conclusions drawn pertaining to the nature of the factors relating to 
RTA causation for a sample drawn from the specified population. 
The nature of RTA causation has been described for a sample of drivers drawn from 
a population of recently RTA involved drivers. Preliminary conclusions relating to 
these RTAs have been drawn and 4 specific scenarios investigated in more detail. 
Firm conclusions cannot be drawn from a sample of this size, however sufficient 
data were gathered to allow further work towards developing a methodology to 
determine primary safety strategy. 
177 
Study 2: Developing A Decision Support TboL 
4.0 Study 2: Developing A Decision Support Tool. 
4.1 Chapter summary. 
This chapter is concerned with the third and fourth objectives of the thesis as a 
whole, namely to define a procedure for correlating RTA causation mechanisms and 
potential RTA countermeasures, and to develop this procedure so a motor 
manufacturer may utilise the methodology to determine their primary safety 
strategy. To this end, a series of Solutions Matrices were developed and 
subsequently used by employees of a motor manufacturer to build a strategy for 
primary safety system development. This chapter reviews the aims and objectives of 
this work before describing the studies undertaken and the contribution of this work 
to the thesis as a whole. 
4.2 Introduction. 
The overall aim of this thesis was to develop a methodology to enable a motor 
manufacturer to make strategic decisions in respect of the development of appropriate 
primary safety technologies. Specifically, motor manufacturers need to know which 
primary safety technologies would be potentially most effective in reducing the 
number of crashes on the roads. At present however, no method to assist in this 
decision making exists. As a consequence of this, and the development process of high 
technology being introduced into vehicles, much of the technology introduced into 
vehicles is decided upon in a non systematic manner. A tool to enable strategic 
decisions regarding appropriate primary safety technologies was therefore required. 
In order to develop this tool, a novel RTA data collection procedure was developed 
and is described in Chapter 3. This data collection procedure enabled a greater 
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understanding of the causes of the RTAs and thus the actual needs of the drivers could 
be deduced. 
Having determined the needs of the drivers, a decision support methodology detailing 
potential primary safety technologies was required in order to deduce which of these 
technologies would potentially be most effective. 
This chapter addresses the development of this decision support tool. The 
methodology employed was developed from the HURT toolset, (Galer et al 1992), in 
which scenarios of use of systems are correlated against potential system functions in a 
functionality matrix. In the current context, potential RTA countermeasures were 
correlated against RTA scenarios as described by the results of the RTA data 
collection. When employing functionality matrices, one of the key aspects to their 
success is the quality of the descriptions of the information presented within them. In 
the current context, this represents the RTA scenarios and potential primary safety 
technologies. This chapter describes the development of these information sources and 
of the coding scheme employed in the completion of the matrices, through a pilot 
study and main study conducted with the assistance of the motor manufacturer. 
Following this, this chapter demonstrates how the data gathered in the RTA data 
collection study may be used to enhance the matrices in order to derive a strategy for 
primary safety system development. 
4.3 Aims and objectives. 
The aim of this phase of the work was to employ the real RTA data collected in the 
questionnaire survey to aid a motor manufacturer to make strategic decisions 
concerning primary safety system development. 
The objectives of this study were; 
- To develop a methodology to determine appropriate RTA countermeasures; 
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o To operationalise this methodology within a motor manufacturer; 
- To deduce a preliminary outline for primary safety strategy within a motor 
manufacturer. 
This chapter describes the pilot work and main work undertaken to develop the 
methodology to determine safety strategy, before describing the implications for 
strategy from the data collected. 
4.4 Pilot study: Development of the Solutions 
Matrices. 
4.4.1 Aim of the pilot study. 
The pilot work for this study was concerned with the first two objectives above. 
Specifically, the pilot work developed the methodology to determine appropriate 
RTA countermeasures and made initial efforts towards operational is ing this 
methodology within a motor manufacturer. 
4.4.2 Pilot study method. 
4.4.2.1 Experimental design. 
To develop a safety strategy, a series of RTA scenarios needed to be cross 
referenced with a number of potential RTA countermeasures to determine which 
technologies were likely to be the most effective overall at reducing the number of 
RTAs. Only one decision making methodology specifically addresses system 
functionality in addition to user and task requirements, that being functionality 
matrices, (Galer, Harker and Ziegler 1992). The methodology chosen was modified 
slightly from the functionality matrices originally developed in the HURT Toolset, 
but retained essentially the same format. A brief description of the matrices outlining 
some example RTA countermeasures and scenarios is given below in Table 4.1. In 
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the current context, a series of functionality matrices were developed that detailed a 
number of RTA scenarios and RTA countermeasures. These were known as 
Solutions Matrices. A coding system was required that indicated the strength of the 
likely association between these two information types and thereby rated the 
effectiveness of the countermeasures in each RTA scenario. 
To complete the matrices, groups of up to 6 people considered each RTA 
countermeasure in turn for a given RTA scenario. Assessments were made of the 
effectiveness of that RTA countermeasure with respect to its likelihood of 
preventing the RTA in question from occurring and the appropriate code marked in 
the sheet. This process was then repeated for a number of additional RTA scenarios. 
The overall effectiveness of any given RTA countermeasure was determined, when 
sufficient, appropriate RTA scenarios have been investigated and weightings 
relating to the frequency of occurrence of the individual factors applied. 
Table 4.1 Schematic outline of the Solutions Matrices with example 
technologies and RTA scenarios. 
Accident Scenarios Potential Accident Countermeasures 
High Le el Stop Lights Anti lock Braking System 
T Junction at Night 
Pedestrian in Roadway 
4.4.2.2 Iterative development of the pilot study Solutions Matrices. 
In addition to determining which RTA scenarios and countermeasures were to be 
presented in the Solutions Matrices, the nature of their descriptions required 
considerable development in order that the matrices accurately reflected these. An 
iterative development process was therefore undertaken in which the potential RTA 
countermeasures, the RTA scenarios and the coding system were continuously 
modified. This was performed simultaneously for the two information types in the 
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Solutions Matrices, (RTA scenarios and RTA countermeasures), and for the coding 
system. For clarity, the development is presented here separately. 
4.4.23 Development of the RTA countermeasures in the Solutions Matrices. 
To derive a list of potential RTA countermeasures, a review of academic and trade 
literature was first performed. This included any countermeasures not based solely 
on the long term aspects of the drivers behaviour, (and thus did not include such 
aspects as improved driver training), but did include transient aspects such as 
fatigue. Additionally, environmental changes such as roadway straightening were 
included. The methodology was devised for a motor manufacturer and thus of 
primary interest were those systems that a motor manufacturer may develop and 
implement themselves. When developing the method however, countermeasures 
relating to environmental modifications were initially included at the request of the 
motor manufacturer sponsoring this work. 
This review produced a list of 53 potential countermeasures. These countermeasures, 
(when system based), were ones that motor manufacturers or suppliers were 
currently either implementing or researching the potential effects of, with the view 
of introducing them into vehicles in the near future. In essence, these were systems 
that a motor manufacturer may bolt onto the existing vehicles that would provide 
some form of driver assistance or driver support. Additional to these, were some non 
system based countermeasures. Typically these were environmental changes, (such 
as roadway design). 
Due to the number of countermeasures identified, a categorisation system was 
required to structure the matrices and to facilitate completion and use of them. 
Several approaches were considered, for example categorising the countermeasures 
on the nature of the interaction with the driver, (e. g. Galer Flyte 1995, see Table 
2.8), or by the nature of driver support the system provides, (Michon 1993). 
Since the focus of the thesis as a whole was directed from a systems approach to 
driving, and most specifically within the driver vehicle interactions, a framework 
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that is consistent with this approach was employed to categorise the RTA 
countermeasures. Thus the systems were split into categories that could be described 
as either driver based, vehicle based, or environment based, or the interactions of 
each of these, (see Figure 4.1, based on Figure 1.1). 
Vision enhancement system 
Pre-information system 
Route Guidance 
Driver Status 
Driver Performance 
Driver 
Speed limiting measures 
Traffic management systems 
VMS, Improved crash barriers 
I "\ 
Environment 
Vehicle 
Head up or mid head displays 
Novel systems 
Structural Aspect of Vehicle 
Visibility of vehicle 
Visibility from vehicle 
Enhanced Features over standard vehicle 
Automated features 
Vehicle failure detection 
Improved glass and mirrors 
Object detection / 
Collision warning 
systems 
Environment - Vehicle 
Communications 
Figure 4.1 Schematic outline of the Solutions Matrices domains including some 
example technologies. 
This allowed amendments to be made in the future in such a manner that would be 
of most use to a motor manufacturer. Most frequently, future amendments would be 
made by a motor manufacturer requiring information concerning a particular 
countermeasure either developed themselves, or by one of their suppliers. Whilst the 
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approach taken by the project is to design RTA countermeasures as indicated by the 
nature of the RTAs studied in the real world sample, the alternative approach of 
determining the efficacy of a novel system is equally likely to be employed by a 
motor manufacturer. Designing the matrix in the manner described below facilitated 
both approaches. 
The domains in which the RTA countermeasures were described are represented in 
Figure 4.1, and briefly described below, (a full matrix is presented in Appendix 4); 
Driver: These systems are directly concerned with the driver. Primarily, they assess 
the state or performance level of the driver at any time to determine the fitness of the 
driver to continue with the driving task. The purpose of the systems is to detect 
when the driver is either no longer safe to continue driving, or is becoming unsafe to 
drive, (for example the onset of fatigue or high levels of workload), so that 
appropriate remedial actions may be initiated. Additionally, countermeasures 
designed to reduce the effects of fatigue or excessive workload, or reduce fatigue 
from building up in the driver were included here. 
Vehicle: These RTA countermeasures are those that are primarily improvements to 
the design of the vehicle itself over and above its current design or systems that 
monitor the functions of the vehicle. Thus, any improvements such as enhanced 
lights of a driver's vehicle or removing blind spots on the vehicle were included 
here. Although infrequent occurrences, systems that monitor the vehicle for failures 
were included within this category. 
Environment: Countermeasures described under this heading were such as improved 
road surface quality or layout and were primarily out of the direct control of a motor 
manufacturer. For the pilot work however, they were included to attempt to 
determine their efficacy so that a motor manufacturer may have the data resulting for 
their consideration. These data would only be of indirect use to the manufacturer 
themselves, but were of relevance to producing a complete safety strategy. 
184 
Study 2: Developing A Decision Support Tool. 
Environment-vehicle interactions: These systems are mainly concerned with 
physical aspects of the driving task such as the alignment of the vehicle on the road 
and lane choice. Whilst some of these systems present information to the driver, (for 
example a parking aid system), the majority of these were concerned directly with 
modifications to the environment or the vehicles themselves. Examples of these are 
road surfaces or tyres with higher coefficients of friction which allow for better grip 
on the road for traction, steering and braking. As with RTA countermeasures in the 
environment domain, many of these are not within the control of a motor 
manufacturer but were included initially for completion. 
Driver-vehicle interactions: These systems are mostly information input and output 
devices and are most typically what could be thought of as high technology in- 
vehicle systems. They may facilitate safety in vehicles by allowing a driver to input 
information to the vehicle in a less distracting way, (e. g. by using stalk input devices 
for controlling a car stereo), or by controlling the output of information to the driver 
in a manner which is less likely to cause distraction to the driver. Examples of these 
may be systems that are not yet implemented, such as Intelligent Cruise Control or 
systems that are currently in production vehicles such as automatic transmission. 
Additionally, novel interfaces designed specifically for drivers with special needs 
were included as they may facilitate the driving task for all drivers and thus improve 
road safety. 
Environment-driver interactions: These systems are primarily designed to enhance 
the drivers ability to perceive the environment outside of their vehicle by either 
enhancing the view ahead directly or providing medium or long range pre- 
information not normally accessible to the driver. Included within this domain are 
such systems as route navigation systems as well as road side beacons or variable 
message signs, (VMS), providing information to the driver concerning the roadway 
ahead. 
Driver-vehicle-environment interactions: For the most part, RTA countermeasures in 
this domain were already described in the other domains. However, some specific 
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systems were more appropriately described here due to the extensive nature of the 
interactions between the driver, vehicle and environment. 
Additionally, space was left at the end of the matrices in this section for bespoke 
systems to be detailed by the participants. Most frequently, these were combinations 
of several systems previously described in the matrices. 
This hierarchy was devised for the purposes of describing the countermeasures in a 
usable framework and was not intended to be indisputable for the purposes of 
assigning a given countermeasure to a specific domain, It is arguable in the case of 
many of the countermeasures whether a given system should be placed, for example 
within the vehicle or the driver-vehicle interaction domain. It was impossible to 
completely define many systems as belonging within any specific domain due to the 
nature of the interactions within the whole driver, vehicle and environment system. 
This was therefore a description of the RTA countermeasures from the point of view 
of producing a usable framework for the matrices development, rather than a 
description of the systems and their place within the driver, vehicle or environment 
domains as a whole. 
4.4.2.4 Development of RTA infonnation in the Solutions Matrices. 
A list of driving scenarios was drawn up from a review of the literature, with special 
regard to situations in which RTAs were known to occur. Initially a series of three 
matrices were devised. These separately concerned the psychological, traffic and 
environmental scenarios that were determined to be linked to RTAs and defined 
these scenarios in a very specific manner. For example, fatigue or driving under the 
influence of alcohol were mentioned as specific psychological factors, T junctions 
were described as environmental scenarios and overtaking with an oncoming vehicle 
was described as a traffic scenario. 
A matrix completion session was performed by the author. This refined the list by 
removing duplicates and modifying the definitions of some of the scenarios. This 
refined list was then used in a matrices completion session held at Loughborough 
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University and subsequently the first matrices completion session held with the 
motor manufacturer employees at their premises. 
Although the matrices had been developed and piloted before being presented to a 
population of employees of a motor manufacturer, the first session in which motor 
manufacturer's employees were participants was viewed to be a test for the 
remainder of the piloting sessions to determine if the underlying process was 
acceptable to a motor manufacturer and the process would be acceptable to their 
organisation. 
The participants felt that the scenarios when described at the level of individual 
factors were too abstract to be of use to them in the completion of a matrix. 
Essentially, too many unknown variables had to be assessed simultaneously and the 
resulting assessments in the matrices were as a result too general to be of use. As a 
result of this, the descriptions of the scenarios were changed significantly. Real data 
from the questionnaire survey were then employed in subsequent sessions, the 
participants being given access to individual questionnaires from that survey for this 
purpose. RTAs were divided into 3 categories, (according to the most frequent RTA 
scenarios described in STATS19); T junctions, Roundabouts and non junction 
RTAs. Each matrices completion group received RTAs from only one of these 
groups to ease completion, these being presented as photocopies of the first two 
pages of each questionnaire. Six RTAs were chosen randomly for each session, the 
choice of the individual RTAs from within these six being determined by the 
participants themselves. 
4.4.2.5 Development of the coding scheme. 
Rather than simply stating that a given system would be effective or not, in order to 
produce a strategy for primary safety system development it was necessary to 
distinguish between potential effectiveness of systems at a number of levels. A 
coding scheme was required to identify the level of effectiveness of each of the RTA 
countermeasures. Functionality matrices typically employ a non numerical coding 
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scheme which avoids the preconceptions that numerical codes have regarding the 
strength of the associations within the matrices. 
The coding scheme employed for this task was however a numerical one, as in this 
case the strength of association between the potential countermeasures and the RTAs 
was required. A strategic approach needed to reflect these associations so that 
overall an assessment of which countermeasures would be most beneficial. The 
participants were asked to rate the size of the likely effect with respect to preventing 
such an RTA in the future as being either small, medium or large, (1,2 and 3 
respectively). The coding scheme was presented as follows; 
* Small effect. The system may not have prevented the RTA, but would have made 
the RTA less severe, for example by warning the driver earlier such that they 
could initiate braking more rapidly. 
Medium effect. The system would have had a strong likelihood of preventing the 
RTA. 
Strong effect. The system would almost certainly have prevented the RTA from 
occurring. 
The ratings were intended to be ordinal in value, (i. e. 3 is a bigger effect than I but 
not necessarily 3 times the effect). This scheme was employed rather than a more 
abstract scheme because the ordinal nature of the ratings were of importance. A 
more abstract scheme as is usually employed in functionality matrices would not 
have been as appropriate as the strength of the effects could not easily be quantified. 
Additionally, a more abstract scheme would have complicated the process of 
strategy building from the completed matrices as weightings according to frequency 
of occurrence would be more difficult to apply to non numerical ratings. 
The results were collated by totalling the number of times each number is present in 
the matrices columns rather than summing or averaging the columns. Thus the 
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Solutions with the largest number of 3 ratings are those that are most likely to be 
effective across the RTA scenarios listed. 
4.4.2.6 Solutions Matrices completion procedure. 
Participants were introduced to the study as a whole and the tasks to be undertaken 
by a 15 minute presentation prior to the completion of the matrices. This included 
details of the countermeasures and coding scheme and the purpose of the whole 
procedure. 
Participants were each given a photocopy of the first two pages of six of the 
questionnaires for a given scenario to review before one of these was chosen by 
consensus of the participants for detailed consideration. (These 6 had previously 
been randomly selected from the returned questionnaires). A question and answer 
session was next undertaken in which the participants asked the experimenter for 
details about the RTA from the original questionnaire sufficient for them to gain 
what they felt was an accurate appreciation of the nature of the RTA. Following this, 
the matrix was completed for the first RTA, the participants being encouraged to 
refer back to the RTA questionnaire itself at any stage for clarification. When the 
group had completed the ratings, a further RTA was chosen. Each group completed 
two RTAs from those chosen per session. 
4.4.3 Parficýpants 
The initial matrices development work was conducted at Loughborough University. 
Three postgraduate Ergonomics students familiar with the functionality matrix 
technique refined the list of scenarios, and countermeasures and developed the 
coding technique. 
For the main piloting work, the matrices were completed by groups of up to 6 
employees of a motor manufacturer. The participants were drawn from a cross 
section of a motor manufacturer employees from such departments as Safety 
Strategy, Accident Research, Lighting and Concept Engineering. Where possible, it 
189 
Study 2: Developing A Decision Support TooL 
was arranged so that each group had members from several disciplines and from a 
varying level of responsibility within the company. It was thus ensured that a range 
of responsibilities and experiences were present to be drawn upon. For the pilot 
work, 4 groups were convened at the motor manufacturer's premises, each group 
lasting 2 hours. 
4.4.4 Results: Iterative development of the Solutions Matrices. 
The main objective of the pilot work was to develop the Solutions Matrices 
methodology with special regard to the nature of the descriptions of the RTA 
scenarios, the countermeasures and the coding scheme. Each of these were 
developed concurrently in an iterative process. The results of the pilot work are 
concerned with the modifications to that methodology and the iterative development 
of the information contained within the matrix. Typically, several modifications 
were made concurrently before the matrices were presented to the subsequent 
groups. The main modifications will now be described separately. 
4.4.4.1 RTA scenarios. 
In the first pilot session using motor manufacturer employees, the RTA scenarios 
employed were described in the simplest terms possible, The scenarios themselves 
were grouped into three categories, road traffic scenarios, environmental scenarios 
and psychological scenarios. Use of RTA scenarios described at this level of detail 
was in general too difficult to be undertaken meaningfully. Although the RTA 
scenarios were described very specifically, use of these scenarios in isolation was 
too vague to be useful in respect of determining the effects of possible 
countermeasures as too many other factors were unknown. Additionally, when 
considering upwards of 50 factors and 50 countermeasures, this process would have 
been too time consuming to proceed with to the point of gaining enough data to 
build a strategy. 
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Subsequently, real RTA scenarios from a random sample of the questionnaires were 
employed. The participants were able to extract information relating to the causes of 
the RTAs in question from the questionnaires and were able to use this information 
to complete the matrices. However, at this point, the participants were not asked to 
explicitly list the factors leading to each RTA. Weightings could not be applied to 
the codings for each countermeasure and thus a strategy could not be deduced from 
the data collected in this manner. For this reason, the analysis of the pilot data was 
not completed with respect to the determination of strategy. 
The methodology to determine the factors relating to each RTA was however 
developed and utilised in the main Solutions Matrices completion sessions. 
4.4.4.2 RTA countermeasures. 
Whilst the countermeasures information when described as systems was useful in 
the context of describing systems, to achieve the aims of the study a significant 
limitation was identified during piloting. Specifically, although this approach 
focused on the requirements of drivers to avoid RTAs, it focused primarily on what 
motor manufacturers were currently thinking of in terms of countermeasures or 
potential countermeasures. It was therefore not possible using this approach to 
design novel systems, but at best only existing systems could be accepted or 
rejected. Additionally, the design of these countermeasures as noted before did not 
focus on the causes of crashes as they occur now. Essentially, the manufacturers of 
these systems were proposing to add technology to a vehicle in an attempt to 
perform several functions to increase the marketability of these vehicles. Thus these 
systems were designed to perform several functions, only one of which was to 
attempt to reduce the number of crashes. However, as has been argued, these 
systems were developed from a technological perspective and thus they essentially 
attempt to prevent crashes without knowing why the crashes occur in the first 
instance. 
The effect of describing the countermeasures in this manner was that the matrices 
completion groups were viewed by the participants as a means to reaffirm their own 
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decisions regarding a strategy for appropriate technology development rather than a 
means to decide on what appropriate strategy for technology development would be. 
Additionally, it was clear that some of these potential solutions would have to be 
present on other vehicles in order to prevent an RTA. Thus, the matrix was 
effectively doubled in size by the addition of an extra column for each 
countermeasure for other vehicles involved in the RTA. In practice, as some of the 
RTAs involved more than 2 vehicles, only the vehicle nearest to 'our vehicle', (that 
belonging to the driver completing the questionnaire), was considered when 
completing the matrices. This was known as 'other vehicle' for the purposes of 
completing the matrices. Assessments of the efficacy of countermeasures for 
vehicles other than 'our vehicle' and 'other vehicle' were not made. 
Finally, to distinguish between existing RTA countermeasures and the functional 
descriptions of those countermeasures, the term technological solutions was adopted 
to apply to the functional descriptions and the systems resulting from completion of 
the matrices. 
4.4.4.3 Method of completion of the Solutions Matrices. 
Overall, the first objective of the piloting sessions was achieved, in that it was 
determined that a motor manufacturer was able to complete the matrices in a 
meaningful manner and that the information resulting was potentially of use in 
building a strategy for primary safety system development. Additionally a number of 
modifications to the matrices and the processes involved in matrices completion 
were suggested which were incorporated in the main matrices completion sessions. 
Specifically, modifications to the coding scheme, the descriptions of the scenarios 
and the descriptions of the RTA countermeasures were made before the main 
matrices completion sessions. 
Due to the nature and extent of the modifications required after the pilot, it was not 
possible to determine with any certainty the likely efficacy of any specific system or 
series of systems and thus a strategy was not developed. However, the procedures 
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and matrices themselves were modified to such an extent that future work, (that did 
provide useful data and enabled a strategy to be designed), was more easily 
performed. 
4.4.5 Conclusions of thepilot stu#. 
The objectives of this phase of the research were to develop a methodology whereby 
a motor manufacturer could decide upon primary safety system development 
strategy and to operationalise this methodology within a motor manufacturer. 
Overall, it was concluded that the first objective was successfully achieved, in that a 
methodology was produced that was both acceptable, (to motor manufacturer 
employees), and usable, (by a motor manufacturer), that would enable a motor 
manufacturer at a future slage to determine which RTA countermeasures would be 
of most efficacy in preventing RTAs in the future. The second objective, to 
operationalise this methodology was partially achieved. A number of important 
modifications to the methodology and processes were implied as a result of the 
piloting which were incorporated in the main Solutions Matrices work. 
4.4.5.1 Coding system. 
The coding system employed in the pilot work required considerable modification 
prior to use in the main phase of the work. Firstly, the system needed to be modified 
to account for any negative effects that the presence of any of the countermeasures 
may have had. Secondly, in some cases, it was not possible to make an assessment 
of the efficacy of any given countermeasure, and the coding system needed to 
acknowledge this. Thirdly, some of the countermeasures would have had no effect 
on the RTA in question and a distinction was required between these 
countermeasures and those that could not be assessed for the RTA in question, (for 
example due to insufficient information). Finally, it was necessary to tic the 
questionnaire data and the Solutions Matrices more closely together. This was 
achieved by limiting the use of coding 3 to those situations in which the 
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questionnaire specifically mentioned that a factor was of importance in the aetiology 
of the RTA. Thus in the future, 3 was only coded when it was definitely known that 
this factor was of relevance to the RTA in question. 
Overall, the time taken to complete the matrices was too long, Whilst some of the 
groups of participants were able to complete two matrices well within the time 
allowed, most groups struggled to achieve this. To alleviate this, participants were 
subsequently asked to complete the matrices as quickly as possible. This also 
reflected the fact that the data the participants were using was potentially biased, 
especially when concerned with other drivers actions. Making a quick judgement of 
the efficacy of a system precluded extensive debate about the factors underlying 
each RTA and allowed a more global, strategic approach to be taken. 
4.4.5.2 Accident scenarios. 
From the piloting, it was immediately apparent that the participants had considerable 
difficulty in utilising scenarios at the level of individual factors. However, using 
complete questionnaires was also problematic as it was not immediately apparent 
how to utilise individual questionnaire data to produce a methodology to determine 
overall safety strategy. In order to produce a strategy, it was necessary to not only 
know which RTA countermeasures were most useful, but how frequently each of 
these RTA countermeasures would be required in order to prevent RTAS. Thus, a 
mechanism was required to explicitly elicit these factors from the questionnaires that 
would allow subsequent determination of the frequency of these factors in the whole 
database. 
This was achieved by defining the factors that lead to the RTA from the perspective 
of our driver. Thus for example, our driver may have been unable to anticipate the 
actions of another road user, or may have failed to anticipate their actions accurately. 
It was important to note that although it was possible to assign culpability in many 
cases no blame was implied at any stage to any of the drivers involved in the RTA. 
Errors and failures were defined as being actions that lead to an RTA occurring, that 
once described could be countered, but were not assigned as human failings per se. It 
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should be noted that RTAs in which our driver was the innocent party, (for example 
one on which our vehicle was hit by a car crossing its path inappropriately), were 
included. Although it would seem that there was little that our driver may have been 
able to do to avoid such RTAs, provision of appropriate information or 
interventions, may have been able to either avoid the RTA, or reduce the 
consequences of these RTAs. 
4.4.5.3 Technological Solutions. 
The main issue identified with respect to the RTA countermeasures was that of the 
nature of the descriptions of these in the matrices. In the piloting, the RTA 
countermeasures were described as technological systems currently in existence, or 
as potential systems being prototyped or simulated. Thus systems such as 
Autonomous Intelligent Cruise Control, (AICO, or forward mounted collision 
avoidance sensors were described as in the literature from which they were derived. 
Whilst for the most part these systems were familiar to the participants, this 
approach has an important disadvantage in that it focuses on existing technology, 
which as has already been discussed has been developed from a technological rather 
than human perspective. Whilst the matrices techniques may be employed to 
determine the efficacy of such systems, (and indeed is likely to be used in this 
manner in the future by motor manufacturers), for the purposes of determining 
primary safety strategy and especially for producing novel systems this approach, 
focusing as it does purely within the framework of existing thought will not produce 
novel systems. In essence, this approach will only at best serve to confirm or dispute 
the efficacy of currently conceived systems. 
To alleviate this, a functional analysis of the potential countermeasures was 
performed. These functions were described as being part of a hypothetical system 
that would allow the driver to perform certain actions when the systems were in 
operation. Thus the functions that a driver would need the vehicle to perform to 
prevent an RTA could be rated in the Solutions Matrices. It was necessary to 
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research these systems in some detail however to ensure that the functions that each 
system would perform were appropriately represented in the matrix. 
As an example of this, when braking, ABS, (Anti-lock Braking System), constantly 
monitors the wheels and detects when they are skidding on the roadway. When 
skidding is detected, the brakes are automatically released for a fraction of a second 
before being reapplied in a manner very similar to but considerably faster than when 
a driver 'pumps the brakes' (i. e. the driver rapidly depresses then releases the brake 
peddle in an attempt to slow the vehicle without skidding). ABS effectively allows 
the drivers to steer the car when otherwise the car would skid and thus allows the 
vehicle to be manoeuvred around objects in the roadway. ABS would therefore be 
presented in the matrix as a system that 'prevents skidding under braking' and as a 
system that 'allows steering to be maintained under braking'. 
The functional descriptions were then separated before being categorised as before 
into driver, vehicle or environment domains and the various interactions thereof as 
before. Since many of the existing systems could be split into more than one 
function, the size of the matrices was therefore considerably increased over those 
used than in the piloting. However, many of the new functions were repeated being 
performed by several systems in a slightly different manner. For this reason, the 
functions were redefined where possible and duplicates removed. The matrices were 
then reduced in size by removing several domains, notably the environment, (since 
the functions performed by RTA countermeasures described in this domain were out 
of the direct control of a motor manufacturer), and the driver-vehicle-environment 
interactions, (the systems previously described herein being broken into functions 
that more appropriately where described in other domains). Additionally, those 
functions within the vehicle that were directly concerned with monitoring the 
vehicle for failures were removed since vehicle failures are an extremely rare 
occurrence and did not warrant inclusion. In effect, these modifications resulted in a 
matrix only slightly larger than the initial matrices used in piloting which was felt to 
be manageable for the main study. 
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The change in emphasis from technology systems to functions of technology 
resulted in the matrices being more effectively utilised for the purposes of 
determining strategy. Rather than attempting to determine the efficacy of a given 
system or series of systems, or attempting to determine which would be most 
effective, combinations of functions could be more readily described. Thus, for any 
given RTA, a bespoke system could be developed from a combination of potential 
countermeasure functions. Throughout the course of the main solutions matrices 
sessions, the participants were therefore encouraged to make as many comments 
about individual functions as they felt to be appropriate and to make links between 
functions in order to build up novel systems from a series of linked functional 
requirements. 
4.4.5.4 Procedure. 
For the purposes of determining countermeasure efficacy, a distinction between the 
different drivers of the vehicles involved in the RTAs was required. The driver that 
completed the questionnaire under discussion was defined as 'our driver' and their 
vehicle 'our vehicle'. Other vehicles involved in the RTA and their drivers were 
therefore defined accordingly as 'other vehicle'and 'other driver' respectively. In the 
case of there being more than one other driver, only the driver of the vehicle in 
closest proximity to our vehicle was considered when assigning factors. 
Since many of the functions relied on vehicles other than the one defined as being 
driven by the driver who completed the questionnaire having the systems, an 
additional column in the matrix was added for other vehicles for each individual 
function described. This thus acknowledged the possible effects of our vehicle on 
one other vehicle and one other vehicle on our vehicle when considering the effects 
of the RTA countermeasures. 
An illustrative example of these effects is that of the differences in braking 
performance between disk and drum brakes. Most modern cars are now equipped 
with much more efficient disk brakes which were more widely introduced into 
production cars in the 1970s. Disk brakes are generally much more efficient at 
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stopping vehicles as compared to drum brakes, the effect of this being that stopping 
distances are greatly reduced. In a line of traffic, if one vehicle is equipped with disk 
brakes whereas the others are all equipped with drum brakes, it is likely, (given that 
other factors are held constant), that the disk brake equipped car will be able to stop 
more quickly than the drum brake equipped cars. Thus while the disk brake 
equipped car will be potentially more able to avoid a hazard on the roadway ahead, 
vehicles following it may not be able to avoid it, and thus the disk brake equipped 
vehicle will be exposed to a change in risk as compared to the road traffic situation 
prior to the introduction of such brakes. In the current context, our vehicle may be 
behind or in front of the disk brake equipped vehicle in question which will have 
implications for the nature and efficacy of RTA countermeasures when presented in 
the matrix. 
4.4.5.5 The use ofgroups to complete the Solutions Matrices. 
The main advantage of completing the matrices in groups was that it allowed 
discussion amongst a number of experts before conclusions regarding the system 
efficacy were drawn, A group whose members were drawn from differing 
backgrounds ensured a diversity of opinions and facilitated a more extensive range 
of opinions than would have been possible with a more homogeneous group. A 
group approach did have disadvantages however, in that considerable time was 
required, (in terms of total man hours), and the resultant costs were correspondingly 
high. However, the functionality matrices from the HURT toolset on which these 
matrices were based, were designed themselves to be completed by groups and it 
was felt that the advantages of utilising groups in terms of the diversity of 
information gathered far outweighed the disadvantages. 
The procedure and materials for the second series of matrices completion groups 
were altered in the light of the experience gained, and results from, the piloting 
matrices. In addition to determining the efficacy of the method, changes in the 
descriptions of the RTA countermeasures, the scenarios and the procedures were 
also altered in the light of the piloting. 
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4.4.6 Discussion of the pilot sLudm 
The first objective of the pilot work was successfully achieved; a methodology to 
determine appropriate countermeasures was produced and primary safety strategy 
derivation made possible by application of this methodology. The second objective 
was partially achieved in that considerable progress towards operational ising this 
methodology within a motor manufacturer was made. Significant modifications to 
the process of completing the matrices were made that enabled the main phase of the 
work to be undertaken. Although the matrices and the method of completion thereof 
were modified sufficiently to be utilised further, insufficient data were gathered to 
allow a strategy to be meaningfully developed at this stage. The data were not 
therefore weighted for this purpose at this stage. 
4.5 Main Solutions Matrices study. 
4.5.1 Introduction. 
Having demonstrated the matrices methodology to be both effective in determining 
potential Technological Solutions and usable by a motor manufacturer for this 
purpose, the main phase of the Solutions Matrix sessions was aimed to produce 
preliminary requirements for Technological Solutions with a view to determining 
how effective this methodology would be for determining safety strategy, Thus the 
information gained in the main phase of the Solutions Matrices work was added to 
that gathered in the questionnaire survey, and preliminary conclusions concerning 
the safety strategy were drawn. 
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4.5.2 Aims and obLectives. 
The aim of the main phase of the Solutions Matrices work was to develop 
preliminary conclusions pertaining to primary safety strategy. To this end, two 
objectives were to be achieved: 
- The Solutions Matrices completion methodology was to be operationalised within 
a motor manufacturer. 
9A series of Solutions Matrices groups were to be completed such that sufficient 
data were gathered to drawn preliminary conclusions pertaining to primary safety 
strategy. 
4.5.3 Method. 
4.5.3.1 Expetimental design. 
Having demonstrated that the Solutions Matrices were effective and could be used 
by motor manufacturer employees, the main phase of this work built upon the pilot 
work. 
A series of nine Solutions Matrices completion groups were held over a week at the 
premises of a motor manufacturer. Each session lasted 3 hours and up to 6 
employees participated. 
4.5.3.2 Participants. 
The participants were all employees of a motor manufacturer. Each individual group 
was arranged so a broad range of disciplines and responsibilities were present and in 
addition, each group contained at least one individual that had previously been 
involved in the pilot work. 
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4.5.3.3 Procedure. 
Four categories of RTAs were chosen for the main matrices work; namely open 
roadways, T junctions and crossroads, Y junctions and slip roads and roundabouts. 
Together, these categories accounted for the 83.6% of RTAs within the RTA 
database, (see Table 3.14). Each group considered only one category of RTA and 
each participant chose one questionnaire at random from the category under 
investigation from the whole population of drivers within that catergory. 
The Solutions Matrices completion sessions were started with a fifteen minute 
presentation concerning the nature of the project, the aims and expected outcomes of 
the session. Since this work was designed as a follow on exercise from the 
questionnaire survey, a detailed description of the questionnaire itself was next 
given together with some definitions of the factors that may underlie an RTA, 
Following this, for the category of RTA scenario under investigation at the time, six 
questionnaires were randomly selected from the RTA database and distributed one 
to each of the participants of the matrices session. 
The participants were then allowed 10 minutes each to review the questionnaire and 
make some notes on important contributory factors. The nature of the factors and the 
manner in which they were to be described were each again emphasised at this 
stage. 
Each participant then briefly presented the RTA to the other participants and listed 
the most salient factors contributing to it. Some of the participants being more 
familiar with the processes of RTA investigation or with this project itself, produced 
considerably more detail than others and frequently questioned other participants 
concerning the RTAs they had reviewed. This was proceeded with only to the point 
of ensuring that all present had a good understanding of both the questionnaire and 
the nature of the descriptions of factors impinging on the RTAs. Detailed 
examination of the RTAs was reserved for later in the sessions. 
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At this stage another fifteen minute presentation was given which principally 
focused on the matrices and the nature of the actions required by those participating 
in the sessions. Thus, having described and discussed the RTA scenarios, the 
functional nature of the Technological Solutions and the coding scheme to be 
employed were described more fully. The participants were then asked if their 
understanding of the matrices and the required tasks was sufficiently complete and 
they were given the opportunity to ask such questions as they felt necessary to 
supplement their understanding of the task in hand. 
One of the questionnaires was then selected for detailed discussion. In practice, since 
each of the groups contained at least one participant who had previously been 
involved in the piloting, the selection of the RTA to discuss at this stage was not 
random within the 6 possible RTAs. Most frequently, the RTA chosen was that 
described by the participant that had previously been involved in piloting. This 
participant was then designated to be the leader for this particular RTA and was 
given the task of coding the matrices for this RTA. With the assistance of the other 
participants, the leader was then asked to list the contributory factors that were 
implicated in the causation of the particular RTA under consideration. The 
participants were required to describe these factors at the level of the errors or 
behaviours made by our driver rather than those of any others involved. Thus for 
example, in the case of another driver hesitating at a junction and our driver 
colliding into the rear of this vehicle, the factor would be listed as our driver failing 
to observe the other, or misinterpreting their actions, rather than the other driver 
hesitating. 
Ideally, the participants of the matrices completion groups should have been familiar 
with the factors as outlined by Carsten et a] (1989). However, pragmatically this was 
not possible due to time constraints; prodigious additional efforts would have been 
required to familiarise the participants with the definitions of the factors as intended. 
However, defining the factors at the level of our driver's failures most closely 
matched the definitions of the contributory factors as defined by Carsten et al 
202 
Study 2: Developing A Decision Support Tool. 
(1989). In addition, defining the contributory factors at the level of the errors and 
behaviours of our driver allowed a focus on our driver from the point of view of 
defining appropriate functional technological solutions. Thus in the example above, 
our driver may be warned that the other driver had not proceeded at the junction, or 
our vehicle may have prevented our driver from attempting to pull away when there 
was a vehicle stationary ahead. There is therefore no reliance upon the other vehicles 
involved being equipped with any additional primary safety technologies and our 
vehicle and driver may therefore avoid an RTA irrespective of the nature of the lead 
vehicle. 
At any stage all the participants were encouraged to ask questions both of the 
experimenter and leader and were asked to refer back to the original questionnaire if 
required. The coding scheme for the matrices was as follows; 
X Function not applicable. The participants were encouraged to strike 
through any functions that were deemed to be inapplicable for the current 
RTA in question. This was largely to save time, since quite frequently the 
participants worked through the matrices in a non linear manner, i. e. rather 
than starting at one end and working through it solution by solution, the 
participants frequently would move to specific areas of the matrices first. 
This was especially evident after each group had completed the first RTA for 
each session. The participants being more familiar with the matrix as a whole 
and especially the functions contained within it would frequently either 
remove functions they felt were ineffective then concentrate on efficacious 
ones, or vice versa. 
? Not known, (the participants were not able to make an assessment of the 
function given present knowledge). 
+ Positive effects, (the functions would have contributed towards preventing 
the RTA). 
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- Negative effects, (the functions would have contributed towards making the 
RTA worse). 
Rate either as 1,2, or 3 depending on the size of the effect, (i. e. small, 
medium or large effect). 
The participants were instructed that they were only to code 3 for a given 
technological solution if it was known from the questionnaire that the factor they 
were considering was definitely associated with the underlying causes of the RTA. 
For example in the case of our driver affirming that they were fatigued prior to the 
RTA, technological solutions relating to fatigue could be coded 3. If fatigue was not 
stated to be a factor in the RTA, the participants were instructed that they could only 
code I or 2 even if they were highly suspicious of the effect of fatigue. Additionally, 
when considering the efficacy of any specific function, the participants were 
instructed to be overly cautious when any disputes arose concerning the codings 
thereby ensuring functions that may have a positive effect are included rather than 
excluded at this stage. With reference to the aims of the project, it was felt more 
important that potentially useful systems were included at this stage, (then possibly 
removed at a later stage), than being removed now and thus being discarded. To this 
end, the participants were encouraged to make any amendments to the Technological 
Solutions as they felt were required. Thus for example, they were encouraged to 
specify the functions in more detail, and to link the functions together wherever was 
deemed necessary. In addition, the participants were asked to define new functions 
where they felt these to be necessary. 
Additionally, the participants were instructed to code each functional technological 
solution quickly where possible rather than debating specific issues at depth. By 
proceeding in this manner, it was acknowledged that the data from which factors 
were elicited, (i. e. the questionnaires) were both subjective in nature and potentially 
biased. This was especially important when considering the actions of any other 
drivers involved in the RTA. Whereas the participants had some data concerning the 
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actions and motivations of our driver in the time period immediately before the RTA 
any such data regarding other drivers had to be treated with more caution. 
Once the Solutions Matrix had been completed for the first RTA scenario chosen, it 
was reviewed briefly to ensure that all relevant comments had been elicited before a 
brief review of the resultant functionality produced. Additional RTAs were then 
chosen from the original questionnaires reviewed and the process repeated. The 
groups normally completed two RTAs per session, although in some cases a third 
RTA was attempted. 
4.5.3.4 Data analysis. 
The data analysis proceeded in three phases. Firstly, the ratings for each individual 
RTA were combined to produce a series of functionally defined Technological 
Solutions for that RTA. Secondly, an estimate of the likely efficacy of each 
functionally described technological solution was derived by determining the 
relative frequency of occurrence of each RTA in terms of its scenario, (as defined in 
Table 3.12) and the contributory factors leading to each individual RTA, (as in 
Tables 3.13 to 3.54). Finally, the ratings for each scenario were combined with the 
frequency data to produce a preliminary outline for a strategic approach to primary 
safety system development. 
4.5.4 Results. 
4.5.4.1 Nature of the functionally defined Technolo_zical Solutions. 
This section will deal with the nature of the RTAs under investigation and the 
resultant Technological Solutions. An example of one specific RTA will be used 
from each scenario presented to the participants of the Solutions Matrices 
completion sessions. In each case, the RTA is first described, followed by the 
contributory factors as assessed by the participants of the Solutions Matrices 
completion groups. Finally, the functions that a Technological Solution would 
require are described. 
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4.5.4.2 Open Roadway. Case number 131. 
This RTA occurred on the nearside lane of the M74 heading north at approximately 
11.30 PM on a Friday evening. Our driver had worked a full day before embarking 
on a trip that he expected to take approximately 4 1/2 hours but due to heavy 
congestion on the M6 heading northbound had taken 7 hours to that point. He stated 
that he was fatigued, was distracted from driving by problems on his mind at the 
time, had difficulty in concentrating on driving and was overconfident in his 
abilities. There was very little traffic on the motorway at the time of the RTA, our 
driver stated that he saw a vehicle approximately 2-300 yards ahead which he felt 
was travelling too slowly on a motorway, (50 mph or less). Our driver nevertheless 
believes he "momentaril fell asleep whilst driving" and consequently although he 
braked, he saw the vehicle in front too late to avoid it. Furthermore, our driver states 
that he "cannotpass on much of the blamefor this accident". 
The participants felt that these were the main factors impinging on this RTA; 
* Fatigue. 
* Failure of our driver to control his vehicle. 
* Lack of judgement of the speed of and distance to the other vehicle. 
* Failure to observe the other vehicle properly. 
* Lack of concentration of our driver. 
In terms of technological solutions, two main approaches were identified. Firstly, 
systems to reduce our driver's fatigue could be implemented such as a route 
guidance system that would have re-routed the driver so that the extra delay did not 
occur, (rated as +3). Additionally, appropriate warning of the onset of fatigue may 
allow our driver to take corrective action, (+3). 
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Alternatively, given that our driver was fatigued and may not have been able to 
determine the speed of and distance to, the vehicle ahead, some driver assistance 
may have aided our driver avoiding the crash. Increasing braking efficiency (+2) or 
detection of the need for and automatic application of braking (+3) both were 
deemed to be potentially effective. Warning the driver of the need for braking was 
viewed to be potentially effective either by an object detection system, (+3), or via a 
novel system that warns the driver of a dangerously high closing speed, (such as by 
flashing the speedometer of our vehicle, +3). Given that our driver was fatigued, it is 
questionable as to the efficacy of such warnings however. Finally, given that the 
motorway was clear apart from the two vehicles in collision, a system that 
communicates between the vehicles to allow each to inform the other of their speed 
and path may allow the vehicles themselves to take corrective action, (+3). An 
'automatic swerving' system was suggested to be of some use, (+2), though 
conventions would need to be established as to which vehicle swerved and the 
direction of this manoeuvre. 
4.5.4.3 Tjunctions: Case number 188. 
In this RTA, in heavy rain, our driver had followed the other vehicle for 
approximately half a mile through a small village that he knew reasonably well, 
when the other driver slowed as if to turn right off the main road into a side road. 
Our driver was unsure if the other driver was indicating right or not, and when the 
other driver stopped to allow a third vehicle past in the opposite direction, our driver 
applied the brakes heavily on his car, "I braked heavily and skidded on leaves". Our 
driver admitted that the other driver did not do as he expected, "Beware other 
drivers do not do asyou expect", but believed he was driving correctly and "did not 
appreciate how many leaves were on the road surface". 
The participants viewed the following factors to be of relevance; 
* Our driver misjudged the road surface, due to both heavy rain and the presence of 
leaves on the road. 
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e Our driver misjudged the speed and path of the other driver, (had not appreciated 
the rate of deceleration of this vehicle). 
Two major contributory factors were noted in this RTA, that our driver did not 
appreciate the rate of deceleration of the other vehicle until too late and once our 
driver had become aware of the need to slow, our driver was unable to slow 
sufficiently due to the road surface. A system that would allow our vehicle to brake 
more rapidly than is currently possible, especially under poor road conditions, (both 
rated +3) was noted to be effective. A system to detect the road surface friction was 
also identified as being useful, (+3), as were systems that communicate this between 
vehicles and the roadway, (+2) and between the roadway and approaching vehicles, 
(+2). A system that maintains a safe stopping distance between vehicles was noted 
to be useful, (+3), as was automatic indication of direction change for the other 
vehicle, (+2), perhaps combined with more visible brake and indicator lights on this 
other vehicle, (+2 for each respectively). 
4.5.4.4 Slip roads: Case number 130. 
This RTA occurred 3 miles into a 95 mile journey at approximately 6 pm in 
October. Our driver had left a 30 mph residential area and was on the outside lane of 
a slip road about to join a 60 mph dual carriageway. Our driver saw a vehicle ahead 
that was accelerating to join the carriageway in the near side lane, glanced towards 
his off side mirror to check that the dual carriageway was clear to join and on 
looking forward again, saw that the other vehicle had swerved across his path and 
slowed considerably. Our driver braked hard, but could not swerve into the 
carriageway to avoid the vehicle as the dual carriageway was busy and could not 
avoid an impact with the front of his car hitting the rear offside of the other car. 
The factors impinging on this RTA were assessed to be; 
" Our driver failed to adequately observe the other driver. 
" Our driver failed to adequately anticipate the speed and path of the other driver. 
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The road layout at that junction is misleading; a motor dealer's exit is on the edge 
of the slip road. Traffic attempting to merge with the dual carriageway must 
observe traffic moving at a very much slower pace leaving the motor dealer's 
premises. 
Significant visibility restrictions exist along the slip road due to the gradient of 
the road and a sharp corner on it. 
The main technological solutions identified as being potentially of benefit concerned 
the braking performance of our vehicle, overall, shorter stopping distances were 
rated at +3. Detection of and enhancement of emergency braking were both rated at 
+3 for our driver, (although one group rated this function as -2 for the other vehicle 
unless our vehicle additionally had the system). Systems that would detect an object 
to the front of our vehicle were rated +3, as were automatic braking systems that 
would have detected the vehicle and applied our vehicle's brakes. Finally, vehicle to 
vehicle communications, thus enabling faster reaction by either our driver or our 
vehicle were rated +3. 
4.5.4.5 Roundahouts: Case numher 186. 
This RTA occurred when our vehicle ran into the rear of the other vehicle as the 
other vehicle was attempting to join a busy roundabout in Monday morning rush 
hour traffic. Our driver, (a 35 year old automotive engineer), stated that he knew the 
roadway well, (he was driving to his normal place of work) and he felt the cause of 
the RTA to be the other driver being indecisive. Having just left a busy dual 
carriageway, our driver stated that the "driver in front hesitated when attempting to 
join the roundabout traffic, missed his opportuniýy and stopped suddenly... I 
attempted to brake very quickly as the other driver in front had started to move then 
stopped suddenly". Our driver did feel some liability for the RTA, he felt that he 
should have maintained a larger distance to the vehicle in front and he should not 
have attempted to read the traffic for him. Additionally, whilst our driver felt that the 
situation was one in which he could not have avoided being in an RTA, he admitted 
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that immediately prior to the RTA, he was attending to the roadway to the right on 
the roundabout rather than the roadway and vehicles ahead of him and, that he was 
frustrated by the traffic situation and that he was maybe overconfident in his driving 
abilities. 
The factors that the participants felt were pertinent to the current crash were as 
follows; 
0 Our driver was frustrated. 
Our driver failed to observe the roadway appropriately. 
Our driver was overconfident. 
- Our driver failed to correctly anticipate the other vehicle, (speed and distance). 
Countermeasures deduced for this RTA would have one of several functions. Firstly, 
from the perspective of the other driver, either a decision support system of some 
form would enable the other driver to make a more timely, (and potentially accurate) 
assessment of the traffic flow at the roundabout, or an intervention system would 
prevent this driver from starting and stopping a manoeuvre. Both of these were rated 
as highly beneficial, (+3). 
From the perspectives of our driver, his attention could be brought to the stationary 
vehicle ahead in a sufficiently timely manner to enable him to avoid the stationary 
vehicle, for example with a forward mounted object detection system, (+3) or via 
vehicle to vehicle communications, (rated as +3 for our vehicle and +2 for the other 
vehicle). Alternatively, an intervention may be designed that would enable our 
vehicle to avoid the collision, for example a system that maintains appropriate safe 
headway, (+3), or one that prevents our vehicle from starting a manoeuvre, when a 
vehicle ahead is not travelling sufficiently quickly to clear the junction, (it was not 
clear whether our driver was moving at all times prior to the RTA or started to 
move when the other driver started to pull away). Both systems were rated +3. 
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4.5.5 Towards a straLegy-for prima! y-Safety system development. 
4.5.5.1 Summary ratingsfor 'our driver'for required Technological Solutions. 
Tables 4.2 to 4.7 present a summary of the ratings for the technological solutions 
considered in the matrices completion sessions across all scenarios. In order to 
present sufficient data to allow meaningful discussion, these include ratings for all 
the RTAs in the matrices, rather than being restricted to those described in sections 
4.5.4.2 to 4.5.4.5. For simplicity, only those technological solutions that were 
deemed to be effective are presented here and the ratings shown are only for our 
vehicle. The values presented are the frequency of occurrence of the ratings , i. e. the 
number of occasions in which +3 for example was rated for each technological 
solution. In total, 10 individual RTAs were assessed, the maximum score for any 
individual rating being 10 ratings of +3. The tables present these technological 
solutions as entire systems, these systems at their heart being based around the 
functional descriptions in the matrices. The systems are grouped into the tables 
according to the similarity of their operation and additionally, whete possible the 
systems are presented in the tables in order of increasing intervention, the systems at 
the top of the tables being warning based whereas the systems presented lower down 
being those that would automatically intervene. 
Table 4.2 Technological Solutions concerning driver performance. 
Ratings 
Technological solution +1 +2 +3 -1 -2 
Detection of mental and physical fatigue, (both 1 2 
induced by driving and prior to driving) 
System to reduce fatigue build-up, (automatic 4 4 1 1 
gearbox, automatic climate control) 
System that warns driver of their violation of 1 2 
the highway code, (violation has occurred or 
will occur unless the driver acts appropriately) 
Intervention to prevent violation of highway 1 1 
code, (e. g. red light running, speeding) 
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As table 3.12 shows, 8.9% of the RTAs in the database were related to fatigue, yet 9 
of the 10 RTAs considered in the Solutions Matrices work would have been 
positively influenced by a system that reduced the build-up of fatigue in our driver. 
Of note, is that in one case, potentially negative effects were noted. This was 
described as the possible effect of reduced arousal leading to drowsiness and an 
increased chance of an RTA. Detection of a currently fatigued state was noted to be 
effective in 3 out of the 10 cases, but this is still approximately three times what 
would have been expected from table 3.12. Violations of the highway code were 
noted to be infrequently effective, only one RTA scoring +3 for this function. 
Table 4.3 Technological Solutions concerning visibility of the vehicle and 
visibility from the vehicle. 
Ratings 
Technological solution +1 +2 +3 -2 
More visible brake lights, (flash rate indicating 2 
braking intensity, variable intensity lights, 'fill 
bar' type lights) 
Increased power of forward I ights 2 1 
Vision enhancement of roadway, (enhanced 2 3 2 
visual overlay of roadway information, or 
night vision enhancement) 
Glass that reduces rainwater and snow from 1 
adhering to it 
Glass that reduces glare from external sources 2 1 
System automatically optimising lighting of 3 
vehicle 
System that detects rain and automatically I 
adjusts wiper speed appropriately 
Although more visible brake lights may serve to warn a following driver that a 
vehicle ahead is braking more effectively, in the RTAs studied our drivers did not 
notice that a lead vehicle was slowing as the drivers were not attending to it, prior to 
the RTA, (for example case number 186). As the majority of the RTAs studied 
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occurred during the daylight, increased power of the forward lights was not viewed 
to be very effective, although vision enhancement was regarded to be more effective. 
This vision enhancement was suggested to be a head up display which not only 
presented a visual overlay of the roadway ahead, but presented the driver with 
additional information such as may be presented by a route navigation system that 
would warn the driver of an impending hazard. The effects of glare and poor lighting 
were in general not felt to contribute to the causes of the RTAs studied and were in 
consequence not noted to be effective in preventing them. 
Table 4.4 Technological Solutions based on enhanced vehicle performance and 
handling. 
Ratings 
Technological solution +1 +2 +3 -2 
System that prevents skidding when braking 2 2 
System that allows shorter stopping distances 2 6 1 
_ System that allows steering to be maintained 1 I 
under braking 
System helping to maintain optimum roadway 2 1 1 1 
position with respect to centre of lane and 
other vehicles, (laterally) 
System helping to maintain optimum roadway 2 1 
position with respect to choice of lane and 
other vehicles, (laterally) 
System maintaining traction under 1 
varying/poor conditions 
System automatically optimising braking 1 3 
under varying/poor roadway conditions, 
(detection of low friction co-efficient on 
roadway) 
System that automatically enhances braking 1 3 4 
efficiency, (detection and enhancement of 
panic braking) 
Tables 3.8 and 3.52 show that overall, braking failures were the most common errors 
across all scenarios although our drivers in general did not skid whilst braking. The 
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majority of the RTAs occurred on roadways with a good surface level of friction and 
therefore systems that would prevent skidding while braking were not frequently 
rated to be effective. Systems that allow shorter stopping distances were rated to be 
very effective, (+3), in 6 cases but were noted in one case to be potentially 
disadvantageous, (in the case of close following vehicles). Systems that 
automatically optimise braking efficiency by for example detecting the state of the 
roadway and automatically applying the brakes appropriately were noted to be very 
effective in 4 cases. This system when combined with a system that allows steering 
to be maintained under braking would be most similar to the operation of Anti lock 
Braking Systems, (ABS), currently available, although the steering functions of 
ABS were not noted to be frequently effective. 
A system that detected panic braking by our driver and automatically enhanced 
braking efficiency in this situation was noted to be very effective, (+3) in 4 cases, 
and moderately effective, (+2) in 3 cases. Such systems have however been 
introduced recently in some vehicle and have proved ineffective due to the high rate 
of inappropriate system operation. Several caveats to the introduction of such 
systems were required, most notably that the systems only operate when required 
and that the rate of false system activation's should be as low as possible. 
Analyses of the 10 RTAs studied show that in the majority of cases, our driver was 
not able to brake as efficiently as they would have liked to do once they became 
aware of the need to initiate braking. This would suggest that either the efficiency of 
brakes should be increased in order to allow our drivers to brake sufficiently well or 
that our driver's attention should be brought to the need to brake more rapidly. The 
work of McKenna suggests that the critical failures involved in RTAs are related to 
failures in hazard perception which would indicate that provision of driver support 
in hazard perception would be beneficial. Table 4.5 illustrates some of the potential 
technological solutions targeted specifically at providing driver assistance in hazard 
perception. 
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Table 4.5 Technological Solutions based on providing enhanced environmental 
information to the driver. 
Ratings 
Technological solution +1 +2 +3 -2 
System providing information concerning the 1 2 1 
nature of the roadway ahead of vehicle, 
(normally out of sight) 
System that detects objects to the side of the 1 2 3 
vehicle 
System that detects objects to the rear of the I 
vehicle, (including C pillar blind spot) 
System that detects objects to the front of the 1 9 
vehicle, (speed dependent with visual and 
audible warning) 
System that helps to maintain optimum 1 8 
stopping distance from the vehicle ahead. 
Speed dependant radar that allows warning, 
(for example flashing speedometer indicator), 
or actively controls the distance to lead 
vehicle, (intelligent cruise control) 
System that detects the need for braking and 2 1 7 
applies the brakes more rapidly than the driver 
would have been able to, (prevention of false 
starts at junctions, object detection and 
avoidance) 
Systems that inform the driver of the state of the roadway ahead of their vehicle 
were not viewed to be particularly effective in respect of preventing the RTAs 
studied. Systems that detect objects to the side of the vehicle were noted to be very 
effective in 3 of the 10 cases, whereas object detection to the rear of the vehicles 
were not rated to be particularly effective. These may have been more frequently 
noted to be effective had parking area incidents been included in the Solutions 
Matrices work. 
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Systems that detect objects to the front of the vehicle and warns the driver 
appropriately were viewed to be very effective, (+3), in 9 of the 10 RTAs studied. A 
system that utilises this detection function to help the driver to maintain the 
optimum stopping distance from this vehicle ahead was viewed to be very effective 
in 8 cases whereas one that detects the need to braking and applies the brakes 
appropriately was viewed to be very effective in 7 cases. 
Table 4.6 Technological Solutions based on vehicle and environment 
communication. 
Ratings 
Technological solution +1 +2 +3 -1 -2 
Vehicle to vehicle communication, (direct 1 1 8 
broadcast of intention to change speed or 
direction of travel, or of coefficient of friction 
of roadway) 
Vehicle to environment communication, 2 1 
(intention to turn off carriageway, current 
coefficient of friction of roadway) 
Environment to vehicle communication, for 2 2 2 
example advisory speed based on hazard 
ahead, (dangerous bend, low coefficient of 
friction of roadway or presence of vehicle 
turning off or onto carriageway) 
Two types of information were stated to be of use with respect to the communication 
between vehicles, and between vehicles and the environment. Firstly, the vehicles 
may broadcast and receive information relating to the state of the roadway in terms 
of the coefficient of friction to allow appropriate performance modifications to be 
made. Thus for example, the vehicles may receive information relating to the state of 
the roadway from a roadside beacon that may allow traction control or four wheel 
drive to be automatically enabled. Upon passage through this section of the 
roadway, this information may be updated if required. Alternatively, the vehicles 
may inform each other of their intention to change lanes, speed up or slow down or 
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pull out of or into a side road. It is most likely that due to the nature of this 
information the systems would be intervention based in nature. In the case for 
example of the slip road RTA discussed, (case number 130), the slow moving 
vehicle joining the slip road may broadcast its intention to so do and the two 
vehicles on the slip road that were involved in the RTA, (our vehicle and other 
vehicle) could automatically slow to allow sufficient space to allow passage. 
4.5.5.2 Summary of Technological Solutions. 
Overall, three main functions were required of the Technological Solutions. These 
were enhanced braking capabilities, object detection systems, (primarily directed 
towards the front of the vehicle), and vehicle to vehicle communications concerned 
with the relative speeds and paths of each vehicle. To some extent, although 
providing for different needs, they are all concerned with control aspects of vehicle 
performance and are specifically related to avoiding other road users on the 
roadway. The most common failures in the RTA database were ones in which our 
drivers stated they were unable to brake sufficiently to avoid an impact. Some of 
these were related to a vehicle performing a manoeuvre which was unpredictable 
from the perspectives of our driver, (for example the slip road case discussed, 
number 130). Others, (for example the open roadway case, number 131) could be 
more associated with a failure on the part of our driver to maintain appropriate 
attention to the roadway ahead. 
4.5.5.3 The efflicacy of the Technological Solutions. 
The ratings in sections 4.5.4.2 to 4.5.4.5 briefly illustrate some of the functions that 
the drivers in the RTAs described would have required in order to prevent those 
particular RTAs from occurring. A number of individual technological solutions 
may be devised and implemented from consideration of these functional 
requirements. However, in order to produce a strategy for primary safety system 
development, it was necessary to consider the frequency of occurrence of these and 
other RTA types and of the factors impinging on these RTAs both in the current 
population of drivers and in the general driving population. 
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In Chapter 3, Tables 3.12 to 3.54 show the frequencies and percentage of 
occurrence, (by scenario) of the situational variables and contributory factors 
impinging on the RTAs collected. The questionnaire in the current work was based 
on the factors outlined in the Leeds study, (Carsten et at 1989, Southwel I et at 1990), 
however the results from the Leeds study may not be used to weight the current data 
directly. Although the Leeds study collected information on approximately three 
times as many RTAs as the current study, (and therefore would have provided a data 
set to cross validate the current data), in the current work additional factors were 
included from previous studies and literature and some of the factors used in the 
Leeds study were not included. Exclusions of certain factors occurred either due to 
their infrequent occurrence in the data gathered by Carsten et at (1989) or due to the 
sensitivity of the particular factor. For example, Carsten et at (1989) included such 
factors as bloodymindedness or thoughtlessness on the part of the drivers concerned 
in RTAs. These factors were too emotive to ask of our drivers and likely to produce 
biased results when asked of any others involved in the RTAs in question. 
Additionally, the definitions of some of the factors were such that they could not be 
sensibly worded in a manner that would produce meaningful results. For example, in 
the pilot interviews, many drivers stated that they were involved in an RTA largely 
because they were in a position in which an RTA could not be avoided. Once the 
critical situation had been recognised a large proportion of the drivers believed their 
actions to be reasonable and that therefore they could not avoid the RTA, (see for 
example Tables 3.12 and 3.54). Thus, an attempt to make a distinction between their 
being in a situation in which a reasonable road user could have avoided the RTA and 
one in which the RTA would not be avoided by such a driver could not be drawn. 
Additionally, the distinction between for example those unable and those failing to 
perceive a hazard could not be drawn. Thus, the factors described in Tables 3.12 to 
3.54 do not correspond directly to the results of Carsten et at (1989) and Southwell 
et at (1990). Additionally, these factors were described by the participants of the 
matrices completion groups in their own words rather than with reference to the 
factors described by Carsten et at (1989). Thus the factors described in Chapter 3 do 
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not correspond directly to those of previous studies and therefore could not be used 
directly to weight the current data. 
However, sufficient data were gathered to allow a methodology to be devised for 
deciding upon primary safety strategy. Broughton and Markey (1996) showed how 
data relating to the causes of RTAs may be interpreted to produce an estimate of the 
percentage of RTAs that may be avoided by appropriate implementation of their 
logical Solutions. Broughton and Markey (1996) used a two level hierarchy of 
factors as they argued that the 4 levels used by Carsten et al (1989) was too complex 
to be used. Thus Broughton and Markey (1996) distinguished between Precipitating 
Factors, (the manoeuvres and failures immediately leading to the RTA), and 
Causation Factors, (the causes for these failures which relate to a specific failure). 
Additionally, Broughton and Markey (1996) distinguished between primary and 
secondary factors, the primary factors being 'very probably' linked to either the 
accident, (in the case of precipitating factors) or to the precipitating factors, (in the 
case of causation factors), (Broughton and Markey 1996, pp 6). Broughton and 
Markey (1996) gave an example of RTAs involving loss of control and driving too 
fast. In their example, loss of control was the precipitating factor and driving too fast 
was either the sole, the primary or a secondary causation factor. 
The formula presented below, (modified from that of Broughton and Markey 1996), 
allows calculation of the expected percentage of RTAs avoided, (61'oavoid), when 
Technological Solutions address specific factors in RTA causation. 
t'loavoid = Npf 
Nx + Ny + Nz) 
100 
Npf is the percentage of total RTAs associated with a particular precipitating factor, 
Nx to Nz are the percentage occurrence of each contributory factor for the given 
precipitating factor, and 17bavoid is the expected overall percentage reduction in RTA 
numbers given implementation of an appropriate technological solution addressing 
factors Npf and Nx to Nz. Thus, an estimate of the number of RTAs that may be 
avoided by appropriate implementation of a technological solution in a given 
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scenario may be achieved when estimates of the occurrence of the factors Npf and 
Nx to Nz are obtained. 
Although complex, given sufficient data this reasoning may be applied to the 
hierarchy of factors devised by Carsten et al (1989) and also those in the current 
study. Thus, by progressing through Carsten's hierarchy assessing the relationship 
between factors, individual and very specific RTAs may be addressed and the 
relative merits of Technological Solutions based upon these factors determined. The 
effectiveness of Technological Solutions addressing a particular error caused by a 
specific skills lapse and a particular reason associated with this skills lapse may be 
represented as follows; 
Oloavoid = Ner-ror 
Nskill + Nreason 
loo 
It is immediately obvious that a very large sample of RTAs would be required to 
perform the multivariate, analyses necessary to partial out the exact relationship 
between the factors at different levels. 
In the current context, the factors impinging on the RTAs in question were 
determined by the participants of the matrices completion sessions. The following 
are worked examples for each scenario discussed based upon the questionnaire data 
presented in Chapter 3 and the analysis of the RTAs by the matrices completion 
groups presented above. As sections 4.5.4.2 to 4.5.4.5 show, a number of skills 
lapses and reasons for these lapses, (as defined by Carsten et al 1989), occurred for 
each RTA. However, in the following worked examples, only one skill lapse and 
one reason for this skill lapse were utilised. Thus the formula used was; 
Oloavoid = Nscenarl'o 
Nskill + Nreason 
loo 
Thus to estimate the expected reduction in RTA numbers overall, (t7cavoid), the 
percentage of overall RTAs corresponding to a particular scenario, (Nscenario) is 
multiplied by the sum of the proportion of those RTAs in the given scenario in 
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which a particular skill lapse and a particular reason for that skill lapse occurs, 
(1Vskill+Nreason1100). Ideally, Nreason should be the proportion of those RTAs in 
the particular scenario, that make the specific skill lapse due to the reason under 
consideration. Thus for example, it should include those drivers that failed to brake 
properly due to fatigue, rather than those that failed to brake properly due to other 
reasons such as not being aware of the need to brake. It was not possible however to 
perform the analyses in this manner due to the volume of data gathered in the current 
study. Table 4.7 represents estimates of the values of 17bavoid for the RTAs used in 
the matrices. Insufficient questionnaire data were collected therefore no attempt was 
made to determine the causal relationship between the factors outlined on the 
questionnaires. Similarly, none was made to distinguish between precipitating and 
causal factors. However, the data were categorised by the scenario of the RTAs, and 
sufficient data were collected to allow the formula above to be applied to specific 
scenarios and the skills lapses commonly found in each scenario. 
Table 4.7 Percentage of RTAs avoided, (%avoid), by implementation of 
appropriate Technological Solutions implied in the current study. 
Scenario Open T junction Slip road Roundabout 
Roadway 
Nscenario 22.9 34.1 8.6 15.1 
Skill lapse Difficulty in Misjudged Misjudged Failed to 
braking braking speed of other observe 
distance roadway 
appropriately 
Nskill 9.4 7.7 21.1 94.4 
Reason for Fatigue Poorroad Visibility Overconfidence 
skill lapse surf ace restriction 
Nreason 12.5 14.9 9.1 9.5 
t7bavoid 5.0 7.7 2.6 15.7 
Number of 3 7 1 7 
avoided 
RTAs 
(current 
study) 
221 
Study 2: Developing A Decision Support Tool. 
Table 4.7 illustrates the values of %avoid implied for the specific RTAs studied in 
the matrices completion sessions were the Technological Solutions implied to be 
implemented. In practice, these figures are likely to be an overestimate as the figures 
for Nreason are approximations as stated above. Additionally, inspection of the data 
relating to the estimates of Nskill and Nreason shows that the number of cases on 
which these proportions are estimated maybe too small to be generalisable. This is 
especially evident for the estimates relating to the roundabout RTA. Table 3.43 
shows that of the 18 drivers answering the question relating to their seeing the 
vehicle in which they were in collision with too late to avoid the collision, 17 stated 
this was the case. The value of Nskill for this scenario is therefore based on less than 
half of the roundabout RTAs for which there are data in the current study and cannot 
be viewed to be generalisable. 
Table 4.8 A schematic outline of summed data to derive primary safety strategy 
for T junction and Roundabout RTAs. 
Scenario T junction, (case 188) Open Roadway, (case 
131) 
Skills lapse Difficulty in braking Misjudged braking 
distance 
Reason Poor road surface Fatigue 
Rating from Solutions +3 (braking under poor +3 (Automatic 
Matrices for implied road surface) application of brakes) 
Technological Solutions 
%avoid 7.7 5.0 
Loading factors, (e. g. cost To be estimated by the 
per RTA, number of Motor Manufacturer 
RTAs of this type) 
Expected gains from 
technology (%avoid X 
loading factor) 
Table 4.8 illustrates how the data collected in the two studies may be integrated into 
a single table to define a strategy for primary safety system development. As has 
been stated, more data is required before definitive conclusions may be drawn, 
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however the methodology employed may be summarised thus. Specific RTA 
scenarios can be chosen from the RTA database devised either as a result of a 
requirement to consider specific RTA types, or as a result of a particular scenario 
being overly represented in the population of RTAs as a whole, (as illustrated by the 
Solutions Matrices work described herein). The skills lapses and reasons for these 
may be deduced from a statistical analysis of the RTA database and appropriate 
Technological Solutions devised. By consideration of the proportion of RTAs in this 
scenario that are related to the specific skills lapses and reasons noted, an 
approximation of the proportion of RTAs at these scenarios that may be avoided 
may be deduced, (9bavoid). Thus, the absolute number of RTAs that may be 
addressed by a technological solution of estimated efficacy may be deduced. 
Additionally, loading factors may be applied to the data in table 4.8. Pragmatically, 
these loading factors may be related to the costs involved in the RTAs in question, 
both in respect of the costs involved in the likely outcome of the RTAs in question 
were they to occur unchecked, and those involved in the development and 
implementation of appropriate Technological Solutions. The exact nature of these 
loading factors are beyond the scope of this project, but in addition, they are likely to 
involve consideration of the marketability of the Technological Solutions under 
consideration. These loading factors are to be deduced by the Motor Manufacturer 
undertaking this work at a later date. 
4.5.6 Conclusions. 
Overall, whilst sufficient data were gathered during the questionnaire distribution 
phase of this project to develop and implement the Solutions Matrices methodology, 
firm conclusions pertaining to a suggested primary safety strategy cannot be drawn 
from these data. The causal chain of events relating to the various factors could not 
be deduced, and therefore the Technological Solutions devised were only 
suggestions based on an inadequate sample size. This however is not a significant 
failing of the project as the project was aimed at a strategic level, and as such was 
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not expected to yield precisely quantifiable results at this stage. As a strategic study, 
it is a means to an end, (IPD 1996). 
The methodology chosen for the deduction of Technological Solutions relied upon 
the functionality matrices approach devised by the HUFIT project, (Galer et al 
1992). The method itself has been used extensively elsewhere, and as such has been 
demonstrated to be valid. The main advantage of this approach and therefore the 
reason for its use is that it readily allows large amounts of complex data to be 
summarised in a single easily usable format. 
In the current case, the Technological Solutions outlined were viewed positively by 
the participants of the matrices completion groups who felt that these where 
appropriate for the RTAs under consideration. In order to produce a definitive 
strategy for primary safety system development, additional questionnaire data are 
required to finalise the scenarios chosen for the Solutions Matrices work. In 
addition, more Solutions Matrices completion sessions may be required as indicated 
by the analysis of the additional questionnaire data. 
The use of multi-disciplinary groups to complete the Solutions Matrices may 
potentially have complicated the processes of completion due to those with differing 
specialisations suggesting different approaches to a given RTA. However, the 
instruction to code the specific Technological Solutions quickly rather than to debate 
issues at length not only prevented excessive debate, but effectively encouraged a 
rapid consensus concerning the functions that a given driver would require. 
Although most of the RTAs studied did produce a number of Technological 
Solutions, they were in general in agreement concerning the functions that the 
systems should perform, but may have differed slightly in the manner in which these 
functions were to be implemented. A functional description of the required 
Technological Solutions was produced but a technological specification (i. e. a 
description of how the technologies should produce the functions), was not 
produced. The same matrices approach may be subsequently employed to define the 
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technological specification of any systems suggested once a more complete 
functional specification has been deduced. 
The disadvantage of utilising groups to complete the matrices, is the costs inherent 
in requiring 6 engineers to allocate half a day for each matrices completion session. 
However, approximately 50 such engineers have now participated in at least one 
matrices completion session and the experience of the pilot work demonstrates that 
once familiar with the technique subsequent sessions are completed very much more 
rapidly. As approximately half of the time period in which the participants were in 
attendance was used in familiarising the participants with the technique it is 
envisaged that approximately twice the number of RTAs will be considered during 
each completion session. 
The ratings employed in the final completion sessions reflected that negative as well 
as positive effects may be resulting from the implementation of the Technological 
Solutions. However, negative ratings were infrequently associated with the systems, 
and when present were in general not attributed to be serious. Restricting the use of 
the code 3 for those RTAs in which a failure on the part of our driver could be 
directly addressed by a specific technological solution focused the participants 
attention on factors that were known to have influenced the occurrence of the RTAs 
in question. However, being cautious in rating, (i. e. applying a higher rating when 
consensus could not be achieved), ensured that functions would be included rather 
than rejected at this early stage. 
Describing the Technological Solutions in terms of functions that they may perform 
avoided focusing on existing systems that a motor manufacturer may already be 
considering. As has been noted, these systems are frequently designed from a 
technological perspective and as such are not directed primarily at increasing the 
safety of those driving. Additionally, a functional approach allows the needs of the 
drivers in the RTAs considered to be addressed directly, ensuring that these needs 
are fundamental in the process of the design of the systems. 
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With respect to the RTA scenarios considered, the individual RTAs were chosen at 
random from 84% of the RTAs in the database of returned questionnaires. As such, 
the 10 RTAs that were considered account for approximately 4% of this sample. 
Additionally, the sample returned cannot be regarded to be completely generalisable 
to the population of drivers from which it was drawn, and this population as has 
been described is not typical of the general driving population. Table 3.12 shows 
that the distribution of RTAs in the current sample differs from those in the 
STATS19 database. However, a larger sample size will allow a statistical 
comparison to be performed and ultimately the loading factors described in Table 
4.8 may be adjusted accordingly. A larger sample size will in addition allow the 
factors outlined in the questionnaires to be analysed in a hierarchical manner as 
originally intended and thus the summary data presented in Table 4.7 may be 
deduced with more accuracy. 
Only preliminary conclusions could be drawn at this stage, however, sufficient data 
were gathered to develop a methodology to produce a primary safety strategy. 
Additionally, this methodology has been modified to enable it to be performed by a 
motor manufacturer to facilitate their independent development of a strategy for 
primary safety system development. 
4.6 Chapter conclusions and summary. 
A methodology to determine appropriate Technological Solutions to RTAs was 
developed and tested. This methodology employed a series of matrices that 
allowed the errors and failures of the drivers in the RTAs to be explicitly listed 
and cross tabulated with potential Technological Solutions defined in a functional 
manner. An approach of this nature encouraged the participants of the matrices 
completion sessions to develop novel technologies rather than focusing on 
existing technologies. 
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This methodology was operationalised within a motor manufacturer such that the 
company was able to utilise it without external assistance. The motor 
manufacturer may now obtain data from returned questionnaires and transfer the 
needs outlined in these questionnaires into the Solutions Matrices in a meaningful 
manner. The Solutions Matrices can be completed by the participants to produce 
a list of functionally defined Technological Solutions for the RTAs considered. 
By considering the frequency of occurrence of the factors impinging on the RTAs 
considered in the population as a whole, these Technological Solutions may be 
evaluated for their potential impact with respect of reducing the toll of real world 
RTAs. When additional data pertaining to the costs of the individual RTAs and 
the development costs and efforts required are tabulated with these efficiency 
estimates, a strategy for primary safety system development may be drawn up. 
Given that the current Solutions Matrices work was based upon an insufficiently 
large sample of returned questionnaires, only preliminary requirements could be 
drawn concerning the strategy for system development. However it was clear 
from the data gathered that three issues were in particular need of addressing with 
respect to system development. The braking performance of the vehicles involved 
in the collisions was in general felt to be inadequate. A forward mounted object 
detection system was felt to be beneficial in many of the RTAs studied, as was a 
system that allowed direct communication between the vehicles involved with 
respect of their relative velocities. 
A methodology to determine a strategy for primary safety system development has 
been developed and described. The procedure involved cross-tabulating functionally 
defined potential Technological Solutions with details of specific RTAs derived 
from a database of questionnaires completed by recently RTA involved drivers. 
Following this, the implied Technological Solutions are weighted according to the 
frequency of occurrence of the factors to which they are addressing. A summation of 
the factors will allow a strategy to be developed. This methodology has been applied 
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within the business processes of a motor manufacturer and found to be both 
practicable and to produce meaningful results. 
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5.0 Discussion of the project. 
5.1 Chapter summary. 
This chapter addresses the project as a whole, and specifically discusses the project 
with respect to the stated aims and objectives of the research. This chapter firstly 
discusses the project in general, before addressing the methodologies developed and 
their limitations. The application of the methodologies employed within the 
framework of the business processes of a motor manufacturer is outlined, and this 
chapter concludes by briefly discussing the implications of the study with respect to 
the application of the strategic decision making framework described. 
5.2 General discussion. 
The underlying hypothesis of this thesis is that in order to develop appropriate primary 
safety technologies, one needs to collect data on the causes of RTAs and have a means 
to decide upon which technologies would be of most benefit in reducing the number of 
RTAs experienced. The goal of this thesis is to produce a methodology the application 
of which would allow a motor manufacturer to make such decisions and thus develop 
their primary safety strategy. This methodology comprised of two parts, an RTA data 
collection tool to determine in detail the causes of a sample of RTAs, (described in 
Chapter 3), and a decision support tool to enable decisions to be made concerning 
which technologies would be most appropriate to prevent the RTAs from occurring, 
(described in Chapter 4). This thesis was necessitated by the lack of such 
methodologies and the consequential poor decision making in respect of appropriate 
primary safety technologies by motor manufacturers. 
It can be readily seen from chapter 2 that no overall model exists to adequately 
account for both the nature of human error and the sequence of events leading to an 
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accident. Ramsey (1985) described a model of the sequence of events leading to an 
accident, but without specific reference to the individual errors made. Rasmussen 
(1987), described the nature of these errors and placed them in a hierarchical 
taxonomy, but did not address the sequence of multiple errors that may occur in an 
accident's genesis. 
With reference to RTAs in particular, although a number of large and small scale 
studies have been conducted both of individual factors and of general RTA 
causation, few models exist to adequately explain the causation of RTAs. There is a 
tendency to focus either on the sequence of events exclusive of the errors in depth, or 
on the errors exclusive of the sequence. The hierarchy of factors described by 
Carsten et al (1989), is the most complete RTA error taxonomy to date and was 
specifically designed to allow the sequence of errors leading to an RTA to be 
investigated. Accordingly, this thesis used these factors as a basis for the 
development of a bespoke data collection tool from which to collect information 
pertaining to the causes of RTAs. 
A bespoke data collection tool was required for two reasons. Firstly, the existing 
data is insufficient to derive a safety strategy. STATS 19 for example contains very 
little data relating to the causes of the RTAs. Data such as the environmental 
conditions and the nature of the driver at the time of the RTA are described, but are 
not readily correlated within STATS 1.9. Additionally, these data are of limited use 
as they were not collected for the purposes of deducing in depth the reasons for the 
RTAs and consequently do not go into sufficient detail. Secondly, of the traditional 
in-depth studies conducted, the majority were not aimed at deducing primary safety 
technologies and therefore their use for this purpose is extremely limited. In 
common with this, for example the Leeds study did not suggest appropriate primary 
safety technologies. Nevertheless, it was an important advance in that it not only 
described explicitly the factors underlying RTA causation, but provided a hierarchy 
through which their sequence could be analysed. The study was deliberately limited 
by considering only urban RTAs that occurred on roadways below the speed of 30 
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mph. Consequently, these data would have been insufficient to build a strategy for 
primary safety system development; the data from this study would be contained 
within this population of RTAs to the exclusion of all other RTA types. 
From the perspectives of a motor manufacturer wishing to reduce the number of 
RTAs in their own vehicles, the Leeds study population would have proved to be 
inadequate as it would be expected to contain comparatively few of these vehicles. 
Similarly, the case study based approaches, although geared towards suggesting 
primary safety technologies, would have provided little evidence for the motor 
manufacturer in question in respect of the nature of RTAs involving their cars. These 
case studies did however demonstrate how appropriate primary safety technologies 
may be devised from consideration of the causes of RTAs. 
The underlying hypothesis to this thesis is that in order to effect a genuine reduction 
in the number of RTAs experienced on the roads, by way of the implementation of 
appropriate technologies in vehicles, it was necessary to gain an understanding of the 
causes of these RTAs, in order to build appropriate countermeasures. An 
Ergonomics approach to the problem has therefore been followed; to effect a desired 
system change, one must first understand the nature of the system. This however 
presupposes that the problem and the methods employed to address this problem do 
not pass one another by, (Wittgenstein 1953). It has been argued that the 
development of high technologies in vehicles as evidenced by the DRIVE and 
PROMETHEUS programmes has fallen into this trap. These technologies have been 
developed on the basis of what is technologically feasible at the expense of the 
actual requirements of the drivers; the problem of the causes of RTAs has therefore 
been overlooked when designing the 'solution'. 
That the errors associated in RTA causation, and the manner in which these errors 
may be addressed, do not necessarily lie in the same domain was first suggested 
some 20 years ago, (Sabey and Staughton 1975). However, much of the research into 
the causes of RTAs, (including that of Sabey and Staughton 1975) was not 
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specifically aimed at deducing primary safety systems. Of those primary safety 
systems that have been considered, their implementation has largely been 
technology, rather than driver centred in approach. The RTA causation studies that 
did focus on primary safety, almost exclusively focused on these technologies. Due 
largely to the technological lead in the development of such systems, there exists the 
considerable danger that not only do such systems not address the needs of the 
driver, but they may actively hinder the driver's use of the vehicle. In order to have 
any benefits, not only must these systems avoid adding unnecessary technical 
complexity, (Oliver and Hall 1997), but they must actively address the needs of the 
drivers. This was explicitly stated by Broughton and Markey (1996), who 
accordingly defined the technologies implied by their work asLogical Solutions. 
To address the first point, considerable efforts have been directed at ensuring that 
any such systems are ergonomically appropriate and thereby do not place 
unnecessary burdens on the drivers. To this end ergonomic standards now exist, for 
example Galer and Simmonds (1984), Robertson and Southall (1992). With respect 
to the needs of the drivers, designing systems from a functional perspective, based 
on the requirements of the drivers themselves will alleviate the danger of 
overlooking the needs of the drivers in respect of their avoiding RTAs. The current 
study differed from that of the Leeds study, (Carsten et al 1989, Southwell et al 
1990) in that the drivers themselves were asked in more detail concerning the factors 
leading to the RTA in which they were involved. It has been argued that this may be 
inappropriate, because as driving is largely automatic, the processes involved in 
driving are not directly accessible to conscious thought, (Clarke et al 1995). 
Consideration of Rasmussen's (1987) model of behaviour appears to verify the 
theory that the largely automatic, knowledge based errors may not be accessible to 
drivers. 
However, this overlooks that fact that irrespective of the everyday nature of the 
scenarios in which drivers are involved in RTAs, the act of being involved in an 
RTA itself is not an everyday one. Thus the reasoning that drivers cannot describe 
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the occurrence of an RTA due to the everyday nature of driving is inherently flawed. 
In addition, West (1997) demonstrated that not only are drivers able to provide some 
explanation of the occurrence of RTAs in which they were involved, (sufficient to be 
reliably coded into scripts), but these scripts are reliably reported over the period of 
several years. The current study in comparison involved drivers who had 
comparatively recently been involved in RTAs. They were however asked in 
considerable detail as to the reasons for these RTAs. That the drivers were not 
always able to ascribe the reasons in detail in the current study, (as reflected by the 
number of occasions 'Don't Know' was indicated), mirrors the results of Carsten et 
al (1989) who determined that approximately one third of the 4th level failures were 
coded by a mutli-disciplinary team as unknown. In the current study, our drivers 
were given the opportunity to answer 'Don't Know' for many of the questions, but 
few chose to do so. Approximately 25% of our drivers nevertheless admitted some 
behaviour on their part may have contributed to the causation of the RTA. However, 
this does not mean that the remaining 75% were merely innocent victims of a third 
party's actions. The absence of evidence with respect to errors does not equate to the 
evidence of absence of these errors. In this respect however, no conclusions may be 
drawn; insufficient data were gathered to statistically cross validate the current data 
against a larger population. However, at a strategic level, sufficient data were 
gathered to enable a methodology to be devised. The data gathered in this project 
were of use in both designing the format of and weighting the results of the 
Solutions Matrices. As has been argued, existing data would not have been sufficient 
to serve this purpose. 
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5.3 Discussion of the methodologies employed. 
To reiterate, the goal of this thesis was the development of a tool through which a 
motor manufacturer could decide upon their primary safety strategy. To achieve this, 
two main methods were developed and employed in this study; a questionnaire 
administered to a population of recently RTA involved drivers and a series of 
Solutions Matrices completed by domain experts drawn from the employees of a 
motor manufacturer. In practice, the development of the methodologies occurred in 
parallel. The initial developmental work was carried out at Loughborough University 
with some assistance from the sponsoring motor manufacturer, whilst the main data 
collection phase of each was performed with the direct support of the manufacturer. 
Each of the methodologies employed is discussed in turn. 
5.3.1 Questionnaire stu 
Section 2.7.2 describes the nature of data usually collected in in-depth studies. In the 
current study, it was not possible to obtain data in addition to that collectable via the 
questionnaire; no on the scene investigations, vehicle examinations or interviews 
with witnesses were possible. This was due to the manner in which the populations 
studied were approached, itself constrained by the business processes of the 
sponsoring motor manufacturer. Unlike Broughton and Markey (1996) who were 
restricted to the use of data collected by an insurance company for their own 
purposes, the current study was able to approach the drivers involved with a view to 
their completing an extensive RTA causation questionnaire. Due to the manner in 
which the population was obtained together with issues of personal and commercial 
confidentiality however, cross validating data was not obtainable through the motor 
manufacturer. 
The aim of the questionnaire study was to collect in-depth RTA data to inform a 
motor manufacturer of the causes of RTAs. This information was required to enable 
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a methodology to be devised to develop a primary safety strategy for a motor 
manufacturer. With respect to this, the objectives were therefore; 
1. To devise a suitable data collection tool to obtain information on the causes of 
RTAs, 
2. To provide information to enable a methodology to devise primary safety 
strategy to be developed. 
The methodology chosen for the collection of the RTA data was a self completion 
postal questionnaire, the reasoning for the choice of which is outlined in section 
3.4.2.1. In retrospect, the reasoning underlying the choice of this methodology was 
verified by the information and experience gained throughout the course of this 
study. Observational methods for example, would have required a prohibitively long 
time period to collect the data given the extensive efforts required to collect these 
data, (as noted by others, for example Mukherjee 1997). 
Interview techniques were employed in the initial piloting work but were rejected as 
the methodology of choice from the main data collection phase of the study. In 
common with observational techniques, interviews take a considerable time to both 
collect and to analyse the resultant data. In addition, considerable social pressures 
exist for interviewees to bias their responses in a socially desirable manner when 
face to face with an interviewer. Whilst time consuming to design, the distribution, 
collection and collation of questionnaire data is very much more straightforward 
than conducting interviews or obtaining observational data. 
A comparison with the Loughborough Campus based piloting indicates that as a 
percentage of overall returns, the main sample contained more incomplete 
questionnaires. This may be due to the differences in educational levels amongst the 
two populations although this is not verifiable due to the small numbers of returned 
questionnaires in the main phase of the questionnaire distribution. 
A number of biases may exist in respect of the completion of the questionnaire. Both 
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conscious and unconscious biases are expected to exist. Those likely to make 
conscious biases, (deliberate falsifications), are equally likely to not return the 
questionnaire, unless they felt compelled to do so by the manner of distribution. 
Unconscious biases are more difficult to quantify and essentially relate to our drivers 
not knowing why the RTA occurred and attributing actions, and underlying factors 
to themselves and to others. If additional data were available, these biases may be 
estimated. For example, physical evidence may be collected from the scene, though 
it is unlikely that many aspects of physical data such as these were exposed to biases 
of this nature. Unlike the physical evidence, which by its nature is mostly verifiable, 
unconscious biases are not quantifiable for the most part given their psychological 
nature. Nevertheless, given sufficient data, the random effects of these biases will be 
reduced. Systematic biases in these data will not however be affected with the 
addition of more data but will remain as at a constant level. Given the present 
sample and methodology employed, the effects of these biases remain unquantified. 
This raises the issue of the quality of the data collected. Obviously, since cross 
validation was not possible, it is impossible to draw definitive conclusions. 
However, it would appear that the data returned in the main questionnaire 
distribution period are of a lower quality than that obtained during piloting. As 
discussed, this is likely to be due to educational differences in the two populations. 
In addition to this there was no motivation to complete the questionnaire over and 
above the request in the covering letter. Whilst some respondents may have felt 
compelled to complete the questionnaire as it was distributed through their insurance 
company, (and thus the response rate resulting may be enhanced), none stated this to 
be the case. It is obvious that for some of the respondents however, care was not 
taken to complete the questionnaire. Overall, the questionnaires were completed to 
such a degree that the data were usable in the Solutions Matrices work. Given that 
the expected use of the data is at a strategic level, the data collected are concluded to 
be of a sufficient quality. Cross validation of the questionnaire data should of course 
be conducted if possible. 
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Although the questionnaire was devised using the factor structure developed in the 
Leeds study, (Carsten et al 1989, Southwell et al 1990), the ordering of the questions 
did not exactly match the ordering of the factor structure. The questionnaire was 
organised in such a manner so that the hierarchy of factors leading to the RTAs in 
question could be pursued however. To some extent this was achieved, however 
insufficient data were collected to allow a full analysis of this. Given that for the 
most part the questionnaire was completed correctly, with sufficient data the 
relationship between the factors at various levels in the hierarchy may be deduced 
statistically. For example, RTAs resulting from a drivers failure to stop at aT 
junction due to their failure to see another vehicle, (and thereby recognise the need to 
stop), may be distinguished from those that were unable to stop due to a poor road 
surface. Applying the principle of Occam's Razor to this, it may be considered 
unnecessary to reduce the descriptions of the RTAs to this level for the purposes of 
defining appropriate countermeasures. However, in the absence of sufficient data to 
perform such analyses, this is a moot point. 
Clustering of RTAs of similar types has been frequently performed in previous in- 
depth studies, (notably the case study based studies described in section 2.7.4). This 
serves to simplify the data and allows large quantities of similar data to be 
combined. However, these clustering techniques are only valid with respect of their 
matching the general population, when based on sufficiently large samples. In the 
current study, due to the small sample size resulting, the clustering was based upon 
the very much larger STATS 19 database. Since fatality data is generally considered 
to be more reliable, the clustering was based upon the size of the clusters of RTAs 
resulting in fatalities from STATS 19. Sabey and Staughton (1975) concluded that 
there were no differences in the genesis of RTAs resulting in fatalities as compared 
to non injurious outcomes. However, advances in RTA investigation techniques to 
date have not been applied to this problem, and consequently this may be viewed 
with some caution. Irrespective of the validity of the clusters employed, the 
methodology created is argued to be valid for the purposes of developing a strategy 
for primary safety system development. 
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5.3.2 Solutions matrices. 
The Solutions Matrices were based on functionality matrices developed by the 
HUFIT project, (Galer et al 1992). Functionality matrices were the only technique 
available for correlating a system's functionality and users requirements that could 
be applied to the current study. The aim of the Solutions Matrices work was to 
develop a procedure for correlating information relating to the causes of RTAs and 
possible technologies which may be employed to reduce the number of these RTAs. 
When reviewing the literature concerning these technologies, it became apparent that 
these technologies themselves were flawed with respect to their primary safety 
application as primary safety was a largely peripheral concern in their developmental 
process. 
A Solutions Matrices methodology was therefore devised that facilitated both the 
specification of the functions actually required of these technologies, (thereby 
ensuring that the solution did indeed address the problem), and enabled strategic 
decisions to be made regarding their relative efficacy. The development of these 
Solutions Matrices was an iterative process. Both the nature of the descriptions of 
the RTA scenarios and the potential technological solutions, as well as the rating 
scheme itself were modified considerably over the course of a number of matrices 
completion sessions. The result was a series of matrices, in which the participants 
were able to deduce from the questionnaires the factors underlying the RTAs in 
question and were able to employ these data to determine appropriate technological 
solutions. 
The major question concerning the use of the Solutions Matrices relates to the 
validity of the findings. It is firstly acknowledged that the sample of RTAs on which 
the matrices work was based may inherently be biased. In respect of the high level 
scenarios, table 3.14 shows that the proportions in each of the high level scenarios 
for the current study and for STATS 19 for 1996 were essentially similar. A 
statistical validation was not performed however for the reasons outlined above. 
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Secondly, as this study was conducted at the level of deducing primary safety 
strategy, no information pertaining to the actual efficacy of the resultant systems may 
be deduced. This is in part due to the fact that many of the resultant systems are not 
in production and hence their effect on real world RTAs cannot be quantified as 
these systems do not exist other than on paper. It was implicit in this work that 
engineers from a motor manufacturer would be an appropriate population from 
which the technological solutions could be derived. The procedure of completing the 
Solutions Matrices was not performed in its final form using participants drawn from 
any other sample, largely because one of the purposes of this study was to devise a 
methodology that could be employed by this motor manufacturer. 
Finally, it was assumed that the technological solutions derived, having been 
produced by specific consideration of the factors underlying the RTAs in question 
would in actuality effect a reduction in the number of RTAs experienced on the 
roads. A number of researchers have suggested that any purely technological 
interventions will not serve to lower the number of injuries experienced on the roads 
due to the effects of behavioural compensation, (see for example Adams 1985, 
Evans 1991 and Wilde 1981,1994). It should be noted that the functionally 
described technological solutions outputted from the Solutions Matrices work are 
not defined in terms of anything other than their desired functionality. Technical 
specifications were not deduced, (though may be using the Solutions Matrices 
technique), and these systems exist only on paper. Prior to implementation, 
additional work, such as simulation and analyses of the behavioural effects on 
drivers of these systems should be undertaken. 
5.4 Application in a motor manufacturer. 
5.4.1 Questionnaire distribution, collection and analvsis. 
Overall, the data collected in the questionnaire distribution were collected in a 
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manner which was consistent with the business processes of the sponsoring motor 
manufacturer. The major difficulty with respect to the questionnaire data collection 
related to the process through which the sample was identified and the 
questionnaires distributed. As this study was carried out with the assistance of a 
motor manufacturer, and the population of recently RTA involved drivers identified 
exclusively through this motor manufacturer, (with the exception of the piloting 
work), several constraints were placed upon the questionnaire distribution 
procedures. For example, due to the sensitivity of the data, names and addresses of 
those involved in the RTAs could not be directly released by the insurance group for 
questionnaire distribution purposes. Additionally, since the names and addresses to 
whom the questionnaires were distributed were not recorded, follow-up 
questionnaires or letters could not be distributed. This was largely because the 
insurance group's records were not computerised. However, had they been 
computerised, the implications of the Data Protection Act would have directly 
precluded the insurance group from divulging personal data. 
The questionnaires were thus delivered to the premises of the insurance group and 
distributed solely by them. Accordingly, the distribution procedures had to be 
designed so as to fit in with the business processes of the insurance group. A driver 
involved in an RTA would therefore be sent the questionnaire and covering letter 
once they had returned the initial claim form to the insurance department. This 
distribution procedure offered two potential advantages over other potential 
procedures. 
Firstly, the ongoing nature of the procedure allowed distribution to be continued 
throughout the year and thus the complete range of environmental conditions 
could be sampled. In actuality, resource limitations within the motor 
manufacturer precluded this. 
Secondly, and importantly, the insurance group had already initiated their 
processing procedures at the stage that the questionnaires were to be distributed. 
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Whilst the exact sample required was specified, it was not possible, (again due to 
resource limitations), to ensure that only these drivers were selected for the study. 
It was stressed in the covering letter that the questionnaire was anonymous and 
would in no way be attributable to themselves at a later date. Additionally, it was 
stated that the study was being conducted with the assistance of the insurance 
department, but independently of them and that individual questionnaires would not 
be identifiable. However, given the return rate in the current study, it can be 
concluded therefore that the questionnaire was an acceptable data collection 
methodology for the purposes of the study in question. 
The major limitation of this study relates to the distribution procedure and the 
resultant sample size. The distribution of the questionnaires was inadequate; 
responses were obtained from those to whom a questionnaire should not have been 
sent and a significant number of those to whom the questionnaire should have been 
distributed were not included. In total, 3000 questionnaires were prepared for 
distribution, yet over the time period outlined for distribution of this number, only 
1000 were distributed. Largely, this was due to the resources available to the 
insurance group for the current study. Both financial and time resource limitations 
prevented the insurance department from distributing the questionnaires to the entire 
sample selected within the population of RTA involved drivers. The resultant sample 
cannot be regarded as generalisable to this population as a whole, and clearly given 
the biased nature of this population nor to the general driving population as a whole. 
The results of the questionnaire analysis in terms of the scenarios of, and factors 
underlying RTAs cannot be regarded as generalisable to the general population of 
RTA involved drivers. 
Additionally, non returned questionnaires remain a significant problem for the 
current study for three reasons. Firstly, due to the distribution methodology, no data 
are available concerning those to whom the questionnaire was distributed and that 
did not return it. Secondly, no data exist pertaining to those that should have 
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received a questionnaire but didn't and thus the true size of the non returned sample 
remains unquantified. Finally, it has to be acknowledged that those returning the 
questionnaire may differ significantly from those not returning the questionnaire. 
This may be a demographic difference, (such as younger male drivers being 
differentially overly represented in the non-returnees), or a difference in the nature 
of the RTAs in which the drivers were involved. 
However, it can be concluded that with respect to the stated aims and objectives of 
the questionnaire study, this methodology was successful; although the distribution 
process was clearly inadequate for the purposes of determining the causes of RTAs 
in general, it enabled the Solutions Matrices and the method of weighting the 
resulting data to be developed. 
In order for the questionnaire distribution to be continued with in house, resources 
will be required to enable the insurance group to target only those to whom a 
questionnaire should be distributed. It is anticipated that when the distribution is 
undertaken by the motor manufacturer, these resources may be made available and 
hence the number of inappropriate distributions minimised. The resulting return rate 
should therefore be enhanced accordingly. 
In respect of the distribution, collection and analysis of the questionnaires, the 
following are required; 
The population identified through the insurance group of the motor manufacturer 
should be sampled as described above, but in a systematic manner and specifically 
data relating to the nature of those that were included and excluded should be 
obtained. From this, an analysis of the non returns would enable an estimation of 
the effectiveness of the sampling strategy can be obtained. 
9 The questionnaires should be distributed using the procedures outlined above in a 
timely manner, (as soon as is practically possible after the RTA). 
The questionnaires should be collated and entered into SPSS for analysis as 
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described. It is particularly important that the resultant data are error trapped prior to 
analysis. 
The expected output of this will be a database of RTAs from the population identified, 
which may be compared against existing databases, (notably STATS 19) in order to 
determine the general isabil ity of the collected data compared to national norms. In 
addition to determining with more accuracy the underlying reasons for RTAs 
occurrence, the database of collected RTA data will outline the frequency of 
occurrence of these factors. This may then be used to determine the number of RTAs 
technologies addressing these factors and hence estimates of overall effectiveness of 
specific technologies may be arrived at. 
5.4.2 Completion of the Solutions Matrices. 
In the final form, the Solutions Matrices were completed by the employees of the 
motor manufacturer in a relatively straightforward manner. It was possible for these 
employees to make judgements regarding the potential efficacy of the technological 
solutions when phrased in terms of the functions that these systems may provide. In 
addition, the participants were able to make links between the individual functions 
and were able to specify in some detail the nature of the required systems. 
With respect to operational is ing the completion of the Solutions Matrices within the 
motor manufacturer's business, as with the questionnaire data, the major issue 
pertains to the resources required. These resource limitations effectively reduced the 
number of individual RTAs that were considered in the matrices completion 
sessions. The Solutions Matrices were always completed by groups, these 
completion sessions typically running for between 3 and 4 hours. Thus, the time 
resources required simply to complete the matrices were considerable. Considerable 
time was also required to train the participants in the methodology. As 
approximately 50 staff have now been trained, the motor manufacturer may now 
complete the matrices themselves with little additional training required. By 
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be made in respect of the motor manufacturer's primary safety strategy. 
5.4.3 Inteoration of the Questionnaire and Solutions Mattices. 
In addition to developing and operational is i ng the questionnaire and Solutions 
Matrices methodologies, it was necessary to map out the processes through which 
the motor manufacturer would integrate these into their core business. An important 
aspect of this is the need for continual updates of the situation pertaining to the 
causes of RTAs and of the resultant injuries. As has been described, driving may be 
viewed from a systems perspective, altering any one of the components of these 
systems will cause an effect throughout the entire system. For example Wilde (1994) 
describes how changes in the economic prosperity of a country causes an effect on 
the absolute number of RTAs experienced on the roads of that country; during 
periods of recession, less money is available for transportation, fewer miles are 
driven overall and the RTA rates consequently fall in line with the lower levels of 
exposure. It is important that once a strategy is devised, it is continuously updated to 
reflect changes in the driver - vehicle - environment system, (see Figure 1.1). 
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Figure 5.1 A schematic business process map to illustrate the development of 
safety strategy within a motor manufacturer. 
In effect, a business process map was required and is presented in Figure 5.1. There 
are two major sources of information presented; that pertaining to RTAs and that 
related to potential technological solutions and RTA countermeasures. The model 
below does not specify in detail any of these information sources, but outlines at a 
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high level the nature of the information to be considered at each stage. Prior to the 
initiation of the current project, no methodology existed to integrate these two 
information sources, and accordingly the development of many RTA 
countermeasures was largely undertaken with no attention being paid in a systematic 
manner to the nature of RTAs. Figure 5.1 illustrates at high level the process through 
which a motor manufacturer may optimise their decision making with respect to a 
strategy for primary safety system development. 
5.4.3.1 RTA information sources andpriori(y checklists. 
Two types of RTA information are presented within the model; relating specifically 
to primary or secondary safety. The information sources detail the main research in 
primary and secondary safety and include studies such as the current study and the 
literature published concerning the causes of both RTAs and the injuries resulting 
from these. An overall set of priorities will need to be devised by consideration of 
the strategic, organisational aims and objectives of the motor manufacturer with 
respect to their safety policy. From consideration of the relative frequencies, 
severities and costs of the RTAs and resultant injuries, priorities for primary and 
secondary safety may be deduced. These priorities are best represented as checklists; 
when new information relating to either primary or secondary safety becomes 
available, it must be compared to the checklists referring to the safety policy. 
Overall, a data monitor will monitor changes in RTA and injury patterns and will 
compare the effects of these changes to the priority checklists. In addition, the 
checklists themselves will need to be continuously updated, by considering the wider 
social context in which the motor manufacturer operates. 
Motor manufacturers are to a large extent driven by legislation, and for example new 
legislation may necessitate that specific injury types are addressed by a motor 
manufacturer's products. Alternatively, in order to maintain competitive advantage, 
a motor manufacturer may require that specific efforts are directed at aspects of 
occupant protection. Given that recently attention has been directed more towards 
primary safety, and that arguably a plateau is rapidly being approached in secondary 
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safety, (Deering and Viano 1994), it is expected that in the near future legislation 
will be directed towards the prevention of RTAs. 
Due to changes in the patterns of RTA or injury causation over time, conflicts will 
arise with respect to the checklists. It can be seen that most of the conflicts that will 
arise in the short term are associated with secondary safety, largely because 
legislation currently focuses almost exclusively on injury rather than RTA 
prevention. When these conflicts are noted by the Data Monitor, these must be 
reflected in the Solutions Matrices, and a new series of Solutions Matrices 
completed to specifically address these changes. 
From the perspectives of the current thesis, two sources of information are of 
particular interest in regards to primary safety strategy; that published in STATS 19, 
and that collected from recent RTAs in the manner described in Chapter 3. Priority 
checklists will be required for each of these to monitor for example any changes in 
the patterns of RTAs over time. Such changes will have implications for the nature 
of the primary safety technologies that should be deployed and hence the changes 
must be reflected in any long term primary safety strategy. 
5.4.3.2 Countermeasures and Technological Solutions. 
A similar procedure will be needed to account for changes in RTA countermeasures. 
The primary inputs for this work are derived from motor manufacturers awareness of 
the nature of primary safety technologies that may be deployed. It is particularly 
important that these are described in functional terms, and that a constant review of 
technologies is undertaken by the motor manufacturer. Two main sources of 
information should be reviewed, market requirements and countermeasure 
information sources. Market requirement information will be needed, largely to 
account for any safety measures that a motor manufacturers competitors may 
introduce. There is a need for such technologies to be analysed and catalogued. In 
addition to this, legislation may necessitate specific products are introduced into the 
vehicle fleet, (such as occurs now with the requirement for rear seat belts to be 
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fitted). Additionally, customer requirements will need to be considered and reflected. 
For the most part, these requirements will at present be related to secondary safety 
measures, as technologies as air bags are now a sought after feature of a new vehicle. 
If a culture change occurs in respect of the desirable qualities of vehicles, primary 
safety features may become more desirable. 
Countermeasures information sources relate specifically to the technologies that may 
be introduced into vehicles to either prevent RTAs or the injuries that result. In 
addition to technical and functional specifications, this information must contain 
data related to the costs, availability and implementation efforts that are required for 
each system. 
In contrast to the RTA information sources, priorities for the initial choice of 
technologies should not be raised at this stage, (all possible technologies should be 
included due to the strategic nature of the work), but a solutions monitor is required 
to assimilate the market requirement and countermeasure information sources. When 
significant changes have been noted, these should be carried forward to the Solutions 
Matrices for consideration. 
5.4.3.3 Solutions Matrices. 
Initially, more data should be obtained from the questionnaire study to enable the 
Solutions Matrices to be completed with a statistically valid sample of RTAs. This 
will produce a series of matrices to illustrate the causes of RTAs as they occur now, 
and will illustrate the functions required to overcome these RTAs. A strategy for 
primary safety system development may then be deduced as illustrated in section 
4.5.5. 
The Solutions Matrices should be updated periodically to account for changes in the 
driver - vehicle - environment system. These changes will be noted by the Data and 
Solutions Monitors within the motor manufacturer and amendments made to the 
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Solutions Matrices accordingly. These changes will be of two main types. Firstly, the 
nature of RTAs, injuries or countermeasures will change over timel . These changes 
will need to be reflected in the Solutions Matrices by updating the descriptions of the 
potential countermeasures and the RTA scenarios. Secondly, quantitative changes in 
the priorities will need to be added to the Solutions Matrices. These are most likely 
to be added after the main Solutions Matrices completion sessions have been 
completed to illustrate the resources required to develop the technologies. These 
resources will include the development time, the costs and the actions and efforts 
required. 
In summary, by use of the methods described in this thesis, a better understanding of 
the causes of RTAs and how to decide between alternative primary safety 
technologies may be arrived at. 
5.4 Chapter Conclusions and Summary. 
This chapter has briefly discussed the project as a whole and has discussed the 
methodologies with respect to the stated aims and objectives of the research. The 
limitations of the studies have been outlined and the implications for applying this 
research within the business processes of a motor manufacturer have been outlined. 
The specific conclusions are as follows: 
- Additional data, (in the form of that collected in the RTA causation 
questionnaire), was required due to the inability to effectively use existing data 
for the purposes of defining primary safety strategy. 
1 The nature of injuries and injury producing RTAs was not specifically addressed within the current 
study. However, different RTA scenarios will result in different injury patterns and therefore priorities 
for reducing these injury types will naturally require some consideration of the scenarios in which the 
RTAs occurred. 
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e Although the quality of these data was not as good as may have been if enhanced 
by additional data sources, it was of sufficient quality to be used in the subsequent 
work. 
The resource limitations of operating this study within the confines of the core 
business of a motor manufacturer precluded extensive data collection for both the 
questionnaire and the Solutions Matrices work. Sufficient data were collected 
however to allow these methodologies to be developed and implemented within 
the motor manufacturer concerned. 
Additional financial and personnel resources are required however if the motor 
manufacturer is to continue with this work in such a manner so the results of the 
Solutions Matrices work will be of optimum benefit with respect to defining a 
strategy for primary safety system development. 
Although limitations to this study exist, the goal to develop a tool for a motor 
manufacturer has been achieved. By application of the RTA data collection 
methodology, a motor manufacturer can deduce with more certainly the reasons for a 
sample of RTAs occurring and can use these data to inform a decision support tool of 
the causes of these RTAs. When combined with functionally defined potential primary 
safety technologies, the output of the decision support system will indicate which of 
the technologies would be more effective at reducing the likelihood of the RTAs in 
question occurring. By applying weighting data based on the frequency of the RTA 
scenarios, (as defined in STATS 19), and the frequency of the factors in each scenario, 
(informed by the results of the RTA data collection), a strategic plan of the 
development of appropriate primary safety technologies may be produced. 
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6.0 Conclusions and further research. 
6.1 Chapter Summary. 
This chapter presents a summary of the conclusions of this research and suggests 
some areas for further research in similar areas. It firstly reiterates the aims and 
objectives of the study, before outlining these conclusions. Finally, suggestions for 
further research are made. 
6.2 Aims and Objectives. 
The underlying hypothesis of this thesis is that in order to understand priorities for 
primary safety system development, one needs to understand in more detail the 
reasons for RTAs occurring. Accordingly, one needs to collect data on real life 
RTAs and have a means of evaluating the value of potential technological solutions 
in respect of their ability to help a driver avoid RTAs. The aim of this work was 
therefore to develop a methodology which could be employed by a motor 
manufacturer to assist their decision making in respect of their primary safety 
strategy. It was implicit that any methodology developed would be consistent with 
the core business processes of a motor manufacturer, so that they could effectively 
utilise the methodology independently. There were 4 objectives to this research; 
* To perform state of the art literature reviews of the current situation with respect 
to accident causation, RTAs in specific, and available and prototype technologies 
that may address primary safety in vehicles. 
To collect information on RTAs to determine the nature of the causative factors 
in more detail. 
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To define a procedure for correlating information on RTA causation and potential 
RTA countermeasures. 
* To develop processes within a motor manufacturer whereby they can utilise such 
a methodology to determine their primary safety strategy. 
6.3 Conclusions. 
The conclusions of the study are briefly outlined below. 
With recent advances in computing technology, it has been possible to place high 
technology in vehicles to aid the driver in their task. However, it is obvious that 
these technologies, developed as they were largely from other domains and 
applied to vehicles, are not focused at the causes of RTAs. In order to design 
appropriate RTA countermeasures, an understanding of the reasons for RTA's 
occurrence is needed. 
Demographic studies of those involved in RTAs and where these RTAs occur are 
useful only as descriptions of these factors. Largely due to the methods that have 
been employed in collecting these data, few conclusions with respect to 
appropriate accident prevention technologies are possible. Additionally, the issue 
of the nature of the statistics quoted complicates the situation with respect to the 
size of the RTA problem, and hence of any possible effects of the implementation 
of accident countermeasures. Due to the inaccuracies in data recording it would 
seem sensible to limit consideration to absolute numbers of accidents, and in 
specific to fatalities. 
It is clear that human factors and specifically errors play a major role in RTA 
genesis although no single model of human error in isolation is appropriate to 
describe RTAs. Ramsey's (1985) model describes the sequence of events in a 
generic accident, whilst Rasmussen's (1987) model describes the nature of the 
errors made. Neither model is therefore complete and each therefore requires 
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elements of the other before a full picture of any given accident may be derived. 
Whilst not outlining potential countermeasures, the study undertaken at the 
Institute of Transport Studies, Leeds was a significant breakthrough in terms of 
understanding the factors impinging on RTAs. In contrast to earlier studies, the 
factors were explicitly defined and placed in a hierarchy that allowed causal 
chains to be inferred. This study therefore most closely matches a composite of 
the models of Ramsey, (1985) and Rasmussen, (1987). 
A data collection method was devised that allowed collection and analysis of the 
factors impinging on RTA causation and enabled a motor manufacturer to gain an 
appreciation of these factors in individual RTAs. The data from the Leeds study 
was insufficient for the current work because it was restricted to urban RTAs 
involving low speed collisions. In addition, since the current work was conducted 
on behalf of a motor manufacturer, their primary interest was RTAs involving 
their production vehicles. The Leeds data would therefore have provided 
comparatively few of these on which to base a strategy for this manufacturer. 
In common with previous studies, the RTA data collected found that the majority 
of RTAs occurred on straight, flat roads in good visibility and in good weather 
conditions. The drivers completing the questionnaire were able to describe in 
some detail the factors impinging on the RTAs in which they were involved and 
approximately 25% of them admitted some liability on their part contributed to 
the cause of the RTA. As was expected of a sample of predominantly middle 
aged, male company car drivers, they drove a higher than average number of 
miles per year and consequently their increased exposure may be related to a 
higher than average RTA rate. 
The INRETS and TRL case studies both suggested appropriate accident 
prevention measures. INRETS demonstrated the use of clustering of accident 
types and illustrated concept of needs with respect to the drivers. This was 
advanced further by the TRL work. 
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* Using a functional definition of the needs of the drivers and hence of the 
performance of the accident prevention measures allowed these technologies to 
be developed in a more driver centred manner. This has been demonstrated by 
Malaterre et al (1992) and Broughton and Markey (1996). 
No methodology existed prior to this study to systematically enable a motor 
manufacturer to make decisions regarding the appropriateness of individual 
Technological Solutions. Furthermore, no strategic decision making framework 
existed. Applying a functional definition of potential technologies and utilising a 
modified functionality matrix, the efficacy of a large number of technologies was 
estimated with reference to the needs of the drivers as expressed in terms of the 
errors made in the sequence of events leading to an RTA. 
From an analysis of the functions required by the drivers completing the 
questionnaires, it was apparent that three functions were commonly required by 
the drivers; enhanced braking capability, object detection systems, (sufficient to 
warn of impending collisions) and vehicle to vehicle communications, (to warn of 
intended velocity change). 
When combining data from the questionnaire study and the Solutions Matrices 
work, a strategic approach to primary safety system development was developed. 
This enables a motor manufacturer to obtain data pertaining to the factors 
underlying individual RTAs and correlate them with potential technological 
solutions. A strategy for primary safety system development can then be deduced 
from these data. 
6.4 Further research. 
There are two main areas in which further research may be undertaken following 
this project: 
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In respect of the current work, cross validating data may be obtained from 
additional sources and thus the validity of the findings may be deduced. This 
should be performed to determine the validity of the responses given by for 
example conducting on the scene investigations of the RTAs. In addition, the 
nature of the population employed in the questionnaire study may have affected 
the resulting conclusions pertaining to the causes of RTAs. This could be 
addressed in a wider scale survey. 
* Secondly, more questionnaire data is required for the motor manufacturer to 
determine with accuracy the direction of their primary safety strategy. 
With respect to other similar areas of research three areas of research are possible. 
The Solutions Matrices methodology may be employed in other areas of a motor 
manufacturer's operations, for example to determine market requirements. 
Additionally, motor manufacturer's suppliers may be approached and the 
methodology applied to determine the technological specification of systems. 
Applying a user centred design philosophy, were the suppliers to consider the 
factors underlying RTAs earlier in the design of technologies, it would enable 
them to produce systems tailored to the requirements of the drivers. The current 
work has focused specifically on the causes of RTAs, but this reasoning could 
equally be applied to any technology placed into vehicles, or the design of the 
vehicles themselves. 
Given that it has been shown that it may be possible to build safer cars, the 
motivational aspects of drivers behaviour in respect of their current behaviour and 
attitudes to road safety require consideration. It has been suggested that drivers 
will drive so as to maintain their target level of risk and consequently would drive 
in an objectively more dangerous manner in an objectively safer vehicle. 
Advances in primary safety technologies may therefore have no net effect if 
drivers compensate by behaving in a more dangerous manner. This must be 
objectively quantified, and were it to be the case, addressed via training or 
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Conclusions andfurther research. 
education. In many respects the pervasive culture surrounding the use of the 
motor car in motorised societies still glamorises speed. Only recently has safety 
become a selling point in vehicles, and this is the case for comparatively few 
vehicles. Research must therefore be directed towards understanding the culture 
surrounding the usage of vehicles such that an understanding of drivers 
motivations may be gained. 
Currently, drivers may purchase any vehicle within their means once they have 
the required license. No specific driver training is mandatory over and above that 
required by the government and there is the danger that even if a vehicle is 
objectively safer due to the presence of primary safety technologies the driver 
may be unable to use these effectively. Whilst it is hoped that these technologies 
would make driving safer for a driver in a vehicle so equipped, the issue of the 
training of the driver requires investigation. In addition, it must be ensured that 
the risks faced on the roads are not loaded towards other more vulnerable road 
users due to the presence of high technology in vehicles. 
6.5 Chapter Conclusions and Summary. 
The aims and objectives of this research have been described and the conclusions 
from this research briefly outlined. Suggestions for further research have been made. 
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Scheme of Contributory Factors 
101 Braking suddenly reasonably 
102 Braking suddealy unrieasonabiy and sharpiy 
M Erratic courie 
104 Loss of controUfaffing over 
105 Failure to avoid 
106 Fatlure to stop, stop signiline 
Where the reasonable road user would. 
Where the reasonable road user would not. 
Any mrad user rollowing an unpredictable course riot resulting from loss of controi. Does not include driving wrong way. 
Sudden loss of adhesion, steering or stability. 
Insufficient or absent evading action once -he likelihood of an accident occ-urnný has been perceived (the reasonable driver should have been able w avoid). 
107 Failure to stop, zebra crossing Not stopping for a pedestrian who has right of way on a zebra crossing. A 
pedestrian onlyhas right ofway when a reasonable driver could have stoppea 
108 Failure to stop, red light 
109 Failure to stop, pelican dashing orange 
110 Failure to stop, other control (e. g. school crossing patrol or police persom 
III Turii/manoeuvre from wrong lane Turning off a road from the wrung lane. 
112 U-Turn Inappropriate or poorly executed. Includes 3-point turns. 
113 Inappropriate overtaking Overtaking in a situation where the reasonable driver would not over-take. 
114 Poorly carried out ma-noeuvre. turning Turning in an inappropriate place or an appropriate place, *out failing to ca= i-. 
out properly idoes not include Cai: ure to yieLd). 
115 Poorly carried out manoeuvre, overtaking Overtakiný in an appropriate place. but 'ailing to carry ;t out properly. Does no-, 
include failure to yieid. changing lane. 
1116 Reversing Inappropriate or poorly executed. 
1 '17 Opening door Opening a door where or when a reasonable person would nothave. 
! IS Failure to anticipate Driver/rider or pedestrian who perceives a vehicle, penori or oo4ect .n their own carnageway or on the Coot ath too late to permit avoidance, and where ne roaci M 
user would normally have right of way. The reasonable road user should haýe. 
perceived it earlier (note this includes the situation where another vehicle turns 
into a major road in front of the vehicle concerned). 
119 Unable to anticipate Driver/rider or pedestrian who perceives a vehicle, person or object ,n their own . I . carn a5eway or on the footpath too late to permit avoidance, anc I" nere -, ne 
driver/rider would normally have had right of -way. The reasonable road user 
would also have been unable to anticipate ý note this includes the situation where 
another vehicle turns into a major road in Front of the vehicle concerned). 
120 In dangerous position Pedestrian or stationary or barely moving vehicle at a location that endangers 
itself and/or other road users ý does not apply to pedestrians crossing a road by 
reasonably direct route). This category excludes manceuvres defined elsewhere. 
121 Driving wrong way Driving/riding on the wrong side of the -load, or up a one-way carnageway the 
wrong way. 
122 Failure to signal Before undertaking any mancieuvre. 
123 Failure to put on lights After dark or in poor visibility. 
124 minor into major Whether marked- signed or riot. 
12 5 no priority At a junction where there are no marks or signs and there is no obvious priority. 
126 Failure to yield. changing lane Whether marked, signed or not. 
127 turning right Includes failing to yield to pedestrians crossing the road into which the vehicie 
turning. 
128 turning left Includes failing to yield to pedestrians crossing the mad into xhich the ýehiclc 
tuming. 
129 pulLing in to the side of a road or into a driveway. Includes failure to yield to pedestrians ,, I 
the footpath. 
130 pulLing out from the side of the road or from a driveway. Includes ; 'ailure to Yield 
pedestrians on the Footpath. 
131 ped to traffic poor crossing sitia Crossing at a place in the mad here a reasonable pedestrian would be awar, 
that it was dangerous. The reasonable pedestrian would chose to cross eisewhem 
132 ped to traffic reasonable crossing san Pedestrian stepping into path of vehicle and unreasonably obstructing it. 
13: 3 Misleading signalling Doing something which the other road user would not expect you to do in -. he 
ofyour signal i includes gestures, iigris. 3ig-nais, : ights [lashing, etc. . 
134 Vehicle EaLiure Non-collision event. in which a vehicle ý'aiiure such as a tire causes 
iri)urv a an 
occupant or rider. 
135 Other Top-level failure riot otherwise gpecified. 
L98 No CaLiure A road user, for whom no Factors are applicable - whether 
human. site or vehicic. 
199 Unknown , top level) Road user for whom we 
do not have enough information to code failures or no 
failure. 
201 Situational problem Site or environmental factor from which the reasonable road user would 
'nave 
difficulty. 
202 Fo0owing too close Road user following a vehicle with insufflicient time to stop. 
203 Driving too fast for the situation Exceeding the speed at which a reasonable driverinder would 
have 
given the circumstances. 
300 Did not gee, type unknown One or the following ractors applied: 
- Failed to took, at aU 
- Failed to look, partial 
- Looked but failed to see 
- Unable to see 
301 Failed to look. at ail Road user who I" to look in any directions in which the reasonable road iser 
would have looked. 
302 Failed to look, partial Road user who fails to look in all directions in which the reasonable road -iser 
would have looked. 
303 Looked but failed to see Looked in one or more directions in which the reasonable road user would 
have 
looked. but having looked failed to see what the reasonable road user should have 
seen. 
304 Misinterpretation, other users Misunderstood the true intentions of other road users -here the reasonable 
user might be misled. 
305 Misinterpretation, layout Misunderstood the true nature of the layout where the reasonable road u Se r 
might be misled. 
306 Lack ofjudgement - path 
Road user who shows errors in ' 
Judgement with regard to the path of other road 
user(s) where the reasonable road user would not 'have done, and therefore 
fails ýj 
correctly assess the risks in the situation. 
307 Lack afjudgement - 3peed/distance 
Road user who shows errors in judgement with regard to the speed or distance of 
other road userýs) where the reasonable road user would not 
'nave done, and 
therefore fails to correctly assess the risks in the situation. 
308 Lack of judgement - other 
Road user who shows errors in judgement mith regard to other aspects of the ' nave done, and therefore faiis situation where the reasonable road user would not 
to correctly assess the risks in the situation. 
309 Lack of motor skills - braking 
Road user who shows lack of braking skills, -here a reasonable road user wouid 
riot. 
310 Lack of motor skills - steering 
Road user who shows lack of 3teenng skills. where a reasonable road user would 
not. 
311 Lack of motor skil-Is - general 
Road user who shows lack of general driving skills, -here a reasonable road user 
would not. 
312 Unable to gee The reasonable road user would not 
have seen. 
313 Foolhardy Road user who, judging the situation correctly, attempts a risky action not 
believing an accident wdi occur. 
314 Deliberate Road user who attempts to precipitate an accident. 
315 Aggressive behaviour Road user who maliciously attempts to impose his/her will on other road user, s), 
intending to force the other road users) to reduce the risks in the situation. 
399 Unknown (3rd level) Road user whose actions we are unable to explain. 
401 Inexperience - driving 
Road user who is unable to driveiride reasonably due to lack of experience of 
driving/riding. 
402 Inexperience - of vehicle 
Inexperience with the particular accident vehicle. 
403 Panic Over- or under-reacLion due to the rear of an apparently impending accident. 
404 Impairment - alcohol 
(Whether or not OPL). 
405 Impairment - drugs 
Road user whose mental and/or motor abilities are adversely affected 
due o 
consumption of drugs (whether prescribed, illegal or other), or riOn-consumption of 
necessary drugs. 
406 Impair-ment - fatigue 
407 Impairment - illness i 
Excludes mental illness) 
408 Impairment - emotional state of mind (Includes mental illness) 
409 Disability - sight Road user with partial or total. temporary or permanent, endogenous sight 
problem. 
410 Disability - heanng Road user with partial or total, temporary or per-marient, endogenous 'nearing 
problem. 
411 Disability - other Road user with partial or total, tern ýIr permanent, endoleenous problem, 
other than of sight or of hearing. IST-would include a sud en cramp, Cor 
example). 
412 Thoughtlessness 
413 Bloodymindedness 
414 Distraction - physical, external Driver/rider who is distracted from pertinent aspects of his/lier situation or 
vehicle, due to attention unduly focussed on an aspect external to the vehicle. 
415 Distraction - physical, internal Driver/rider who is distracted from poertinent aspects of hmher situation or 
vehicle, due to attention unduly focussed on an as Peet internal w, or of, the 
vehicle. (This includes distraction due to passengers ul/on vehicles). 
-- - 7Biitractmft-phy&tca1_pedestri" Pedestrian who is distracted from pertinent aspects of hisher situation, due to 
attention unduly focussed on any external cause. 
417 Distraction - mental Road user who is distracted from Irtinent aspects of 
hisoher situation. lue to 4 
oughts. attention unduly focussed on other 
418 Overcon-ddence Road user who assesses the risk as lower than it really is. 
419 Tyre deflation before impact Sudden loss of air pressure that occurred prior to accident. 
420 Tyre - lack of tread 
421 Tyre - wrong pressures 
422 Brake defect - Fault or degradation in the braking system. 
423 Steering defect 
424 Lights defect One or more lights not in working order ý other than lights too dim). 
425 Lights inadequate One or more lights wo dim to be seen or too dim to light up the road (headlights). 
426 Lights, signal defect One or more signals not in working order -other than signals too dim). 
427 Mech defects, motive power/dnve train Car does not respond properly to accelerator. clutch or gearbox. 
428 Total electrical failure If this results in a lighting, signal, braking, or motive power failure this also 
should be noted if relevant. 
429 Load defective Improperly secured or inappropriate load. 
430 Winciscreen defective Break or permanent mark on windscreen such that vision is obscured, or 
complete absence of windscreen. 
431 Wipers not working 
432 Fire 
433 Overall poor condition Numerous faults such that vehicie required total overhaul to be put in iaic 
condition or such that vehicle should have been scrapped. 
434 ", snow/ice on window Sufficient snow or ice on a window such that normal vision is obscured and -hicý 
the reasonable driver would have cleared. 
435 Obstruction/obscuration, load Load such as to block vision of driver/rider. 
436 Obstructio n/obscu ration. misted up Interior of a window steamed up such that normal vision is obscured and whici 
the reasonable driver would have cleared. 
437 other interior Obstruction from some other person, object or animal in the inwrior such tha 
normal vision is obscured and which the reasonable driver would have moved. 
438 pedestrian clothing/equipment I Vision ofpedestnan obscured by a pieoe oftheir own clothing or equipment. 
439 sitn, vertical/horizontal curvature Geometry of road surface such as to block vision of road user. 
440 sitn, street furniture Position ofstreet furniture such as to block vision ofroad user. 
441 sitn, weather concin, snowisleet. /hail Road user vision hindered by severe snow or sleet or hail. 
442 gitn, weather condition, rain Road user vision hindered by severe rain. 
443 sitn, weather condition. foWrrust Road user vision hindered by fog or mist. 
444 sitri. object in road Object in road such as to block vision of road user. 
145 sitn. parked vehicles Parked vehicles such as to block vision or path of road user. 
146 3itn' stationary vehicles Stationary vehicles such as to block vision of road user. 
147 sitn' moving vehicles Moving vehicles such as to block vision of road user. 
148 sitn' vegetation Vegetation such as to block vision of road user. 
449 31to, pedestrian Pedestrian such as to block vision of road user. 
450 sita. building/ fenceiwail One or more buildingwfencesi'walls such as to block vision ofmad user. 
451 3itc, spray Road user vision hindered by spray. 
452 Lack of preparedness Road user who fails to adjust or clean their vehicle properly pnor to or during driving/nding, or rails to ensure that their clothing is suitable for driving/riding. 
453 Poorly positioned street Furruture Wrongly or dangerously positioned street furniture ýexcludes obscuration factors). 
454 crossing facilities for pecis Inadequate Crossing racilities for pedestrians which are absent, or, if present, are not 
- working correctly or need to be upgraded. Crossing facilities include pedestrian 
refuges, zebra crossings, pelican crossings. pedestrian hase of traffic lights, g 
. police or school crossings, and subways or bridges over ma 
455 Inadequate traffic lights Traffic lights which are not working in part. 
_or 
at ail. or wrongly programmed 
signal settings (excluding pedestrian crossing tacilities). 
456 Misleading visual layout A road layout with visual clues From the , Dhvsical environment, excluding inadequate si ns r markings, which might rlus[ead the reasonable road -aser. 3 lu 's 
This could inc de . deceptively sharp bend. 
457, Lack of/faulty guard rail A faulty guard rril is either one that is damaged or one whose design rný_Kes t 
unsuitable. 
458 Poor road/pavement surface A road/pavement surface which is likely to deflect the paths ,, f a driverrider. 3r 
cause a pedestrian to stumble or fail. 
459 Slippery road. low skid resistance Applies to road, pavement or verge. 
460 Slippery road, wet Applies to road, pavement or verge. 
461 Slippery road, mud/graveLloose stonealoil Applies to road, pavement or verge. 
462 Slippery road. ice Applies to mad, pavement or verge. 
463 Slippery road, snow Applies to road, pavement or verge. 
464 Slippery road, flooding/water Applies to road, pavement or verge- 
465 Poor conspicuity of other road users 
466 Steep hills (not including obscuration factors). 
46 7 'Phantom' A mad user or object which, as a result of; ts presence or act: on, influences other 
road users to take an action which results in an accident. The 'phantom' is not 
directly involved in the accident. Not applicable when being chased/scared ýs a 
factor. 
468 Dazzle/glare from sun Sufficient to temporarily blind a mad user. 
469 Dazzleiglare from headlights Sufficient to temporarily blind a mad user. 
470 Poor/absent street lighting 
4", 1 In a hurry A mad user whose ability to use the road or pavement has been reduced by 'heir 
motivation to get sornewýere quickly. 
472 Being chased/scared (other than panic). Includes chasing. 
473 Unfarniliar road environment A mad user who encountered a road environment of which -. 1hey have little or no 
experience and which prevents them from acting safely. 
474 Playing'chicken' A road user who challenges another road user to alter their path or speed by 
placing him/berself directly in their path, for reasons of gaming or amusement. 
475 Frustration Only as a result of impatience with the traffic situation. 
4 7,6 Showing off As a result of doing something meant to imprrss ýexcluding playing'chicken'). 
477 Encouragement Receiving advice, support, or courage from another person ýexcluding playing 
'chicken1 
478 Nervousness ýIrelaLed to the traffic situation). 
479 Insufficient parental control ma user whose guardian doesn't attempt to control the young road user A youn d bl h d to t of a reasona e guarcian. e egree expecte 
480 Poor banking; camber Excessive camber or improper or madequatebanking. 
481 Inadequate road signsimarkings 
ý82 Weather condition fgenerai) 
499 Unknown (4th level) 
A 3ite where the 3igns and/or markings are Fauity. non-exisLent. improper or 
wrongly piaced. 
(factors other than obscuration or road snirface factors). 
Road user whose actions we are unable to explain. 
Accident Questionnaire 
This questionnaire is divided into sections dealing with different aspects of the accident you were involved in. 
You may find that it will help you to answer the questionnaire if you read through it once to familiarise yourself 
with it before you complete it. Some questions provide a Line for you to print your answer --- 
qMWff- or ask you 
to tick a box ý. Tick as many boxes as are relevant. If you want to change your response, put a cross through it 
id and tick vour new response. Even if you are not sure about the answer, do not leave the item blank, pick the 
answer that is closest to what you think. Please tick the'No'box where applicable rather than leaving the item 
blank. It is important that you complete all the sections and answer every relevant question. 
This section is about what you can recall of the accident, how the accident may have been caused and how 
others may be able to avoid a similar accident in the future. 
To start with, please draw a diagram of the accident and its location as best you can. Include as much detail as you 
can recall e. g. roads, road markings or crossings, vehicles involved in the incident, the paths that they were 
travelling, the directions of impacts and the final resting place of each vehicle involved, if you know. 
Diagram of accident location. 
I. I. Please describe the circumstances that led up to the accident, i. e. where you were going to and from, and 
where the accident occurred. 
Driving from: ................................................................................................................................ ..... .............................. 
Driving to: ............................................................................................................................................................................ 
The accident occurred at: .................................................................................................................................................... 
1.3. What do you think were the main reasons for the accident? .......................................... ........................................... 
.......................................................................................................................... ................... ................................................ 
......................... .................................................................................................................................................................. 
................................... ............................... ................................................................... ........... ......... ................. ........... 
..................................................................... I .................. .. I............... ............. ....... ... ........... ........................ 
1.6. If vou had to make a list of Do's and Don'ts to give to other road users to avoid an accident such as this, what 
would they be? 
Do's ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 
............................................ ............................................................................................................................................ I I. 
I .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 
............................................................................................................................................................................................... 
........ I .............. .................................................................................................................................................................... 
Don'ts 
.......................................................................................................................................................................... ... 
....................................................................................... I.. I .................................................................................................... 
..................................... .............................................................................. ................... I ..................................... I ................ 
............... ................. ......................................................................................................................................................... 
............................................................................................................................................................................................... 
---- ýBl- 
This section is about the area immediately around the accident scene, e. g. the layout of the road and the 
problems you may have experienced as a result of this. 
2.1. What sort of area you were in? 
City centre shopping 
City centre residential 
City centTe industrial /business park 
Suburban shopping 
Suburban residential 
Suburban mdustrial. /business park 
Village/town shopping 
Vfflage/town residential 
ZI Village/town industrial /business park 
Open countryside 
Other (please describe) ...................................... ....... 
2.2. What type of road you were on? 
Motor-way 
'A' road dual carriageway 
'A'road single car-riageway 
'A'road with signed overtaking lane 
'B' road 
'C' road or unclassified. 
One way street 
Other (please describe) ......................................... 
2.3. Did the accident occur? 
At a junction 
Close to but not at a junction, (within 100 metres) 
Not at/close to a junction (Please go to question 2.10) 
2.4. What type of junction? 
Cross road 
T junction 
Y junction or shp road e. g. Motorway junction 
More than 4 turnings 
Mini roundabout 
Roundabout 
Pulling into or out of a driveway or entrance 
Other (please describe) .............................................. 
2.5. Which direction were you heading at this junction? 
Straight on Other (please describe) .............................................. 
Turning right 
Turning left 
0 
2.6. When the accident occurred, which road were vou on" 
Main road, you were not expected to give way Priority not explicit, unclear whether you were to 
Main road, you were instructed to stop e. g. by give way or whether other road users were to give 
traffic lights way 
J Secondary road, you were expected to give way 
2.7. What type of road were you approaching? 
Motor-way 
'A' road dual carriageway 
'A' road single carriageway 
'A'road with signed over-taking lane 
'B' road 
D 'C' road or unclassified 
One-wav street 
Pulling into or out of a driveway or entrance 
Other (please describe) .............................................. 
2.8. What type of traffic controls were there at this junction? 
Stop or give-way sign 
Traffic lights 
Roundabout 
Fainted lines or chevrons 
Traffic island 
2.9. Did you stop at this junction? 
Yes 
No 
None 
Other (please describe)... .................... ................. 
Not sure 
Not applicable, not expected to stop 
2.10. What was the speed limit on the road on which the accident occurTed? ............................ mph 
Zl Don't Know 
2.11. Did vour vehicle run off the road? 
Yes 
No 
Not sure 
2.12. What was the road layout like close to the accident scene? Please tick all that apply 
Types of bends Approaching At accident scene After accident scene 
accident scene 
-Straight Q LI CI 
Single wide curve :1 Q 
Multiple wide curves 
Single narrow curve 
Multiple narrow curveýs 
Types of slopes Approaching At accident scene After accident scene 
accident scene 
Flat 
Uphill slope 
Downhill slope 
TOF ()f hill 
Bottom of hill 
Hump 71 
2.13. Were there any other changes in the road layout between the area immediately before the accident and the 
area of the accident? 
C3 No changes Leaving a zone with road lighting 
Speed lin-Lit change, new limit .......... mph 
Entering a zone with road lighting 
Q Don't know Other (please describe) .............................................. Road width increase 
C3 Road width decrease ........................................................................................ 
2.14. Were there any other changes in the road layout between the area of the accident and the area immediately 
after it? 
No changes Leaving a zone with road lighting 
Speed limit change, new limit .......... mph 
Entering a zone with road lighting 
D Don't know Other (please describe) ...... ........... .......... ................ Road width increase 
Road width decrease 
2.15. Did the accident occur close to any of the following? 
J Access/slip road 
D Parking area 
Bridge 
Underpass/ overpass 
Pedestrian crossing 
Bicvcle path/ lane 
Chicane 
Speed retarders e. g. road humps 
None of these 
Other (please describe) ..... ........ 
..................................................................... 
2.1t). Inunediately before the accident occurred, were you changing lanes e. g. preparing to overtake 
Yes 
No 
Not sure 
2.17. How was the visibility along the road? 
Partially restricted 
Severely restricted 
Not restricted (please go to question 2.19) 
2.18. What was restricting the visibility along the road? 
Hill or slope in the road 
Bend in the road 
Trees, bushes, hedges etc. 
Roadworks 
Street signs 
Wall or houses 
Snow, sleet, rain or hail 
Fog or mist 
Spray from another vehicle 
Parked vehicle 
Stationarv but not parked vehicle, (i. e. one in 
stationary or slow moving traffic) 
Other (please describe) ................ . ............. ...... 
...................... ...... - ...... I .................................... I 
2.19. Do vou think beLng dazzled by glare mav have helped to cause the accident? 
Yes 
Not sure 
No (please go to question 2.21) 
2.20. What was this glare from? 
An oncoming car'5 headlights Other (please describe) ........................................ 
The sun 
........................... ......................... 
2.21. Please describe where you were looking immediately before the accident 
2.22. Was the view out of the vehicle obscured bv? 
A break or mark on the windscreen Other (please descnbe) ................ ................ ............ 
Snow or ice on the vehicle's windows 
Misting on the windows 
Another person or animal inside your vehicle Vision not obscured 
Were you unable to see until too late an object or vehicle that caused you to have the accident 
Yes :1 Not applicable no other vehicles involved (please 
No go to 2.27) 
J Not sure 
2.24. What vehicles or objects were in the accident? 
Another car 
Van 
Truck 
Bus or coach 
Construction vehicle, e. g. JCB 
Bicycle 
Moped or Motorbike 
Pedestrian 
A-n object on the road 
An animal on the road 
An object at the side of the road, e. g. a lamp post 
Other (please describe) .............................................. 
........................................................................................ :1 No other road users or objects involved please go 
to question 1-27 
2.25. What was the nature of the impact with the other objects? 
Front to front, head-on Z-1 Roll over 
Front to side ZI Other (please describe) .................................... 
Side swipe 
Front to rear ............................ ................ ..................................... 
Multiple impacts 
:3 Not sure 
2.26. In total, including your own, how many vehicles were involved in the accident' 
2.27. Did you see what you were in collision with before the accident happened. ' 
Yes 
No (please go to question 2.30) 
Not sure 
2.28. Did you expect a collision? 
Yes 
No 
Not sure 
2.29. Did you think vou could have avoided the collision by any of the following? 
--I I thought it woulý slow down enough No, I saw it too late to avoid it 
I thought I could slow down enough Other (please describe) ............................................. 
I thought it would avoid me 
I thought I could avoid it 
2.30. Do you now think that you were driving too close to a vehicle in front prior to the accident? 
Yes Not sure 
No Not driving behind another vehicle 
2.31. Did the road surface influence the vehicle's handling? 
No (please go to question 2.33) 
Yes, it influenced handling 
Not sure 
2.32. What was the condition of the road? 
Wet, after long dry period 
Wet 
Snow 
ice 
Loose gravel 
J Mud 
L3 Oil 
LJ Other (please describe) ....................................... 
f 
2-33. Approaching the accident scene, were there any roadsigns to indicate a difficult section of road a-head, e. g. 
chevrons on a bend, a warrung of the road narrowing? 
D Yes 
:1 No (please go to question 2.34) 
J Not sure (please go to question 2.34) 
Please describe 
..................................................................................................................................................................... 
2.34. What marked the centre of the road? 
No centre markings 
Barner 
Grass verge 
Double white lines 
Broken Line and single white Line, your side 
Broken line and single white line, other side 
Broken line 
Other (please describe) .............................................. 
........................................................................................ :1 Not sure 
2.35. What was the volume of traffic at the time of the accident? 
Low High 
Medium Traffic jam 
2.36. Was there anv unusual hindrance to the flow of traffic? 
Yes 
No (please go to question 2.38) 
2.37. What was this due to? 
Not sure 
Road works 
J Commuting traffic 
:1 School 
:1 Factory 
Enforced detour, due to an accident 
Other (please describe) .............................................. 
2.38. Did the accident foilow another accident? 
Yes 
No 
Not sure 
2.39. Is there anything else about the accident situation that you would like to mention7 ........................ ..................... 
............................................................................................................................................................................................... 
Section 3: lournev Details 
This section is about the journey such as the weather at the time, how long you had been 
driving and other 
things that may have affected the way you drove. Tick as many boxes as you feel are appropriate. 
3.1. When did the accident happen? 
Month ............................ 
Day of the week ...................... 
Approximate time of the accident .................... AM/PM 
3.2. How Light was it at the time of the accident? 
Dawn Dusk 
Day Night 
3.3. Was there anything special about the day of the accident? 
Day before a public holiday Nothing special 
Day of public holiday Other (please diescribe) 
Day after a public holiday 
Heavy vacation traffic 
3.4. What did you do the day before the accident? 
-1 Holiday Driving less than 4 hours 
Q Driving more than 4 hours Normal working day 
3.5. What was the temperature at the time of the accident? 
Hot Cool 
Warm Cold 
Z) Neutral Not sure 
3.6. Was there any rain, snow or hail at the time of the accident? 
None (please go to question 3.8) Sleet or snow 
Rain or hail Not sure 
3.7. What was the rate? 
Light 
Medium 
CJ Heavy 
3.8. Was there anv wind at the time of the accident? 
None Strong 
Slight Not sure 
Medium 
3.9. What sort of vehicle were you driving at the time of the accident? 
Manufacturer .............................. 
Model ...................................... 
3.10. Year of manufacture or registration year, e. g. P ........................... 
3.11. What colour is the car? 
White 
Black 
Light grey 
Dark grey 
Light blue 
Dark blue 
Light green 
Dark green 
Orange 
Yellow 
Bright red 
Burgundy 
Light brown 
Dark brown 
Silver 
Other (please describe) .............................................. 
3.12. What sort of body does the vehicle have? 
Saloon 
Hatchback 
Estate 
Pickup 
Small van 
3.13. What features does the vehicle have? 
Front wheel drive 
Rear wheel drive 
4 Wheel drive 
Manual gearbox 
Automatic gearbox 
Continuously variable transmission 
Servo assisted braking system 
Convertible 
Coupe 
Other (please describe) .............................................. 
.......................................................... ............................. 
:1 Anti-lock braking system 
ZJ Power steering 
Automatic traction control 
Cruise control 
Other (please describe) .............................................. 
...... I ................................................................................. 
3.14. Including yourself, how many occupants did your vehicle have at the time of the accident? .............. 
3.15. What was the purpose of your journey? 
To or from your place of work or study Other (please describe) .............................................. 
As part of your job 
Social, domestic, pleasure ...................................................................................... 
3 16. What was the direction of the trip in which the accident happened? 
GoLng Other (please describe) .............................................. 
Returning 
Round trip ........................................................................................ 
3.17. How often have you driven along that route? 
-1 Daily Extremely rarely 
At least once a week J First time 
At least once a month Other (please describe) .............................................. Several times a year 
............................... .................................................... 
3.18. What was the total trip distance you planned7 .......... miles 
3.19. What was the distance you actually drove? .......... miles Not sure 
3.20. How long had vou thought the journey would take? .......... hours 
......... minutes 
3.21. How long did the journey take up to the accident? ........ .. hours Not sure 
......... minutes 
3.22. How would you describe the atmosphere in passenger compartment munediately before the accident? 
Neutral, alone or no interaction with passengers Conflict/ argument 
Calm conversation Other (please describe) .............................................. 
Playful 
........................................................................................ 
3 TI. How well do you know the road on which the accident occurred? 
0 Very well CI Not very well 
0 Quite well Q Not at all 
3.24. Did any of the following factors affect the cause of the YES NO MAYBE DON'T 
accident? KNOW 
Being in a hurry 
chased Or Wared. by another road user 
Being in an unfamiliar road layout 
Bting Oustrated by the traffic situation 
Driving so as to impress a passenger or other road user 
Receiving ýencowagernent to do something you ordinarily would El 
not haw- done 
3.25. Did you drink any alcoholic drinks in the 24 hours prior to the accident? 
C] No (please go to the next section) 
(: -I Yes, what type of drink? ...................................... When? ............................ 
3.36. Do you think this may have been a factor in the accident? 
C3 No 
C3 Yes, (please describe) 
.............. ................................................................................ 
....................................................................................................................................... 
........... ..... 
................. 
...................... 
...................... 
................. 
................ 
I 
Section 4: Causes of the 
It is not uncommon for drivers to make minor errors or misjudgements in their driving during the development 
of an accident. This section is about the actions of those involved and any errors or misjudgements that may 
have been made. 
For each of the following, please indicate if you feel it affected the cause of the accident by ticking the appropriate 
box. 
4.1. Immediately before the accident, did you do anything that you 
felt to be reasonable at the time but that other road users may have 
considered to be unexpected? 
BrAked reAy haxd 
Deliberately drove in an errabc course , e. g. swerving to avoid 
something 
Lost control of the vehicie e. g. by skidding on ice 
Gave a misleading signal e. g. signalled and failed to turn or 
turried without signalling 
Had difficulty steering effectively 
Had difficulty braking effectively 
Made a turn or other nianoeuvre from the wrong Lane, e, g. 
turrdng left from the outside lane of a roundabout 
, 
Madea L; turri or 3 point turn in an inappropriate place 
Overtook another vehicle where vou would not normallv do 
Reversing in an inappropriate plactý, c. g. onto a main road 
Vehiclewas either stationan, or barely moving and in a position 
that would have endangered itglf or other road users, e, g. 
waiting to turn at a busy ýuriction 
Drove the wroný4 way up a one wav treet or other re-stricted 
road 
Made some mancieuvre that vou normalIv would not have done, 
e-g. you overtook in a more 
; iskysitnatjo n than you would 
normaUv have done 
Other, (please describe) 
YES NO MAYBE DON'T 
KNOW 
cl D 
-D Cl 
cl D D 
CD Q cl Q 
IE-) 
Fl Q D : -I 
4.2. If you had more experience of the particular vehicle you were driving, do you think you could have avoided 
the accident? 
Q Yes ZI Not sure 
CJ No 
4.3. In your opinion, did another person behave in such a wav that vou consider to be careless? 
Yes' No't applicable (single vehicle accident) 
No Not sure 
Please describe 
4.4 Did another road user behave in a way that was confusing or ambiguous? 
CD Yes CJ Not applicable (single vehicle accident) 
CJ No D Not sure 
Please describe ..................................................................................................................................................................... 
4.5. Immediately before the accident, did another road user do YES NO MAYBE DON'T 
anything that you consider to be unexpected? Please tick as many KNOW 
boxes as you feel are important. 
SingJe vehicle accident (please go to question 4.6) 
Braked really hard Q 
Deliberately drove in an erratic course, e. g. swerving to avoid 
something 
Lost control of the vehicle 
Signalled in a misleading manner, eg. signalled and failed to 
tum turned without signalling 
Thev did not brake effectively Q 
They did not steer effeýtvely 
They made a turn or other manoeuvre from the wrong lane, e. g. 
turned left from the outside lane of a roundabout 
They made aU turn or3 point turn in an inappropriate place Q D 
They overtook another vehicle in a place that you would not a D 
normallv do 
They were revening in an inappropriate place, e. g. onto a main Q 0 F1 
road 
Their vehicle was either stationarv or barely moving and in a D D 
position that would have endangered itself or other road users 
e. g. waiting to turn at a busv junction 
They were driving the wrong way up a one way street or other :J Dý 
restricted road 
Thev ran off the road 
They made a manoeuvre that you would not have done, e. g. they C] ýJ 
overtook in a riskv situation 
Other, (please describe). 
4.6. What was your approximate speed immediately before the accident? ..... .... mph 
Q Not sure 
4.7. Before the accident, did you misjudge the speed of another road user, e. g. by thinking the other road user was 
moving more slowlv than they turned out to be? 
Yes Not applicable (please go to question 4.9) 
No (please go to question 4.9) Not sure 
Please describe 
..................................................................................................................................................................... 
4.8. Before the accident, did you n-dsjudge the distance to another road user, e. g. by thinking the other road user 
was further away than they turned out to be? 
EJ Yes C] Not applicable (please go to question 4.9) 
CI No (please go to question 4.9 Q Not sure 
Please describe ..................................................................................................................................................................... 
I 
4.9. If you had more experience of driving do you think you could have avoided the accident? 
Yes 
No 
Not sure 
I Section 5: Causes of misjudgements 
This section addresses in more detail things that you feel may have contributed to the accident. 
5.1. Did any of the following affect the cause of the accident? 
Distracted by looldrig for something in the vehicle 
Distracted by looking for street names or route dircction, ý 
Distracted by disturbances in your vehicle, e. g. children 
Distracted by problems on your mind at the time 
Felt tired or fatigued 
Felt angry or annoyed 
Felt urýwell 
Felt depressed 
Difficulty in concentrating on driving 
Were late and in a rush 
Felt parkked 
Overconfident in your J ri ving abilities 
The road surface made the car difficult to control 
Tle road layout was r-nisleading, 
The road signs were misleading 
Road signs were i-russing 
Poorly placed road 5ign,. ýi 
Traffic lights were not workingor were misleading 
There was another road user who caused the accident without 
themselves crashing 
You were nervous , vhen driviog 
You could not avoid being involved in xi acLident 
Pedestrians were crossing in an inappropriate place 
YES NO MAYBE DON'T 
KNOW 
El cl 0 cl 
Ll Q 
cl ED 
:1 il cl 
cl U cl 
Z-1 cl 
cl cl 
J cl ca 
Q Cl D 
Q Q 
Cl :1 
j Q cl 
Q Z) 
D Ll 
ZI Q 
Other, (please describe) ........................................................................................... .......................................................... 
3.2. Do you feel your mental and/or physical abilities were impaired before the accident? 
EJ Yes 
No (please go to question 5.4) 
Not sure (please go to question 5.4) 
5.3. What was this due to ? 
Consumption of alcohol El Emotional factors or vour state of mind 
Non-consumption of necessary prescribed drugs Other (please describe) .............. ............................... Consumption of necessary prescribed drugs 
Fatigue ........................................................................................ 
Illness 
5.4. Do you suffer from any disabilities that may have helped to influence the cause of the accident? 
No disabilities D Physical disability 
Visual CJ Other (please describe) .......... ........................... ....... Hearing 
........................................................................................ 
5.5. Do you normally wear spectacles or contact lenses for driving? 
CJ No (please go to question 5.7) 
Yes, worn at the time of the accident 
Yes, not worn at the time of the accident 
5.6. Do you feel dus was a factor in the accident? 
:1 Yes 
No 
Not sure 
5.7. Before the accident, was there a problem or a mechanical failure with the vehicle, such as a blown tyre that 
may have contributed to or caused the accident? 
No (please go to question 5.9) Brake defect 
Sudden tvre deflation Steering defect 
Other tyre fault, e. g. lack of tread, or tvres being at Light defect 
the wrong pressure F-I Other (please describe) .......................................... 
5.8. What was the effect of this? 
Delay in braking 
Loss of effectiveness of brakes 
Pull to one side 
Lack of precision or play in steering system 
........................................................................................ 
Lights didn't work at all 
Reduced visibilitv 
Intermittent light failure 
Other (please describe) ..................... ........................ 
....................................................................................... 
5.9. Were you carrying a load in your vehicle that mav have affected either vour drivuig or the performance of the 
vehicle arýd affecte'd the cause the accident? 
'-I Yes 
No 
Not sure 
5.10. Were there anv other factors that mav have caused the accident? (Please describe) ............................................... 
.............................................................................................................................................................................................. 
Section 6. About vou 
Please tell us a bit about yourself. 
6.1. What was your age last birthday .................. years? 
6.2. Sex Male 
Female 
6.3. Nationalitv .................................... 
6.4. Lengýh of residency in UK' 
From birth 
Resident for less than one vear 
6.3- What is your present marital status? 
Single 
Co-habiting 
Resident for more than one year 
Ln transit/ temporary stay 
Married 
Separated or divorced 
Widowed 
6.6. How manv children under 18 do vou have? ........................ 
o. 7. What is your highest educational qualification' 
Secondarv school, (0 levels) 
Secondary school, (A levels) 
BTech 
City and Guilds 
HN-D/HNC 
Degree 
Higher degree 
Other, (please describe) ....................................... .... 
................................... ..... ... .......................... 11 ................ 
6.8. What is your present employment status? 
:1 Employed full time 
Employed part time 
Unemployed 
Retired 
Housewife/ husband 
Student 
6.9. What kind of work have vou done most of your adult life" e. g. accountant, bus driver, housewife 
.......... I ........................................ I .................................................... ...................................................................................... 
6.10. Are you a professional driver? e. g. a taxi driver or other profession in wl-dch you drive for a large proportion 
of your time, (more than 4 hours a day) 
No 
Yes, (please describe) .................................................................................................... ................................................. 
6 11 What type of driver's licence do you have7 
Provisional 
Full 
6.12. For which type of vehicles is this licence valid? 
Motorcycle 
Car, automatic oniv 
Car, manual and automatic 
PSV 
HGV 
:1 Other (please describe) .................................. ....... 
........................................................................................ 
6.13. Approximately how long have you held this licence? .......................... years 
professional or advanced drivers training? 6.14. Have you had any 
No 
Yes, (Please describe) ...................................................................................................................................................... 
.............................................................................................................................................................................................. 
6.15. Approximately how many miles have you driven in the last year 
Less than 5,000 miles 10,000-15,000 miles Over 20,000 miles 
5,000-10,000 miles 15,000-20,000 miles 
6.16. Please tick if you drive frequently on; 
Motor-ways Dual carriageways 
Other main roads Urban roads 
Rural roads 
6.17. How many minor accidents have you been involved in all together as a driver? A minor accident is one in 
which no-one required medical treatment and the costs of damage to vehicles and property were less then E500. 
Number of minor accidents ......................... 
6.18. How many maýor accidents have you been involved in all together as a driver? A major accident is one Ln 
which either someone required medical treatment or the costs of damage to vehicles and property were more then 
E500 or both. Number of major accidents ......................... 
6.19. Approximatelv how long has it been since your last accident ...................... vears? 
:1 Not applicable 
6.20. Before the accident, how many penalty points did you have on your licence? 
6.21. What is your connection to the vehicle you were driving at the time of the accident? 
Own vehicle :1 Rental 
Spouse's vehicle ZI Other (please describe) ................................ ............. 
Borrowed from other fami-ly member ........................................................................................ Borrowed 
Company car,, car pool 
6.22. Approximately how far have you driven in this vehicle since you acquired it? .................... miles 
6.23. How often have you used this vehicle before? 
Daily Less than once a month 
Several times a week First time 
Several times a month 
6.24. Finally, do you have anv other conu-nents vou would like to make? ...................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................................................................................................... 
..................................................................... I ................................................................................... I ....................... 
Thank you very much for completing this questionnaire and for assisting us with our research. Please return the 
completed questionnaire to Loughborough University in the FREEPOST reply envelope provided. NO STAMP IS 
REQUIRED. 
Dear 
The Vehicle Safety Research Centre, which is part, of Loughborough University, has 
for the last 13 years been researching into the cause of injuries that are sustained in a 
sample of car accidents. The anonymous results from the data collected provide the 
government and motor manufacturers with valuable infon-nation to develop safety 
policy and safer cars. The Centre has worked with the full co-operation of the police 
forces in the East Midlands who provide summary information about who was 
involved in the accident, the type of car, date and time of the accident. The Centre then 
contacts those people involved. 
For the purposes of this research your accident was not sampled, however I have been 
seconded to the Centre to help with my own project on accident causation the aim of 
which is to provide motor manufacturers with a better understanding of some of the 
reasons why motor vehicle accidents are caused so that these manufacturers can find 
ways to reduce the number of accidents in the future by producing improvements in car 
design and implementing new technologies into cars. 
I must emphasise that your returned questionnaire will be completely anonymous, I do 
not require personal details such as your name or vehicle registration number to be 
recorded on them and any comments you make on the questionnaire will in no way be 
attributable to you in the future. Additionally, the individual questionnaires themselves 
and the prepaid return envelopes are not numbered or marked and cannot be traced to a 
given accident. 
Additionally, no information from individual questionnaires will be passed onto anyone 
else under any circumstances. Although this project is being carried out by 
Loughborough University with the assistance of external agencies. this research is 
being carried out independently of these and as such no individual data will be passed 
to them for any reason. 
Finally, the names and addresses of drivers to whom this letter has been sent have not 
been recorded, I would like you to indicate your willingness to participate in this study 
by returning this letter to Loughborough University in the FREEPOST reply envelope 
provided, having ticked the box below. You will then be sent a questionnaire to 
complete and return in another FREEPOST reply envelope. If you do not wish to be 
contacted for this study, please ignore this letter and you will not be contacted again by 
the University for this project. 
Yours sincerely 
Simon Fletcher. (Research Student) 
: 11 am prepared to assist by completing a questionnaire about the causes of motor 
vehicle accidents. 
Dear 
Thank you for retuming my letter indicating your willingness to take part in the current study 
concerned with the causes of motor vehicle accidents. I have enclosed with this letter the 
questionnaire for you to complete and a FREEPOST reply envelope for you to return the 
questionnaire to us at Loughborough University. 
As I outlined in our previous letter, this research is being independently conducted by Loughborough 
University, the aim being to provide motor manufacturers with a better understanding of some of the 
reasons why motor vehicle accidents are caused so that these manufacturers may then develop 
technical solutions to reduce the number of accidents in the future. 
As I stated before, the questionnaires we have distributed are completely anonymous and 
confidential. I do not require any personal details such as the registration number of your vehicle or 
your address so any comments you may make can in no way be attributed to you in the future. In 
addition, neither the questionnaires themselves, or the return envelopes are numbered so cannot be 
traced to any given person or accident. Under no circumstances will any individual questionnaires be 
passed to anyone else, including the external agencies that are assisting this project. 
The questionnaire itself is relatively long and detailed, however, the majority of the questions require 
you to tick a number of appropriate responses so the questionnaire should not take you long to 
complete. Even if you are not sure about an answer, please do not leave the item blank but pick an 
answer that is closest to what you think, It is important that you complete all the sections and answer 
every relevant question. 
I will be sending out a follow-up questionnaire as a reminder in approximately two weeks from now. 
As I will have no way of identifying whether you have previously completed this questionnaire, you 
will receive this follow-up whether you have completed the first questionnaire or not. Please ignore 
the follow-up questionnaire if you have previously completed this questionnaire. Following this, you 
will not be contacted by me for this study again. 
I would like to thank you for completing this questionnaire and for helping us in our research. Please 
return the questionnaire to Loughborough University in the FREEPOST reply envelope provided. 
Yours Sincerely, 
Simon Fletcher. (Research Student) 
Deoartment of Hurnan Sciences 
Loughborough University Loughborough Leicestershire LEI I 3TU UK 
hborough LUonuivgersity 
Dear Driver, 
Loughborough University request your assistance in a research project designed to provide motor 
manufacturers with a better understanding of some of the reasons why motor accidents happen. 
The intention is to provide information to aid the development of car design improvements and 
technologies with a view to reducing accident frequency. 
Attached is a questionnaire which is very detailed, along with a FREEPOST envelope for its return. 
The majority of questions require a tick response and should not take long to complete. If you are 
unsure about an answer please do not leave a blank section, but choose an answer closest to what you 
think. 
This project is being independently conducted by Loughborough University and no information from 
individual questionnaires will be passed onto any other parties. 
The names and addresses of drivers to whom this questionnaire has been sent have not been recorded 
and all returned questionnaires will be completely anonymous. Personal details are not sought, any 
comments made will not be attributable to you in the future. 
Success of the project is dependant on your goodwill, thank ou for taking the time to help Z, yC 
Yours sincerely 
c; 
Simon Fletcher. (Research Student) 
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